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

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THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

PAUL R. ABRAMSON, JOHN H. ALDRICH, PHIL PAOLINO, and DAVID W. ROHDE analyze the independent presidential candidacies of George C. Wallace (1968), John B. Anderson (1980), and H. Ross Perot (1992). Comparing these candidacies, they shed light on problems facing third-party and independent candidates in the United States.

JOSEPH LEPGOLD and TIMOTHY McKEOWN examine the common view that American foreign policy is exceptionally moralistic, mistrustful of entangling commitments, and judgmental about others' domestic affairs. They show empirically that claims of highly unusual U.S. behavior have been exaggerated and suggest a way to reframe the exceptionalist debate.

JOHN HART examines President Clinton's attempt to reduce the size of the presidential staff. He sees this as a badly mismanaged exercise in political symbolism that backfired and argues that it raises doubts about the effectiveness of presidential leadership through symbolic politics.

WALLACE MENDELSON finds "interpretism-noninterpretism" a less than useful approach to constitutional law. The real problem, he suggests via the history of the Ninth Amendment, is artifice versus candor in court opinions.

DEEPA OLLAPALLY analyzes the drawbacks of conventional realism in explaining Third World relations with the United States. She argues that domestic politics and ideology in the Third World are significant variables in foreign policy and utilizes the case of Indo-U.S. relations to suggest that the post-cold war era may hold more difficulties for the United States than expected.

NANCY BERMEO reexamines the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism and argues that we have mistakenly applied it to dictatorships of fundamentally different natures. Comparing the short-lived Greek dictatorship of 1967–1974 to the states that gave rise to the model initially, she shows how misclassification leads us to misperception and erroneous predictions.

In a new *PSQ* section called "Opinion," JAMES R. VAN DE VELDE argues that the United States in August 1945 was fortunate in getting such a stubborn foe as Japan to surrender without an invasion of the homeland. The atomic bomb, far from being unnecessary, secured an early surrender, thus saving Japanese and Allied lives and leading to a benevolent occupation of Japan by American forces.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Third-Party and Independent Candidates in American Politics: Wallace, Anderson, and Perot

PAUL R. ABRAMSON
JOHN H. ALDRICH
PHIL PAOLINO
DAVID W. ROHDE

Between 1852 and 1992 the United States held thirty-six presidential elections. The Democrats won fifteen, the Republicans won the other twenty-one. This duopoly has been threatened from time to time, and Perot's 1992 challenge was remarkably successful in winning popular votes. But no third-party or independent candidate has come close to winning the presidency, largely because the electoral rules in the United States create barriers that third parties and independent candidates have been unable to surmount.[1]

We review U.S. elections since 1832, for these barriers to new political parties were in place even then. The Republicans displaced the Whigs between 1854 and 1860, despite these structural barriers, by changing the issue agenda over slavery.[2] Fortunately for the United States, but unfortunately for third par-

[1] This article emphasizes the reasons third parties fail. For an extensive discussion of the reasons voters do support third-party candidacies, see Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, *Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[2] See John H. Aldrich, *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); William H. Riker, *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982); and Riker, *The Art of Political Manipulation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

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ties, since the Civil War no issue as divisive as slavery has restructured American politics.[3]

We focus on three recent efforts to challenge the two major parties—George C. Wallace's American Independent Party candidacy in 1968, John B. Anderson's independent candidacy in 1980, and H. Ross Perot's independent candidacy in 1992. Several earlier third-party candidacies are as interesting, but for these recent contests we have high quality survey research data that allow us to test propositions about individual-level behavior. Lastly, we discuss presidential elections in the French Fifth Republic, showing how different electoral rules, along with a different political culture, lead to substantially different outcomes.

The Electoral Rules in the United States

The basic rules for electing the president are spelled out in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, as modified by the Twelfth Amendment. The most crucial feature of these rules is that the winning candidate must have a majority of the electoral votes. Under the original provisions for electing the president, each elector cast two votes, both of which were for president, and one of these votes had to be for a candidate from outside the elector's state. If no candidate won a majority of the electoral votes, the U.S. House of Representatives—voting by state delegations—chose among the five candidates with the largest number of electoral votes. If two candidates both had a majority, and if they both had the same number, the House chose between these two majority-winners.

The Twelfth Amendment, ratified shortly before the 1804 election, prevents the outcome that occurred in 1800, when Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr both won a majority of the electoral vote and both won the same number of votes. This tie forced the Federalist-controlled House to choose between Jefferson and Burr, both Democratic–Republicans. Under the Twelfth Amendment, each elector casts a separate vote for president and for vice-president (one of whom must be from outside the elector's state). If no candidate receives a majority of the electoral vote, the House now chooses among the top three candidates—once again voting by state delegations. However, ties among two majority-winners could have been prevented in 1800 or after without constitutional change, for parties could have instructed one or more presidential electors to cast a strategic vote to assure that the party's presidential candidate had more votes than the party's vice presidential candidate. In fact, the Democratic–Republicans in 1800

[3] Race-related issues led to substantial shifts in party support since World War II (see Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), but not to the success of a new political party. For a recent critique of the Carmines and Stimson thesis, see Alan I. Abramowitz, "Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship in the U.S. Electorate," *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (February 1994): 1–24.

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were aware of the dangers of a tie, but believed that their party would win in Rhode Island and that one of the state's four electors would withhold his vote from Burr.[4] The winning party has had electoral votes to spare in every presidential election except 1876, when Rutherfold B. Hayes won by a single electoral vote, and as the Republicans held the Senate (which could have chosen the vice president between the top two candidates, with each senator casting an individual vote) they might have still won the vice presidency.

Reducing the number of eligible candidates from five to three may have affected the outcome of the 1824 election, the only other election decided by the House. Although there was only one political party, the nominee of the Democratic-Republican Congressional Caucus, William Crawford, was challenged, leading to a four-way contest among Crawford, Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and Henry Clay. Jackson won ninety-nine electoral votes, Adams gained eighty-four, Crawford received forty-one, and Clay won thirty-seven. Clay was thus ineligible for election. As Speaker of the House, he had considerable influence, but could not use it to win his own election. Instead, Clay's support proved crucial in securing Adams's election, and his efforts were apparently rewarded when Adams selected him to be secretary of state.

For the next three years, Jackson campaigned for the presidency claiming that a "corrupt bargain" between Adams and Clay had denied him election. These charges helped undermine the Adams presidency. Although presidential election by the House is a legitimate way to gain office, few candidates begin a campaign with election by the House as their goal.

The preferred strategy for gaining the White House is to win a majority of the electoral votes and to be elected without incurring any additional obligations. But some parties and candidates have followed alternative strategies. In 1836, the Whigs ran three presidential candidates against Martin Van Buren, each candidate appealing to a different region. It is not clear what their next step would have been had this strategy led to denying Van Buren a majority of the electoral vote. The strategy of running different presidential candidates in different regions of the country was never tried again.

Wallace was on the ballot in every state in 1968, but he had no realistic chance of winning the 270 electoral votes needed to be elected. Rather, his declared goal was to win enough electoral votes to deny either Richard M. Nixon or Hubert H. Humphrey a majority. All of Wallace's electors were technically unpledged. In principle, Wallace might have bargained with Nixon for his electors, for Nixon wanted to avoid having the House of Representatives determine the outcome. It is difficult to imagine just what sort of bargain Nixon could have made with Wallace that would not have undermined his presidency. As Nixon won a clear majority of the electoral vote, Wallace had no bargaining power.

[4] See Ralph Ketcham, *James Madison: A Biography* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1990).

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Clearly, the House procedure is not seen as a runoff among the three top candidates. From 1828 through 1992 a single presidential candidate has gained a majority of the electoral vote. But even if a third-party or independent candidate did become eligible for election by the House, a legislative body dominated by Democrats and Republicans would be unlikely to turn to an independent. On 16 July 1992, Perot announced that he would not run for president, because he feared that his candidacy would throw the election to the House and that this would be disruptive. Ed Rollins, who had resigned from the Perot campaign days before, claimed that there was a strategy to deal with the eventuality of a House election, but he provided no hint about what that strategy was. The majority-win election rule, then, appears to have promoted stability in presidential elections by encouraging the formation of two major parties to prevent the potentially harmful consequences arising from the election of a president unable to claim a mandate from the majority of the electorate.

It is not just the need for an electoral vote majority that thwarts third-party candidates. The way that states choose their electors also undermines their chances. The Constitution allows each state to select its electors in a manner determined by the state's legislature. Since the Civil War, every state has chosen its electors by popular vote. Every state except Maine and Nebraska chooses its electors by voting for a statewide slate. Maine and Nebraska choose two of their electors by a statewide vote, and then select one elector from each of the state's congressional districts. All of these elections are based upon plurality-vote-win rules. Even states that require runoffs for other offices require no runoffs for choosing presidential electors. In principle, states could allocate their electors by proportional representation, although no state has ever done so. The plurality-vote system chosen by most states creates an additional obstacle to third-party and independent candidacies.

Duverger's Law and the Two-Party System in the United States

The U.S. plurality-vote system can be seen as a confirmation of Duverger's law. According to Maurice Duverger, "le scrutin majoritaire à un seul tour tend au dualisme des partis."[5] Barbara North and Robert North translated this as: "the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two party system."[6] Clearly, by "majoritaire" Duverger meant what we would call a plurality, or what North and North call a "simple majority." By "un seul tour" Duverger meant a system without runoff elections, which for all intents and purposes is an outcome of the plurality-vote decision rule. Duverger explicitly saw the U.S. system for electing presidents as confirming his law. As he writes, "The American procedure corre-

[5] Maurice Duverger, *Les partis politiques*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1958), 247.

[6] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, trans. Barbara North and Robert North (New York: Wiley, 1963), 217.

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sponds to the usual machinery of the simple-majority [plurality] single-ballot system. The absence of a second ballot and of further polls, particularly in the presidential election, constitutes in fact one of the historical reasons for the emergence and the maintenance of the two-party system."[7]

According to Duverger, his law applies for two reasons. First, the plurality-vote-win system has a "mechanical" effect. Third parties or independent candidates may win many votes nationwide, but gain a plurality of the vote in very few electoral units. Second, the plurality-vote-win system has a "psychological" effect. Some voters who prefer a candidate or party that they think cannot win will cast a vote for their first choice among the major-party candidates. This behavior is often called "sophisticated" or "strategic" voting, and is widely known as "tactical" voting in Britain, another democracy with a plurality-vote-win system. William H. Riker defines strategic voting as "voting contrary to one's immediate tastes in order to obtain an advantage in the long run."[8]

The mechanical effect of the U.S. electoral system is easy to demonstrate. Between 1832 and 1992 a total of thirteen third-party or independent presidential candidates received either 5 percent of the popular vote or 5 percent of the electoral vote.[9] Ten of these thirteen candidates received a larger share of the popular vote than they received of the electoral vote. Perot won 18.9 percent of the popular vote without gaining a single electoral vote, because his support was distributed relatively evenly across the country.[10] He finished third in forty-eight states as well as the District of Columbia. He finished second in two states, but in neither did he come close to a plurality, losing by 8 points to Bill Clinton in Maine and by 16 points to George Bush in Utah. Perot came closest to winning a vote in Maine's second congressional district, but even there he trailed Clinton by 5 points. Anderson received a far smaller share of the popular vote (6.6 percent), finishing third in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia and fourth behind Ed Clark (the Libertarian candidate) in Alaska. Wallace did have a regional base, but he too was underrepresented in the electoral college. He gained 13.5 percent of the popular vote, but only 8.5 percent of the electoral vote (including one faithless elector from North Carolina).

[7] Duverger, *Political Parties*, 218. For a discussion of the historical developments leading to Duverger's law, see William H. Riker, "The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," *American Political Science Review* 76 (December 1982): 753–66. For a more recent formulation by Duverger himself, see Duverger, "Duverger's Law Forty Years Later" in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart eds., *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon Press, 1986).

[8] Riker, *The Art of Political Manipulation*, 78.

[9] The complete list of candidates is presented in Paul R. Abramson et al., "The Problem of Third-Party and Independent Candidates in the American Political System: Wallace, Anderson, and Perot in Comparative Perspective" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1994), table 1.

[10] See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, *Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections*, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995), 76.

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Two third-party candidates were overrepresented in the electoral college. In 1860, John C. Breckinridge, the Southern Democrat, won 18.1 percent of the popular vote, but gained 23.8 percent of the electoral vote (including eight electoral votes from South Carolina, where the electors were chosen by the state legislature). Sixty-seven percent of his popular vote came from the slave states, which had somewhat lower turnout among their politically eligible population than states outside the South. Moreover, under the three-fifths rule, the slave population contributed to a state's representation in the U.S. House of Representatives, and, therefore, to representation in the electoral college. In the same election, John Bell, the candidate of the Constitutional Union Party, the last remnant of the Whigs, was neither under nor overrepresented, receiving 12.6 percent of the popular vote and 12.9 percent of the electoral vote.

In 1948, J. Strom Thurmond, the States' Rights Democrat, won only 2.4 percent of the popular vote, but he won 7.3 percent of the electoral votes. Thurmond won 55 percent of his popular vote in the four states that he carried (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina), all of which had low turnout, partly because the large African-American population was disfranchised. He received no popular votes at all in thirty-one of the forty-eight states.

The psychological effects of the plurality-vote system are more difficult to document. The argument that voters should avoid wasting their votes on a candidate who has little chance of winning is well known to politicians and has been used frequently by them. For example, in the 1932 presidential elections in the Weimar Republic, the three major candidates were Paul von Hindenberg, Adolf Hitler, and the Communist candidate, Ernst Thälmann. Campaign posters for Hindenberg did not emphasize his merits. Instead, Hindenberg posters in working-class neighborhoods warned that "a vote for Thälmann is a vote for Hitler," whereas posters aimed at conservative voters warned that "a vote for Hitler is a vote for Thälmann."[11] In that same year, supporters of Franklin D. Roosevelt urged Americans not to waste their vote on Norman Thomas, the Socialist candidate. Thirty-six years later, Thurmond purportedly helped hold South Carolina for Nixon by arguing that "a vote for Wallace is a vote for Humphrey."[12] And in 1992, Perot countered the wasted vote argument with the slogan, "Don't waste your vote on politics as usual."

That politicians make (or refute) the wasted vote argument does not mean that voters act upon it. As the chances that an individual voter will break or create a tie in a presidential election are remote, voters may decide to vote for their first choice, consistent with the logic of John A. Ferejohn and Morris P.

[11] See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2nd. enlarged ed. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1958), 264.

[12] Nadine Cohodas, *Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 400.

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Fiorina's minimax-regret model.[13] Indeed, their model predicts that rational voters never engage in strategic voting.

To demonstrate the presence or absence of sophisticated voting one needs survey data, so we cannot determine whether Hindenberg benefited from his campaign posters.[14] And while American third-party and independent presidential candidates from William Wirt in 1832 through H. Ross Perot in 1992 may have been hurt by the wasted vote argument, we are restricted to examining the psychological effects postulated by Duverger for voters in the 1968, 1980, and 1992 elections.

Before attempting to test for these effects, we want to underscore that even if Wallace, Anderson, and Perot all lost some votes as the result of strategic voting, it seems highly unlikely that they lost enough votes to cost them the election. In fact, it seems likely that all three would have finished second in head-to-head contests against either of the major party candidates they faced. Moreover, it seems likely that Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton were all Condorcet winners. The Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) argued that if there is an outcome that would be preferred by a majority over any other alternative, that outcome should be selected. A candidate who would defeat any of his or her opponents in a head-to-head contest meets this criterion. If there is a three-person contest in which candidate A would defeat candidate B in a head-to-head contest and would also defeat candidate C in a head-to-head contest, candidate A meets the Condorcet criterion. If candidate A wins the actual election, he or she is the Condorcet winner. But since in most elections voters can state a single preference for each office, a candidate can meet the Condorcet criterion but lose the actual election. And there may be no outcome that meets the Condorcet criterion. For example, candidate A might defeat candidate B in a head-to-head contest, candidate B might defeat candidate C, and candidate C might defeat candidate A.[15]

To support the conclusion that Nixon, Reagan, and Clinton were Condorcet winners, we rely upon the "feeling" thermometers in which respondents are asked to evaluate candidates. Respondents who have "Very warm or favorable" feelings toward candidates can score them at 100°, whereas those who have "Very cold or unfavorable" feelings can score them at 0°. A score of 50° indicates "No

[13] John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina, "The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 68 (June 1974): 525–36; "Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and Dancing," *American Political Science Review* 69 (September 1975): 920–25; and "To P or Not to P? Still Asking After All These Years?" (typescript, Harvard University, 1993).

[14] For individual-level evidence suggesting that some voters behave strategically in Britain, see Bruce E. Cain, "Strategic Voting in Britain," *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (August 1978): 639–55. For evidence on Canada, see Jerome H. Black, "The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian Federal Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (August 1978): 609–38.

[15] For a discussion of Condorcet's theory of social choice, see Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

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TABLE 1

Comparative Thermometer Ratings of the Candidates in 1968, 1980, and 1992
(Head-to-Head comparisons in percentages)

Republican versus Democrat		*Republican versus Independent*		*Democrat versus Independent*	
Part A. All Respondents					
1968 Postelection Survey: Candidate Rated First*					
Nixon	48	Nixon	78	Humphrey	72
Tie	13	Tie	7	Tie	7
Humphrey	39	Wallace	16	Wallace	20
Total	100	Total	101	Total	99
(N = 1,302)		(N = 1,290)		(N = 1,293)	
1980 Pre-election Survey: Candidate Rated First					
Reagan	41	Reagan	50	Carter	50
Tie	10	Tie	16	Tie	15
Carter	48	Anderson	34	Anderson	35
Total	99	Total	100	Total	100
(N = 1,521)		(N = 1,378)		(N = 1,384)	
1980 Postelection Survey: Candidate Rated First					
Reagan	48	Reagan	59	Carter	49
Tie	13	Tie	16	Tie	16
Carter	39	Anderson	25	Anderson	35
Total	100	Total	100	Total	100
(N = 1,370)		(N = 1,273)		(N = 1,275)	
1992 Preelection Survey: Candidate Rated First					
Bush	40	Bush	52	Clinton	56
Tie	12	Tie	12	Tie	14
Clinton	49	Perot	35	Perot	30
Total	101	Total	99	Total	100
(N = 2,414)**		(N = 2,295)**		(N = 2,293)**	
1992 Postelection Survey: Candidate Rated First					
Bush	36	Bush	47	Clinton	57
Tie	11	Tie	14	Tie	15
Clinton	53	Perot	39	Perot	28
Total	100	Total	100	Total	100
(N = 2,222)**		(N = 2,178)**		(N = 2,175)**	

Continued

feeling at all." These "thermometer" measures can be used to create a mock election, since voters are very likely to vote for the candidate whom they score highest on this measure. The thermometer measure was used to evaluate the candidates and other political leaders in the 1968 National Election Studies (NES) postelection survey. The 1980 and 1992 NES measured feelings toward the candidates in both the pre- and postelection surveys.

We begin our analysis by analyzing the head-to-head comparisons among all three candidates in all three elections, and these comparisons are presented in Table 1. As we do not know what turnout would have been if voters could make a series of head-to-head comparisons, we begin by examining rankings

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TABLE 1 *Continued*

Republican versus Democrat		*Republican versus Independent*		*Democrat versus Independent*	
Part B. Respondents who Reported Voting for President					
1968 Postelection Survey: Candidate Rated First*					
Nixon	51	Nixon	80	Humphrey	74
Tie	10	Tie	5	Tie	6
Humphrey	39	Wallace	15	Wallace	20
Total	100	Total	100	Total	100
(N = 975)		(N = 969)		(N = 970)	
1980 Pre-election Survey: Candidate Rated First					
Reagan	45	Reagan	51	Carter	47
Tie	9	Tie	15	Tie	14
Carter	46	Anderson	34	Anderson	39
Total	100	Total	100	Total	100
(N = 947)		(N = 886)		(N = 889)	
1980 Postelection Survey: Candidate Rated First					
Reagan	52	Reagan	61	Carter	46
Tie	11	Tie	14	Tie	15
Carter	37	Anderson	26	Anderson	39
Total	100	Total	101	Total	100
(N = 980)		(N = 940)		(N = 937)	
1992 Pre-election Survey: Candidate Rated First					
Bush	41	Bush	52	Clinton	57
Tie	9	Tie	12	Tie	13
Clinton	50	Perot	36	Perot	30
Total	100	Total	100	Total	100
(N = 1,660)**		(N = 1,615)**		(N = 1,614)**	
1992 Postelection Survey: Candidate Rated First					
Bush	37	Bush	47	Clinton	57
Tie	9	Tie	13	Tie	14
Clinton	54	Perot	40	Perot	29
Total	100	Total	100	Total	100
(N = 1,665)**		(N = 1,651)**		(N = 1,647)**	
Part C. Validated Voters (1980 Only)***					
1980 Pre-election Survey: Candidate Rated First					
Reagan	46	Reagan	52	Carter	46
Tie	8	Tie	15	Tie	14
Carter	45	Anderson	33	Anderson	40
Total	99	Total	100	Total	100
(N = 814)		(N = 772)		(N = 775)	
1980 Postelection Survey: Candidate Rated First					
Reagan	53	Reagan	61	Carter	44
Tie	11	Tie	14	Tie	16
Carter	36	Anderson	25	Anderson	40
Total	100	Total	100	Total	100
(N = 767)		(N = 736)		(N = 734)	

Source: The results are based upon our analyses of the National Election Studies.

* Candidate thermometers were not used in the 1968 preelection survey.

** The numbers for 1992 are weighted using the time-series weight.

*** There was no vote validation study in 1968 or 1992. Our procedures for classifying respondents as validated voters or nonvoters follow those described in Paul R. Abramson and William Claggett, "Race-Related Differences in Self-Reported and Validated Turnout," *Journal of Politics* 46 (August 1984): 719–38, except that we classified four validated voters who said they did not vote for president as nonvoters.

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among all respondents. In Part B, we compare rankings among respondents who reported voting for president in the postelection interview. The 1980 NES survey included a vote validation study that checked registration and voting records to determine whether or not respondents actually voted, and in Part C we compare rankings among validated voters.

As Wallace was far more conservative than either Nixon or Humphrey (and thus unattractive to moderates, let alone liberals), it seems highly unlikely that he met the Condorcet criterion. He did not. As the table shows, Wallace would have been badly defeated in a head-to-head contest against either Nixon or Humphrey. When we restrict the analysis to self-reported voters (Part B), Wallace loses by a slightly larger margin. In addition, nearly half the total sample rank Nixon ahead of Humphrey (Part A). Among respondents who report voting, a slight majority rank Nixon ahead of Humphrey (Part B). Nixon, therefore, emerges as the likely Condorcet winner.

A centrist candidate like Anderson is more likely to meet the Condorcet criterion yet lose, because voters discount his chances. But the evidence suggests that Anderson did not meet the Condorcet criterion. Head-to-head thermometer comparisons suggest that he would have finished a distant second to either Ronald Reagan or Jimmy Carter. Ties are reduced when we restrict the analysis to self-reported voters, but the overall ratio of major party supporters to Anderson supporters is not affected (Part B). When we restrict the analysis to validated voters (Part C), the hypothetical race between Carter and Anderson tightens considerably. However, regardless of whether we examine all respondents, self-reported voters, or validated voters, Reagan decisively defeats Anderson in the postelection survey. And Reagan clearly leads Anderson in the pre-election interview.

Table 1 also reminds us of the changing dynamics of the 1980 contest. In the 1980 preelection survey, Carter appears to be the likely Condorcet winner, at least among the entire sample. But when the analysis is restricted to reported voters (Part B), Carter edges out Reagan by only a single percentage point, and when it is restricted to validated voters (Part C) Reagan ekes out a one point margin over Carter. There thus appears to have been no clear Condorcet winner before the election. In the postelection survey, Reagan emerges as the likely Condorcet winner. Almost half the total sample rank Reagan ahead of Carter (Part A), and among both self-reported voters (Part B) and validated voters (Part C), a majority do.

The Perot candidacy is more interesting, because Perot won a far larger percentage of the popular vote than Wallace or Anderson, and also because some critics have argued that he would have won if pre-election polls had not predicted his defeat. Gordon S. Black and Benjamin D. Black reach this conclusion based upon an analysis of the exit polls conducted for the four television networks by Voter Research and Surveys.[16] At the end of the exit poll ballot, respondents

[16] Gordon S. Black and Benjamin D. Black, "'Perot Wins!': The Election That Could Have Been," *The Public Perspective* 4 (January/February 1993): 15–16.

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were asked to check statements that applied to them. One statement read, "Would you have voted for Perot if you thought he had a chance to win?" (About 4,000 respondents were asked this question.) Black and Black report that 36 percent of the respondents said they would have voted for Perot, whereas another 4 percent who did not answer this question had voted for him. As Larry Hugick points out, it is inappropriate to conclude that many of these Clinton or Bush voters would actually have voted for Perot had his chances been viewed as better.[17] It seems more reasonable to infer that many voted for Clinton or for Bush with little enthusiasm, and answered yes merely to voice their frustration. Moreover, as Hugick points out, Gallup polls found that 5 percent of Perot's supporters said they would not vote for him if they thought he could win.

If Gordon and Benjamin Black are correct, Perot should emerge as a winner in a set of head-to-head comparisons using the feeling thermometers. Although voters may be reluctant to "waste" their votes, there is no reason for them to waste their opportunity to score Perot highly. Granted, responses to the feeling thermometer may be affected by how the respondent has voted or (in the case of the pre-election survey) by how he or she plans to vote. To the extent that the respondents' assessments of the candidates' chances affect their ratings on this measure, the measure does not provide an evaluation that is independent of the vote itself. Despite this qualification, the head-to-head rankings in Table 1 strongly suggest that Perot would have lost a two-candidate contest to either Clinton or Bush. Clinton emerges as the likely Condorcet winner in both the pre-election and postelection survey. Steven J. Brams and Samuel Merrill III, who use somewhat different procedures based upon these same data, also conclude that Clinton was the likely Condorcet winner. They also report that Clinton would have been elected if approval voting had been employed.[18]

Although it seems very unlikely that Wallace, Anderson, or Perot lost because of sophisticated voting, all three were probably hurt somewhat by the wasted vote argument. Moreover, even if a relatively small percentage of voters who preferred Wallace voted for Nixon, the net effect of their behavior could have undermined his strategy of preventing either Nixon or Humphrey from winning an electoral vote majority. If Wallace had carried the three states in which he came in second to Nixon (North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee), Nixon could have won only 270 electoral votes, and a faithless elector would have deprived him of a majority. As we will show, there is clearly some evidence consistent with the logic of sophisticated voting.

[17] Larry Hugick, "A Response to Gordon and Benjamin Black: Perot's Own Actions Determined His Fate," *The Public Perspective* 4 (January/February 1993): 17–18.

[18] Steven J. Brams and Samuel Merrill III, "Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential Election Under Approval Voting?" *PS* 27 (March 1994): 39–44. The 1992 NES exaggerates Clinton's support. See Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, *Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections*. However, it seems unlikely that these biases are so great as to call into question the conclusion that Clinton was the likely Condorcet winner.

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Direct tests of strategic voting require that, in addition to feeling thermometer evaluations of the candidates, one must also measure the respondent's assessment of each candidate's chances of winning the election. Measures of these voter assessments proved valuable in demonstrating the presence of sophisticated voting in the 1988 presidential nominating contest.[19] But similar measures were not included in the 1992 NES, nor were they used in the 1968 or 1980 surveys. All the same, the candidate thermometer scores provide important indirect evidence about problems facing third-party and independent candidates.

Table 2 reports voting choices in the 1968, 1980, and 1992 elections controlling by the respondents' three-way ranking of the candidates on the postelection feeling thermometers. In all three elections, those who ranked a major party nominee highest overwhelmingly supported that candidate. Bush suffered a larger percentage of defections of any of the major party candidates, but even he won 93 percent of the vote among respondents who ranked him highest. Wallace won the votes of 84 percent of the voters who ranked him highest, but he was less successful in holding his supporters than the major party candidates.[20]

Anderson, by contrast, won the votes of only 57 percent of the voters who ranked him highest. We find similar results among Anderson supporters who were found by the vote validation study to have actually voted. Among validated voters who ranked Anderson first ($N = 91$), 56 percent voted for him, 18 percent voted for Reagan, and 26 percent voted for Carter. Among validated voters who ranked Reagan first ($N = 323$), 97 percent voted for him, 2 percent voted for Carter, and 1 percent voted for Anderson. And among validated voters who ranked Carter first ($N = 183$), 97 percent voted for him, 3 percent voted for Reagan, and none voted for Anderson. Among voters ranking Perot highest, 79 percent voted for him, while 21 percent defected. This finding supports Gordon and Benjamin Black's claim that Perot was hurt by strategic voting. But it seems implausible that he was hurt enough to cost him the election.

One alternative explanation for the findings in Table 2 is basically methodological. Assuming that voters are reporting their behavior accurately, we have a measure of their behavior on election day. We have a measure of their feelings toward the candidates in a survey conducted about a month or more after the election. Feelings toward the candidates can change after the election, and the rankings of third-party candidates may be more changeable than those of the major party candidates. We cannot test this possibility for 1968, but we can compare pre- and postelection evaluations in 1980 and 1992.

We have elsewhere presented the joint distribution of individual-level rankings before and after each of these elections.[21] The results for 1980 reveal a

[19] See Abramson et al., "'Sophisticated' Voting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries," *American Political Science Review* 86 (March 1992): 55–69.

[20] For evidence that Wallace supporters who voted for Nixon were acting strategically, see Richard F. Bensel and M. Elizabeth Sanders, "The Effect of Electoral Rules on Voting Behavior: The Electoral College and Shift Voting," *Public Choice* 34 (1979): 69–85.

[21] See Abramson et al., "The Problem of Third-Party and Independent Candidates," table 4.

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TABLE 2

Candidate Thermometer Rankings of the Candidates and the Vote: 1968, 1980, and 1992 (in percentages)

First Place in Thermometer Ratings*	Presidential Vote in 1968				
	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace	Total	(Number)
Nixon	96	2	2	100	(418)
Humphrey	2	97	1	100	(353)
Wallace	15	1	84	100	(107)
Nixon-Humphrey tie	39	60	2	101	(67)
Nixon-Wallace tie	[4]	[0]	[5]		(9)
Wallace-Humphrey tie	[0]	[3]	[0]		(3)
Three-way tie	[3]	[4]	[2]		(9)
First Place in Thermometer Ratings*	**Presidential Vote in 1980**				
	Reagan	Carter	Anderson	Total	(Number)
Reagan	97	2	1	100	(409)
Carter	3	97	0	100	(253)
Anderson	18	25	57	100	(111)
Reagan-Carter tie	40	60	0	100	(41)
Reagan-Anderson tie	88	3	9	100	(34)
Carter-Anderson tie	7	67	26	100	(27)
Three-way tie	24	64	12	100	(25)
First Place in Thermometer Ratings*	**Presidential Vote in 1992**				
	Bush	Clinton	Perot	Total	(Number)
Bush	93	2	5	100	(481)**
Clinton	2	95	3	100	(674)**
Perot	9	12	79	100	(233)**
Bush-Clinton tie	50	42	8	100	(72)**
Bush-Perot tie	45	4	51	100	(51)**
Clinton-Perot tie	4	60	36	100	(80)**
Three-way tie	23	40	37	100	(27)**

Source: The results are based upon our analyses of the National Election Studies.

* Based upon the postelection thermometers.

** *The numbers for 1992 are weighted using the time-series weight.*

substantial individual-level shift away from Carter and toward Reagan, reflecting the aggregate-level shift toward Reagan documented by Table 1. Even so, among respondents who ranked Carter first before the election, 71 percent ranked him first after the election. Among those who ranked Reagan first, 88 percent did so after he was elected. But among respondents who ranked Anderson first before the election, only 53 percent ranked him first in the postelection survey. Relatively few respondents switched to Carter. Among respondents who ranked Carter first after his defeat, 84 percent were Carter supporters before the election. By contrast, only 70 percent of those who ranked Reagan first after his victory had ranked him first before the election. Two-thirds of the respondents who ranked Anderson first after the election had ranked him first before the election.

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Our analyses also reveal that evaluations of Perot were less stable than those of Bush and Clinton. Among respondents who ranked Bush first before the election, 74 percent did so after his defeat, while among those who ranked Clinton first, 84 percent did so after his election. But among those who ranked Perot first before the election, only 55 percent ranked him first in the postelection interview. Among respondents who ranked Bush first after his defeat, 83 percent had ranked him first before the election, while among those who had ranked Clinton first, 79 percent had done so before he was elected. Among respondents who ranked Perot first after the election, only 56 percent had ranked him first before the contest. (Perot was not a candidate for the entire period during which the pre-election interviews were conducted. But overall levels of consistent candidate support are only slightly higher among respondents interviewed in October and November than among those interviewed in September.)

Even though we can measure respondents' feelings about the candidates before and after the election, we cannot use the NES surveys to measure their evaluations on election day itself. All the same, respondents who ranked a candidate first both before and after an election were more likely to have ranked him first on election day itself than respondents who switched their rankings. In Table 3 we present the reported vote choice among respondents according to both their pre- and postelection rankings. Among candidates who change their rankings between the pre- and postelection interviews, defection rates are substantially higher than those who do not. As our results make clear, the postelection rankings provide a better predictor of voting choices than the pre-election rankings. Among voters who rank a candidate highest in both the pre- and postelection interview, the vast majority voted for that candidate. Even so, the percentage of consistent Anderson supporters who voted for him is less than the percentage of consistent major party supporters who voted for their first choice. All 275 voters who ranked Reagan first both before and after the election reported voting for him, while 97 percent of the respondents who ranked Carter first both before and after the election voted for Carter. On the other hand, three out of ten respondents who ranked Anderson first both before and after the election voted for either Reagan or Carter. Moreover, similar results obtain if we restrict these analyses to validated voters. Among validated voters who ranked Anderson first both before and after the election ($N = 60$), 70 percent voted for Anderson, 10 percent voted for Reagan, and 20 percent voted for Carter. By contrast, all 220 validated voters who ranked Reagan first both before and after the election reported voting for Reagan. Among the 143 validated voters who ranked Carter first in both the pre- and postelection interview, 97 percent voted for Carter, 3 percent voted for Reagan, and none voted for Anderson.

Perot was more successful in winning the votes of his consistent supporters than Anderson was in holding his. Even so, he was less successful than the major party candidate with consistent support. Among respondents who ranked Clinton highest both before and after his election, 98 percent reported voting for him, while 96 percent of the respondents who ranked Bush highest before and after

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TABLE 3

Candidate Thermometer Rankings of the Candidates in the Pre- and Postelection Interviews and the Vote: 1980 and 1992 (in percentages)

*First Place in Pre-Election Ratings**	*First Place in Postelection Ratings**	*Presidential Vote in 1980*				
		Reagan	*Carter*	*Anderson*	*Total*	*(Number)*
Reagan	Reagan	100	0	0	100	(275)
Reagan	Carter	[1]	[0]	[0]		[1]
Reagan	Anderson	[4]	[0]	[2]		[6]
Carter	Carter	3	97	0	100	(196)
Carter	Reagan	90	10	0	100	(21)
Carter	Anderson	20	70	10	100	(10)
Anderson	Anderson	11	19	70	100	(73)
Anderson	Reagan	89	4	7	100	(28)
Anderson	Carter	[0]	[8]	[0]		[8]
*First Place in Pre-Election Ratings**	*First Place in Postelection Ratings**	*Presidential Vote in 1992*				
		Bush	*Clinton*	*Perot*	*Total*	*(Number)*
Bush	Bush	96	1	3	100	(407)**
Bush	Clinton	38	53	9	100	(24)**
Bush	Perot	33	3	64	100	(29)**
Clinton	Clinton	***	98	2	100	(524)**
Clinton	Bush	[3]	[2]	[0]		[5]**
Clinton	Perot	3	22	74	99	(31)**
Perot	Perot	3	9	88	100	(126)**
Perot	Bush	69	4	27	100	(22)**
Perot	Clinton	3	86	10	99	(29)**

Source: The results are based upon our analyses of the National Election Studies.

* Cases in which respondents tied candidates for first place have been excluded.

** The numbers for 1992 are weighted using the time-series weight.

*** Less than one percent.

his defeat voted for his reelection. But even among voters who ranked Perot first both before and after the election, one out of eight reports voting for one of the major party candidates.

These results strongly suggest that at least some voters responded to the wasted vote argument. Even so, the mechanical effects of the plurality-vote-win system had more of an impact than its psychological effects. In both 1968 and 1992, the system's mechanical effects were strong enough to transform a plurality-vote winner in the popular vote into a majority-vote winner in the electoral college. And while Reagan won a popular vote majority of 50.7 percent in 1980, the mechanical effect transformed that vote into a huge 90.9 percent electoral vote majority. Moreover, as the apparent Condorcet winner won all three elections, it would be difficult to argue that the electoral system led to a pernicious result. Still, the psychological effect appears to have some genuine impact. Riker argues that elites also act on the psychological effect (as noted above in several ways,

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including explicit campaign appeals).[22] That Wallace held nearly the same poll standing in September as Humphrey, but then lost support rapidly while Humphrey's increased, for example, suggests that the institutional base of a major party made elite manipulation more effective for the major parties, and thus reinforced the status-quo, two-party system.

Presidential Voting In France

Although presidential systems are widely used in Latin America and although many newly created democracies have presidential systems, Arend Lijphart classifies only three Western democracies as presidential: the United States, Finland, and France.[23] As Finland has had only one popular vote election for president (held in 1994), it can provide little evidence about the effects of electoral laws upon presidential voting. However, the six popular vote elections of the French Fifth Republic provide insights about the effects of direct popular vote election.

Differences between the French and the U.S. party systems cannot be explained by institutional differences alone. As Philip E. Converse and George Dupeux pointed out, differences between French and American political socialization processes lead to weaker partisan loyalties in France than in the United States.[24] The relative importance of ideology and partisanship in French elections is a subject of debate,[25] but ideological factors are more important in French elections than in most U.S. elections. And there are great differences between the American republic that has been politically stable since 1865 and the French republic in which civilian leaders abandoned power in the face of a threatened military coup as recently as 1958.

But institutional differences are also important in contributing to the French multiparty system, as Converse and Dupeux recognized.[26] As Joseph A. Schlesinger and Mildred Schlesinger demonstrate, the run-off system in legislative

[22] Riker, "The Two-party System and Duverger's Law."

[23] Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

[24] Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 26 (Spring 1962): 1–23; see also Converse and Roy Pierce, *Political Representation in France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

[25] Converse and Pierce, "Comment on Fleury and Lewis-Beck: 'Anchoring the French Voter: Ideology versus Party,'" *Journal of Politics* 55 (November 1993): 1110–17; Christopher J. Fleury and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Anchoring the French Voter: Ideology versus Party," *Journal of Politics* 55 (November 1993): 1100–09; Fleury and Lewis-Beck, "*Déjà Vu* All Over Again: A Comment on the Comment of Converse and Pierce," *Journal of Politics* 55 (November 1993): 1118–26; and Ronald Inglehart and Hans D. Klingemann, "Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-Right Dimension among Western Mass Publics" in Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie, eds., *Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition* (London: Wiley, 1976).

[26] Converse and Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate."

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elections has not only shaped electoral outcomes but the strategies pursued by the political parties.[27]

Nine of the ten National Assembly elections of the Fifth Republic have employed a run-off system, and French presidential elections employ a run-off system as well. To be elected on the first ballot, a candidate needs a majority of the votes cast, and if no candidate receives a majority a run-off is held among the two top candidates. By contrast, to win in the first round of a legislative election, one needs a majority of the votes cast in a single-member district; any candidate with 12.5 percent of the registered voters is eligible to compete in the run-off. There have been only seven presidential elections in the Fifth Republic, and Charles de Gaulle's election in 1958 was by an electoral college of elected officials. In 1962, the Fifth Republic adopted direct presidential elections in a referendum approved by only 62 percent of the voters, and by only 46 percent of those registered to vote. The first direct election was in 1965, when de Gaulle sought a second seven-year term. Even de Gaulle could not win a majority of the vote and was forced into a run-off. After winning the runoff, de Gaulle became France's second directly elected president. The first was Louis Napolean Bonaparte, who was elected president of the Second Republic in 1848.

French presidential elections have many candidates, partly because it is easy to get on the ballot. As France is a unitary system, one qualifies for placement on a national ballot, and does not need to qualify separately in fifty-one electoral units. After the 1974 election, in which a record twelve candidates qualified for the presidential ballot, the requirements for gaining ballot access were tightened somewhat. A candidate must receive signatures from a total of 500 elected officials, and those officials must come from at least thirty of the ninety-six departments. As a further requirement, no more than 10 percent of the signatures can come from any one department. But there are many elected officials in France,[28] and these requirements can be met by relatively obscure candidates. Ten presidential candidates qualified for the ballot in 1981, and nine qualified in 1988 and 1995. Political parties have little control over access to the ballot, but parties do officially support candidates.

The French electoral system may appear to be ideally designed for independent candidates, but no one has ever been elected without party support.[29] De Gaulle claimed to be above the parties, but a Gaullist party (the Union for the New Republic) supported him. In 1969, Georges Pompidou was the leader of

[27] Joseph A. Schlesinger and Mildred Schlesinger, "The Reaffirmation of a Multiparty System in France," *American Political Science Review* 84 (December 1990): 1077–1101; "French Parties and the Legislative Election of 1993," *Party Politics* 1 (July 1995): 367–78.

[28] See Françoise Subileau and Marie-France Toinet, *Les chemins de l'absention: une comparaison Franco-Américaine* (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 1993).

[29] For the complete results for the five direct presidential elections held between 1965 and 1988, see Abramson et al., "The Problem of Third-Party and Independent Candidates," table 6.

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the Union of Democrats for the Republic (the new name of the Gaullists), and in 1974 Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was president of the Independent Republicans. In 1981 François Mitterrand was first secretary of the Socialist party. Jacques Chirac, elected in his third presidential race in 1995, reorganized the Gaullists in 1976. He was president of the Rally for the Republic (the current name of the Gaullists) when he announced his candidacy in November 1994.

Partly because there are so many candidates, a run-off becomes very likely and is widely anticipated by the electorate. In fact, several candidates have qualified for the run-off with a low percentage of the popular vote. In 1981, Mitterrand won only a fourth of the first ballot votes, but overtook Giscard d'Estaing in the run-off. In both 1988 and 1995, Chirac qualified for the run-off with only a fifth of the vote. Chirac was soundly defeated by Mitterrand in the run-off in 1988, but he overtook Lionel Jospin, the Socialist candidate, seven years later.

In addition, a relatively large number of third-or-worse place finishers receive a substantial share of the vote. The contrast with the United States is striking. In the forty-one U.S. presidential elections between 1832 and 1992, only thirteen third-or-worse place finishers received 5 percent or more of the popular vote. In the six French presidential elections between 1965 and 1995, fourteen third-or-worse place finishers won 5 percent or more of the first round vote.

Strategic voting may occur in first-round presidential elections. A voter may recognize that his or her first choice has little chance of qualifying for the run-off, but may have a less favored candidate who has a good chance of qualifying. On the other hand, recognizing that a run-off will be held, voters may choose to vote sincerely on the first ballot, which may account for the large percentage of votes for candidates who have very little chance of winning.

The French experience raises questions that proponents of direct presidential elections in the United States should consider. How would the presidential nomination process work? Would a run-off be required if no candidate gained an absolute majority of the popular vote? Would a lower percentage be sufficient, and, if so, what would that percentage be? Does direct election make a "wrong winner" less likely than the current U.S. system?[30] We will not answer these questions here, but one conclusion seems warranted. Directly electing the president by popular vote would threaten the Republican and Democratic presidential duopoly.

As of today, major electoral change seems unlikely, although some states may adopt the district system employed by Maine and Nebraska. But the plurality-vote-win system does not guarantee major-party dominance, as the Progressive

[30] See David W. Abbott and James P. Levine, *Wrong Winner: The Coming Debacle in the Electoral College* (New York: Praeger, 1991).

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Conservative party in Canada learned in October 1993. Ultimately, no electoral system can protect major political parties from the electorate. But the U.S. system clearly offers considerable protection for the major parties. The Wallace, Anderson, and Perot candidacies illustrate that both the mechanical effects of the electoral system, as well as the psychological effects of the system on individual voters, create serious problems for candidates who challenge two-party dominance.*

* The National Election Studies surveys used in this article were provided by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The Consortium is not responsible for our analyses or our interpretation of these data. We are grateful to Joseph A. Schlesinger and Mildred Schlesinger for their assistance and to Abraham Diskin for his suggestions.

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

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Is American Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis

JOSEPH LEPGOLD
TIMOTHY McKEOWN

At least since Alexis de Tocqueville's era, the only clearly articulated view of American foreign policy has been exceptionalism, which holds that Americans deprecate power politics and old-fashioned diplomacy, mistrust powerful standing armies and entangling peacetime commitments, make moralistic judgments about other people's domestic systems, and believe that liberal values transfer readily to foreign affairs.[1] These dispositions, which seem to rest on the premise that war and peace are polar opposites, are at last consistent with and may help to explain America's oft-noted all-or-nothing approach to foreign commitments. This approach, in turn, is consistent with oscillations between major involvement overseas and significant retrenchment.[2] According to this view, because American values are strongly inconsistent with the methods and objectives of *Realpolitik*, the country has a more messianic, erratic style abroad than has been typical of other great powers.

[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. i (New York: Vintage, 1990), 232–236; Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 148–157; Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 236–245; George Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, expanded edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

[2] Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Concept of a Commitment in International Relations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13 (March 1969); Frank L. Klingberg, "The Historical Alteration of Moods in American Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 4 (January 1952); Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 55–65.

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As prevalent as these claims have been, they have not been tested: we do not know if or in what sense U.S. foreign behavior is idiosyncratic. This article tests the conventional wisdom on these matters in three straightforward ways. Each examines whether an aspect of U.S. behavior discussed prominently in the literature has been atypical of the major powers. We conclude that claims of exceptional U.S. external behavior have been exaggerated, although more research is needed to determine whether other dimensions of U.S. foreign policy that have been widely discussed, such as its presentation to domestic audiences, are indeed highly atypical.

The next section reviews the claims that are made in the literature on American exceptionalism. We then identify questions one would ask were these claims to be taken seriously as hypotheses about behavior and its sources. We then discuss our data, methods, and hypothesis tests. We conclude by discussing what our findings imply for the exceptionalism arguments and by suggesting some directions for future research.

Arguments About American Exceptionalism

A core assertion in the literature on U.S. exceptionalism is that Americans think of war and peace as polar opposites. Peace is held to be the norm, since its advantages have seemed self-evident, while war is viewed as a product of evil leaders. When they do fight, "the American preference is for aggressive actions followed by going home and back to normal as soon as possible."[3] This disposition has been part of a broader self-image, in which America has seen itself as the New World (a classless, politically open society) in sharp contrast to the Old World (composed of feudal societies and, originally, repressive governments). Along with this distinction went another: Old World countries were seen to relate to one another through power, while Americans dealt with the world through commercial and legal mechanisms. This view may simply be a moralistic interpretation of America's insular, sheltered experience,[4] but it is thought to be pervasive. It would follow from this belief that one negotiates seriously only when "peace" is possible – that is, when one's foes have been vanquished and there is no longer a threat to one's values. As Henry Kissinger put it, "the [American] instrument for settling disputes during periods of peace was [seen as] diplomacy, which we conceived as being analogous to commercial negotiations, attaching a disproportionate emphasis to bargaining technique."[5] Ongoing bargaining with adversaries and potential adversaries contradicts these beliefs, since it presumes that war is a continuation of nonforcible interaction by other means rather than something fundamentally different politically.

[3] Barbara Tuchman, "The American People and Military Power in an Historical Perspective" in *America's Security in the 1980s*, Part I, Adelphi Paper No. 173 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 6.

[4] Colin Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 48.

[5] Henry Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 182.

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This dichotomous view of international life is consistent with an American tendency to make many foreign security commitments during periods of conflict but to turn inward after the conflict is over.[6] Frank Klingberg, who first tried to explain these oscillations, did not attach much causal weight to deep-seated feelings that the country had either an "exceptional" mission abroad or none. He simply noted, as one possible explanation for the cycles, that "America, until recently at least, has been in a geographic and economic position which has enabled her to withdraw from world politics more than any other power.[7] But others see the ability to withdraw from involvement abroad, which is not an option for most countries, as an underlying cause of the cyclical patterns in U.S. behavior, even if this observation is not always explicit in their work. Several of them note that absent a national emergency to which Americans can respond at full throttle, Americans tend to grow weary of foreign commitments or the executive's authority to manage them; when "the ambiguities of an imperfect world" intrude, Americans show little tolerance for sustained, contingent strategic interaction.[8]

Because it is believed that Americans see conflict and war as unnatural, scholars agree that they view the instruments and objectives of *Realpolitik* suspiciously, They prefer general principles in foreign affairs, especially moralistic and legal ones, to a context-dependent approach.[9] And because they tend to apply these principles to themselves as well as to others, they normally "feel alienated from the struggle for power among nations."[10] For both reasons, it is believed that the United States can often be expected to lack the flexibility enjoyed by less open political systems.[11]

U.S. attitudes towards military institutions exemplify this. While deeply respectful of technical military prowess, Americans have tended traditionally to view large standing armies as unnecessary and as a threat to liberty. They are thought to be unnecessary because the nation's liberal value system sees conflict as essentially avoidable.[12] They are seen as a threat to liberty because military discipline is incompatible with the open nature of civilian life and because militaries historically have been sinecures for and instruments of the aristocracy.[13] Even though these sentiments characterized feelings toward both the army and

[6] Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory*, 48.

[7] Klingberg, "The Historical Alternation of Moods," 266.

[8] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 57; Hrach Gregorian, "Assessing Congressional Involvement in Foreign Policy: Lessons of the Post-Vietnam Period," *The Review of Politics* 46 (January 1984): 97.

[9] Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, 95-96; Francis Fukuyama, "The Beginning of Foreign Policy," *The New Republic*, 17 and 24 August 1992, 24-25, 28, 30, 32; Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 150.

[10] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 150.

[11] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. i, 234-236.

[12] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. ii, 264.

[13] John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 1 (Winter 1971): 216; Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 153-157.

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navy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Americans have mistrusted armies more. Perhaps referring to the way British soldiers were billeted in colonial homes during the mid-eighteenth century and to the army's greater visibility in general, Thomas Jefferson said that "a naval force can never endanger our liberties, nor occasion bloodshed; a land force would do both."[14] Later, because the army's officer corps was seen as an "aristocratic caste," the "West Point clique" was more a target of populist Jacksonians than the navy.[15]

Just as Americans are thought to see peace and conflict in either-or terms, they are often said to think of other nations' internal practices and institutions as either "good" or "bad," depending on their conformity to individualistic pluralism. Promoting liberal values abroad has thus been seen as a principal U.S. value, although clearly it can also be used to rationalize actions undertaken for other reasons. Observers, therefore, believe that unlike many other peoples, Americans have trouble acting abroad in ways that fail to reflect their internal principles. For instance, America's entry into World War I, although justifiable geopolitically, was sold and understood at home as a crusade for neutrals' rights and democracy.[16] By implication, it is often claimed that Americans resist interacting abroad, short of war, with those of whom they morally disapprove.

These two dichotomies—commitment in emergencies vs. retrenchment in peace and "good" vs. "bad" actors abroad—in turn have been seen to produce a rigid, nonsituational approach to foreign commitments. Nonsituationalism emphasizes the general principle that underlies a commitment more than the rationality of honoring it at any particular time. While there are practical as well as principled reasons for taking this view, American cultural values are also thought to contribute to a nonsituational perspective. Deterrence theorists, for example, have argued that specific pledges matter mainly as symbols of a more general firmness. The moralistic reasoning is as follows: if Americans commit only to good causes, they can have only good allies, and deserting such an ally would be immoral.[17]

In sum, the exceptionalism literature depicts America as more rigid than one would otherwise expect a great power to be. This is largely because its nationalism is based on the perceived superiority of its ideals rather than race or the quest for material advantage.[18] It is said to keep its promises, to refuse to fight for selfish advantage, and to try when possible to promote its ideals abroad. While this interpretation can be dismissed as simply self-serving, there is wide consensus on the main point: in general, America is thought to refuse to play the game of nations on any but its own moralistic terms. Along with George Washington's

[14] Marcus Cunliffe, *Soldiers and Civilians* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 43.

[15] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 156.

[16] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 59; see also Huntington, *American Politics*, 240–245.

[17] Weinstein, "The Concept of a Commitment," 52–53.

[18] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 152. Note, however, the quite different view that race has played a key underlying motivation in shaping American identify; this is found in Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

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maxim that Americans should avoid European alliances, these principles are said to have greatly "simplified" American foreign policy,[19] as compared to countries that follow more flexible strategies.

A Critical Appraisal of the Exceptionalist Argument

We now turn to the questions one would ask about the exceptionalism argument if it were taken seriously as a set of hypotheses about behavior and the sources of behavior. Since the core exceptionalist assertion is that America is an outlier, with behavior patterns unlike those of other major nations, empirical falsification of this claim would cast serious doubts on the argument. A fair test requires that we specify the behavior that is expected to be different and how the degree of difference is to be assessed.

The literature pinpoints three areas in which one might expect America's behavior to differ from others. First, we would expect U.S. military forces to increase and decrease largely independently of those of other major powers before 1941, at least during periods when America was formally at peace. Americans should have been particularly loath during these years to compete with other great powers by building a substantial army, given their *a priori* predilections against it, as well as their distance from countries with major land forces. Not only was the United States able to stand to one side of the European great-power competition; as Tocqueville observed, large armies increase government power[20] and tend to transform low-tax polities in which government is unobtrusive into garrison states. In the absence of serious external threats, those reared to idealize the night-watchman state ought to have resisted this.

This expectation is buttressed by some well known facts. Because America prior to 1940 was not a player in the central balance of power, it did not develop the tightly centralized military staff system of the continental European states and Japan.[21] Indeed, even after that, it still had far more decentralized military institutions than many other countries.[22]

Interestingly, few discussions of the military's impact on government and society by Americans or those commenting on U.S. society explicitly discuss navies. As noted above, this could be because armies were regarded as inherently more obtrusive in British and early American culture. Alternatively, "army" in the early American lexicon could have applied to both land and naval forces generically. It is also possible that the lack of direct criticism of navies might be an implicit geopolitical loophole for an incipient maritime power.

Second, we expect to find that American diplomatic activity has been idiosyncratic as compared to other major states. Rather than viewing the representational

[19] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. i, 234.

[20] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. ii. 268–269.

[21] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), 127.

[22] Samuel P. Huntington, *American Military Strategy*, Policy Papers in International Affairs No. 28 (Berkeley: Institute of International Affairs, University of California, 1986), 30–33.

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and informational functions of emissaries abroad in purely instrumental terms, which would suggest wide diplomatic links and close attention to the links established by others, the exceptionalist arguments imply that Americans have been far more selective and judgmental in this regard. In addition to the relative economic and military insularity the United States enjoyed before 1914, this inference is suggested by the moralistic stance Americans have often taken toward internal developments in other countries, especially revolutions. As Robert Dallek writes:

> Americans have always been at odds with the outside world. And not without reason. Power struggles, wars, authoritarian governments, class divisions, extremes of wealth and poverty, and oppressed minorities were antithetical to American institutions and professed ideals; they made isolation from overseas affairs an attractive option and a fixed principle of foreign policy. . . . When the nation did reach beyond its borders in the period before 1945, its overseas involvements were cast as serving not national gain but larger moral ends.[23]

Since the two centuries of America's national existence have seen much war and especially revolution, the exceptionalist arguments imply that America has ignored large parts of it diplomatically, significantly more so than the other major powers.

It follows that if the exceptionalism argument is correct, Americans should be observed using diplomatic relations with other countries as rewards and punishments for certain kinds of behavior, especially internal behavior, and that other major actors should do much less of this. There is ample anecdotal evidence for this: Woodrow Wilson's refusal to recognize the effective authority of Victoriano Huerta's government in Mexico, the sixteen-year delay in recognizing Soviet control of the Russian Empire, and the delay of almost thirty years before the United States recognized the Communist government on mainland China. In short, Americans tend to equate diplomatic recognition with moral and political approval, while other nations typically do not. Because international law has developed no clear distinctions between recognition of a government's effective existence and recognition as establishing and maintaining diplomatic relations,[24] governments can only indicate disapproval of others by refusing to acknowledge their legal existence. Still, few governments do this, America being the most prominent apparent exception. We thus expect America to have fewer or more irregular diplomatic links than other major powers and to be markedly indifferent in establishing, maintaining, and modifying such links to others' comparable behavior.

Third, for reasons suggested above, we expect the pattern of American foreign security commitments to differ from those of other major states. Not only should there have been significantly fewer U.S. commitments before 1945, but the ones

[23] Robert Dallek, "The Postwar World: Made in the U.S.A." in Sanford J. Ungar, ed., *Estrangement: America and the World* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1985), 29.

[24] Louis Henkin, *How Nations Behave*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 16.

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America has made can be expected to have been more rigid. The reasons for this are long-standing: in his farewell address, George Washington implored his fellow citizens not "to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of [Europe's] politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships and enmities."[25] Later, according to Kissinger, this practical maxim became an ideological value:

> As the United States grew in strength and European rivalries focused on Europe, Africa, and Asia, Americans came to consider the isolation conferred by two great oceans as the normal pattern of foreign relations. . . . American political thought had come increasingly to regard diplomacy with suspicion. Arms and alliances were considered immoral and reactionary.[26]

If America has indeed behaved exceptionally on this dimension, as this suggests, its alliance-making patterns should be markedly different from any other major actor.

Unfortunately, these hypotheses are necessarily imprecise. How would one know whether a state's military investments, diplomatic links abroad, and external commitments have been "exceptional"? To be exceptional means to be unusual or extraordinary, but this leaves us no *a priori* criteria for establishing the degree of difference that matters in assessing international behavior. Moreover, the extant literature provides little guidance, since it hardly ever compares the United States systematically and explicitly to other countries. There is no fully satisfactory solution to this quandary, but we deal with it in two ways. We first assume that the underlying commonality in all of America's allegedly exceptional behavior has been aloofness toward other major actors and relative inattention to the ordinary vicissitudes of their politics. America is presumed in the exceptionalist literature to prefer that it deal with the world on its own terms or not at all. It is explicitly or implicitly assumed not to react closely and consistently to the behavior of other actors. We then assume that such putative standoffishness can be approximately gauged by comparing the degree to which America reacts to other major countries with the others' rates of reactivity. In other words, how does America's degree of policy "elasticity"—its changes in behavior as a function of others' changes—compare to that of others? This implies use of a statistical model that compares national policy elasticities across each of the three variables discussed above.

Data, Methods, and Hypotheses

The data for this project come from three sources. Data on national military expenditures between 1816 and 1985 for each international system member as defined by the Correlates of War project come from COW. This project, con-

[25] Quoted in Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. i, 232.
[26] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 58–59.

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ducted by J. David Singer at the University of Michigan and Melvin Small at Wayne State University, furnished many studies dealing with the causes of international conflict. It also furnished a large data set that many other scholars have used. These are measured annually in thousands of current-year British pounds through 1913 and annually in thousands of current-year U.S. dollars thereafter. Annual army and navy expenditures for Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary from 1871 to 1914 were taken from the Choucri-North *Nations in Conflict* data set; comparable data for the United States were taken from *The Historical Abstracts of the United States*. The number and kind of diplomatic missions received by members of the interstate system from other members (as defined by COW) from 1816 through 1990 were provided by COW, though rank of mission was not recorded for the years 1950–1965. Finally, a list of types and members of interstate alliances that were formed between 1816 and 1990 was provided by COW.

The alliances and diplomatic missions data present some problems that should be briefly noted. First, although alliances were classified according to the COW three-level system of neutrality agreement, entente, and defense pact, they were available only in tabular list form. This precludes statistical tests without completely recoding the data, but there is so little alliance activity for the United States before 1945 that for our purposes such tests are unnecessary. It should also be mentioned that diplomatic missions received by nations were coded by COW only at five-year intervals, which makes it difficult to gauge states' reactivity in a very precise way.

All statistical models used in this paper take the form of Changes in U.S. Behavior is a function of changes in lags of others' behavior, because we are looking at nations' reactivity to other nations. As Kenneth Waltz notes, this *Realpolitik* conception rests on the belief that "the fate of each state depends on its responses to what other states do."[27] This is a simplification, but a defensible one, since some portion of national behavior can be presumed to be a reaction to the external environment. Alan Alexandroff, for instance, found in a quantitative examination of European diplomacy between 1870 and 1890 that others' actions rather than national attributes best explained states' behavior.[28]

Unlike most studies that use quantitative models, we pay no attention to whether particular coefficients on right-hand side variables are statistically significant. We instead examine only the overall goodness-of-fit of the respective equations. This amounts to testing a one-tailed hypothesis: American behavior is less reactive to foreign events than that of other countries. Hence, the goodness-of-fit for the American equations should be significantly less than the goodness-of-fit for the other countries examined. Only this finding would constitute a falsification of the null hypothesis that America is no less reactive to external stimuli than other countries.

[27] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 127.

[28] Alan S. Alexandroff, *The Logic of Diplomacy* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981), 14.

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For two reasons, we are interested in the differences in nations' behavior between times t_0 and t_1 rather than absolute levels. First, differencing the variables weakens the effects of the common trends often found in time series that have grown or decreased in a secular fashion. A second and more substantive reason is that those who have written about strategic behavior in the *Realpolitik* tradition have typically been concerned with prompt reaction by governments to changes in others' behavior. As Edward Gulick put it in describing eighteenth-century diplomacy, to "hold the balance" implied "a ready mobility in the direction of policy. Statesmen must be able to act quickly and expertly in cutting encumbering ties or making new ones as balance necessities dictate. . . ."[29] Aaron Friedberg similarly argues that

> As one actor moves and the other responds, both will have to make more or less continuous assessments of their opponent's intentions and capabilities in order, when necessary, to adjust their own plan of action. Strategic behavior therefore requires both that an actor be open to feedback and that it be able to modulate its own behavior as needed to achieve its objectives.[30]

In essence, those who make the exceptionalism argument claim that the United States has been unwilling or unable to act strategically in this sense.

Results

In general, our data cast doubt on arguments that the United States government has behaved exceptionally abroad. Table 1 displays goodness of fit statistics for regression models of military expenditures for the United States and eight other countries. An amusing result of the analysis is that for the 1871–1914 period the United States actually appears to be the *most* responsive to other powers' military expenditures. In no period is there support for the notion that the United States is uniquely unresponsive to the armaments procurements of other powers.

Table 2 presents the findings of an analysis of naval and army expenditures for the 1871–1914 period. Since maritime powers may be responding more to naval programs than to military spending per se, while continental powers may act similarly with regard to spending on armies, this analysis is a useful safeguard against over interpreting the first set of findings. Moreover, since the United States is generally held to be less attached to the central system in the years before 1914 than afterward, the selection of time period can be said to have been biased toward finding results that distinguish U.S. behavior from that of the other countries. If the United States is not exceptional during this period, when would it ever be?

The general pattern of results in Table 2 provides no support for claims of American exceptionalism in this era. Like Britain, another maritime power,

[29] Edward V. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: Norton, 1955), 67.

[30] Aaron Friedberg, "Is the United States Capable of Acting Strategically?" *Washington Quarterly* 14 (Winter 1991): 5–6.

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TABLE 1

*Variance in Changes in Military Expenditures Explained by Lagged Changes in Other Countries' Military Expenditures (R^2)**

Country	*1871–1914*	*1919–1939*	*1945–1980*
USA	.62	.63	.73
UK	.60	.91	.79
France	.59	.62	.70
Germany	.49	.95	
Italy	.50	.79	.72
Japan	.44	.77	.49
Russia/USSR	.60	.40	.69
Turkey	.22	.30	.29
Austria-Hungary	.50		

* The usual checks for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and collinearity were performed. The results presented here are from conventional Ordinary Least Squares regressions.

the United States is considerably more responsive to changes in others' naval procurements than to changes in their army procurements. It is also noteworthy that the two most responsive powers – France with respect to its army and Austria-Hungary with respect to its navy – were in situations where they were being hard pressed by rising challengers. Responsiveness for such states is at a premium.

Table 3 reports goodness of fit statistics (the likelihood ratio) for multinomial logit regressions of changes in the level of diplomatic representation as a function of lagged changes in the level of other countries' representation. Here there is some support for the notion that the United States is not as responsive as other nations. In the interwar period, changes in U.S. diplomatic representation are the least responsive to changes in others' representation; in the 1871–1914 era the United States is the second least responsive. However, there are several reasons to be cautious about accepting this as evidence for even a weak form of exceptionalism. First, in the interwar period the appropriate data on British diplomatic representation is missing from the COW dataset. Because, in the pre-1914 era, the analysis found that changes in U.S. diplomatic representation

TABLE 2

Changes in Navy and Army Spending as a Function of Lagged Changes in Others' Navy and Army Spending, 1871–1914 (R^2)

Country	*Navy*	*Army*
USA	.27	.14
UK	.26	.04
France	.15	.51
Germany	.09	.08
Russia	.22	.16
Austria-Hungary	.71	.46
Italy	.06	.07

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TABLE 3

Variance in Changes in Diplomatic Representation Explained by Lagged Changes in Other Countries' Representation

	Likelihood Ratio	
Country	*1871–1914*	*1919–1940*
US	279	148
UK	324	insufficient data
France	264	286
Germany	309	150
Italy	395	300
Russia	389	292
Turkey	330	252
Austria-Hungary	352	

were particularly responsive to prior changes in British representation ($p < .018$), the omission of the British data in the interwar period probably results in a deterioration in model performance that hits the American results more strongly than that of the other countries.

A second reason for caution is that although the Americans are the least responsive in the interwar period, the difference between American and German goodness-of-fit is trivial, and no one argues that the Germans were exceptional. Likewise in the 1871–1914 period, the French appear even less responsive than the Americans, and no one argues that the French were exceptional in this period either.

A third reason for caution is that our test of exceptionalism is a bit restrictive. We are essentially testing whether the United States is behaving like a good follower country—not whether it is playing the role of leader. Countries that are leaders might rationally choose in anticipation of how followers will react to their choices, and in that sense be quite responsive to the international system. However, the econometric tests we have presented do not provide for this possibility. This is most likely to be a live issue in the post-1945 era (where data problems preclude presenting any results), but less likely for the earlier periods, where U.S. leadership (except perhaps in the New World) seems a very problematic assumption to make. Of course, this assumption was seldom made before 1945.

As Table 4 indicates, there is somewhat more evidence that American alliance behavior has been unusual, but this must be qualified by comparison to states that were at least somewhat comparably placed geopolitically. We report alliance activity only for the years between the Franco-Prussian War and the beginning of World War II when there was no system-wide war. War years are omitted because exceptionalist arguments stress aversion to peacetime alliances. After the burst of alliance formation in the later 1940s and early 1950s, new alliances by the powers that we examine are confined to a few agreements with less developed countries. Because the alliance patterns of all the countries we study were essen-

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TABLE 4

Total Alliances, Ententes, and Nonaggression Pacts 1871–1914 and 1919–1939

Country	*Number of Pacts*
Russia/USSR	30
Italy/Sardinia	23
France	21
Prussia/Germany	20
Austria-Hungary/Austria	16
Ottoman Empire/Turkey	16
Great Britain	12
Japan	7
United States	2

tially frozen during the cold war, once again it is evident that Americans are not outliers.

It is clear from these data that, although the United States was indeed involved in exceptionally few foreign entanglements in this era, it is not such a large outlier when account is taken of the differences between continental and maritime powers. (Britain, the most alliance-prone of the three maritime countries, was a key player in the European central system and, therefore, had more reasons to interact with those on the continent.) If an aversion to alliances implies exceptionalism, maritime powers as a group are more prone to it than continental states. Still, these results provide the most compelling empirical support in this article for the claim of American exceptionalism.

Discussion and Conclusions

If exceptionalism does not imply exceptional behavior, it may not be a very interesting or important argument. We have looked for evidence that America is an outlier in the three areas emphasized by writers who have made the argument: arms procurement, diplomatic representation, and alliance participation. Only in the case of alliance involvement is the claim of American exceptionalism sustainable for the period prior to the cold war. While America minimized alliance commitments during peacetime before World War II, much the same could be said about Japan and, to a lesser extent, Britain, the other major maritime powers. When one considers as well the other dimensions of comparison—military expenditures and diplomatic representation—there is little evidence that U.S. external behavior has differed radically from other maritime powers.

Of course, the idea that states' external behavior reflects their geopolitical circumstances is not new. Realists have long claimed that the external environment rewards societies that adjust prudently to it.[31] Even large states, for example,

[31] Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory*, 44–45; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 128.

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tend to specialize in land or sea power assets.[32] Our comparison of U.S. naval and army procurement before World War I illustrates this and puts a new twist on the oft-stated U.S. distaste for large standing armies. Because Britain's navy had been her main asset in trying to put down the American colonial revolt, because allied naval power had greatly aided the Americans toward the end of the war, and because the new republic then sought to protect its vulnerable coasts from new threats, U.S. strategic thought from the beginning focused on navies. This predilection was reinforced because the United States also needed a fleet to protect its overseas trade and to conduct much of its domestic commerce, which was concentrated along the coasts. While navies were mistrusted throughout the agricultural sections of the United States for some time after the Revolution, armies were strongly mistrusted in all regions.[33] Finally, because continental states share more land borders with others than maritime states, and because states' war participation is related to uncertainty, which increases with its number of land borders,[34] land powers can be expected to join more defensive alliances than maritime powers to reduce the uncertainty.

Geographic placement and their own naval resources have usually allowed the maritime powers—Britain, the United States, and Japan—to avoid peacetime alliances. Until the twentieth century, for example, Britain's separation from the Eurasian continent allowed it to forego security commitments except in three situations: to fight an ongoing war, to prevent any single power from dominating the continent, and via the so-called two-power (force sizing) standard, to prevent itself from being outclassed at sea by a coalition of the next two strongest maritime powers, France and Russia. Britain's unprecedented peacetime alliance with Japan and the entente with France and Russia before World War I stemmed from a desire to neutralize lesser threats in order to deal with Germany. Similarly, the United States was also able to remain aloof from alliances, since it faced no threat on land after the French were defeated in Canada in 1763,[35] and it had few strategic external interests before 1900. Even after that, arms control could plausibly have been thought to substitute for alliances by acting to reduce uncertainty about other states' behavior and by restraining what they could do. A similar argument applies to Japan.[36]

It follows that U.S. alliance participation, while clearly low before World War II, may thus have been modal behavior for a well protected island nation—

[32] Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory*, 57.

[33] Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 40–41.

[34] Manus Midlarsky, "Power, Uncertainty, and the Onset of International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 18 (September 1974): 419–420.

[35] Tuchman, "The American People and Military Power," 7.

[36] Emily Goldman, "Maintaining Security Systems" in Dan Caldwell and Timothy McKeown, eds., *Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander L. George* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993). For an illuminating discussion of the British view of interwar naval arms control, see John R. Ferris, *Men, Money, and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1919–1926* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

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similar, for example, to Japan's – rather than exceptional. British thinking about alliance commitments during the nineteenth century also fits this pattern. Although long-time Prime Minister Lord Robert Cecil Salisbury saw France as a foe and Germany as a potential friend,

> He wished an alliance with neither power, telling the German Ambassador 'Nous sommes des poissons' (We are fish) and that 'the sea and her chalk cliffs were England's best allies.' He understood both the advantages and weaknesses of sea power and once reminded Queen Victoria (who wanted him to do something about Turkish atrocities in Armenia): 'England's strength lies in her ships, and ships can only operate on the seashore or sea. England alone can do nothing to remedy an inland tyranny.' He described his policy as 'Splendid isolation' and 'the supremacy of the interests of England.'[37]

In fact, the geographic underpinnings of American strategy before 1945 can be seen in reverse during the containment era. Then, because U.S. separation from Eurasia was in large part a strategic handicap, numerous alliances and forward-based troops were put in place to convince the world that separation did not imply aloofness, as it had before.

This interpretation clearly weakens the exceptionalist hypothesis. Indeed, while Stanley Hoffmann devotes over one hundred pages in a book on U.S. foreign policy to America's "national style," he admits that "it would be easy to demonstrate that American foreign-policy moves are no more moral, display no more fervent idealism, and demonstrate no greater religion of law than the policy of others."[38] Yet the exceptionalist argument might be salvaged in a different form, as is suggested by Hoffmann's notion of foreign policy "style." Rather than being atypical abroad, American leaders might use unusual internal justifications, perhaps through idiosyncratic symbols and metaphors.

The language they use to legitimate their policies may have little geopolitical content, leaving only metaphors based on national self-image and values. Why would this be true? In any society, government builds support for its policies by linking them to general societal norms, usually through political symbols that have reference to deeply shared values.[39] For several reasons, American foreign policy symbols seem unusually linked to domestic rather than external values. Because U.S. society was formed before the American state existed in a system of competitive states[40] and was held together by shared ideas rather than religion or blood, American mass society has had little use for the symbols of competitive nationalism in the Old World sense or the geopolitical concepts that went with it. Lacking the shared cognitive maps that other peoples develop to deal with

[37] Robert K. Massie, *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War* (New York: Ballantine, 1991), 201.

[38] Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles*, 126.

[39] Thomas Trout, "Legitimating Post Cold-War Foreign Policy" (paper delivered at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago), 4.

[40] Huntington, *American Politics*, 237.

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tangible disputes over territory and resources, Americans typically do not grasp the politics, history, and social forces out of which foreign policy is typically made elsewhere.[41] U.S. foreign behavior abroad is thus justified through general formulas and slogans, which are present in exaggerated form or "oversold" because the polity rejects the notion of "reason of state."[42] Given the black-and-white character of the domestic value system, it is easier to blame failure on malevolent foreign or domestic actors than to adjust the beliefs.[43]

If we assume that U.S. internal foreign policy justifications are different in this sense from others, as an abundance of literature suggests, why is American behavior not more atypical as well? We briefly suggest two possibilities, both of which deserve fuller exploration elsewhere.

Perhaps foreign policy justifications *do* constrain behavior, if only in some settings, because the audiences that attend to official rationales demand consistent expectations. Paul Anderson argues that a policy rationale must conform to precedents acceptable within the government (and perhaps the wider policy community of pundits and ins-and-outers), since virtually all actors agree on the need to maintain desired and stable expectations abroad.[44] If this is true, contradicting the public rationale for a policy violates a key internal norm.

This in turn raises a large puzzle: why is U.S. behavior less clearly different from other nations than the value-laden public justifications imply? Perhaps U.S. leaders were clever enough during the years of cold war and American economic hegemony to find idealistic interpretations for a variety of actions, as Richard Nixon did when he characterized his relatively flexible détente diplomacy in Wilsonian terms.[45] It is also highly likely that anticommunism often served moralistic as well as geopolitical purposes. Testing this hypothesis would require a close look at the substance and political efficacy of the justifications.

An alternative view is that any contradiction between public rhetoric and American behavior presents no puzzle at all, since justifications do not necessarily constrain what the government actually does. Murray Edelman claims that different constituencies want different goods from government; some are satisfied with "symbolic reassurance," while others demand "tangible resources" or "substantive power."[46] If this is true, or might be so under certain conditions, political leaders might try to segment their public communications according to the demands of the audience, with no expectation that the rationale will in every case reflect or affect substance. American religious groups, for instance, might be

[41] Alan Tonelson, "Why Americans Do Not Think in National-Interest Terms" in W. David Clinton, ed., *Rhetoric, Leadership, and Policy* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), 76; Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles*, 138.

[42] Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton), 139–145.

[43] Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles*, 138.

[44] Paul Anderson, "Justifications and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (November 1981): 740–748.

[45] Stanley Hoffmann, "Will the Balance Balance at Home?" *Foreign Policy* 7 (Summer 1972): 77.

[46] Murray Edelman. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 22.

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interested in either humanitarian or deeply ideological symbols and some token gestures to support them, while portions of the business community might be interested in a different agenda pursued more regularly but quietly. If Edelman is right, the former could have what they want without necessarily contradicting the message sent to other groups. It is not inconsistent for Americans to mistrust militarism and yet to produce a military establishment of high stature and accomplishment.

This second possibility raises a host of issues. In cases where the agendas of different domestic audiences are not so separable, what would allow decision makers to both articulate the principles and symbols demanded by some audiences while acting inconsistently for others? How can they segment audiences so as to offer justifications that will bring them maximum political support? In short, how can one act inconsistently with a principle without having to concede that it is being violated?

While we cannot address these questions here, the force of our argument is that they should be examined. If America is not truly exceptional abroad, something about the public message that surrounds its behavior is unusual. The link between those messages, its actual behavior abroad under different conditions, and the bases of domestic support for it merit further scholarly work.

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President Clinton and The Politics of Symbolism: Cutting the White House Staff

JOHN HART

During the 1992 presidential election campaign, all three candidates embraced the idea of reducing the size of presidential staff, and their almost complete agreement on this problem virtually eliminated it from the agenda of campaign issues. President George Bush, Governor Bill Clinton, and Ross Perot differed only on the precise size of the reduction, and then the difference was marginal. All pledged that they would reduce staff numbers in the White House if elected, and all linked their promise to similar reductions in the size of the congressional staff.[1]

President Bush appeared the boldest of the three candidates, promising to cut the White House staff by one-third, although his pledge was also the most artful. He did not specifically promise to reduce staff numbers, but rather to cut "the operating budget" of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) by one-third and made that conditional on similar staff reductions by Congress. Ross Perot fixed on a 30 percent reduction for both presidential and congressional staffs, and Governor Clinton settled on a 25 percent target for both. Unlike Bush, neither Perot nor Clinton made the White House downsizing dependent on Congress doing the same.

Apart from the one-sentence commitment in Clinton's campaign platform, two sentences in the case of Bush, and three sentences for Perot, little more was said about the size of the presidential staff during the 1992 campaign. The consensus between the three candidates made it a nonissue, although with hindsight some campaign exposure to the finer points of the proposal to downsize the presidential staff might have been beneficial to candidate Clinton. When, as

[1] The candidates' proposals for reducing the White House staff are reproduced in "Blueprints for Cutting U.S. Workforce," *Washington Post*, 26 October 1992.

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president, Clinton announced his intention to implement his campaign pledge shortly after taking office, he embarked on one of the most clumsy and mismanaged initiatives of his first year in the White House.

White House Staff Reductions As a Symbolic Act

Adapting Barbara Hinckley's definition, it may be said that symbolic acts are actions that call forth a larger and usually more complex set of ideas than the basic meaning of the action, in which the intrinsic subject is primarily a vehicle for conveying a broader message.[2] That presidents of the United States engage in symbolic politics is not news, but the task of identifying any particular political gesture by the president as a symbolic act is problematic. Presidential actions can be substantive as well as symbolic. What a president says and does can have real content while simultaneously conveying a broader symbolic message designed to reach a wider audience. Yet, although Murray Edelman points out that "political activities of all kinds require the most exhaustive scrutiny to ascertain whether their chief function is symbolic or substantive,"[3] the literature provides no practical guide on how this exhaustive scrutiny can be applied to separate the two.

To some extent, the recognition of symbolism in presidential politics will always be less than scientific. In much the same way as former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart was able to identify obscenity ("I know it when I see it"[4]), so we are now exposed to so much symbolic political action emanating from the White House, made so transparent by the media, that recognition of symbolic politics becomes instinctive. Yet the absence of a rigorous methodological framework does not necessarily mean that the recognition of symbolism in presidential politics need be a totally subjective exercise. The White House often highlights the symbolic purpose of a particular initiative through statements, speeches, background briefings, and press releases; and these may be utilized as a source of purposive declarations on which one might base a judgment about the balance between symbolism and substance. These purposive declarations then become the core of media reporting. The media decodes them, explains them, criticises them, and, above all, exposes them, because those declarations are essentially strategic tools for the White House. In order to expose strategy, the media must of necessity expose symbolism when it is presented to them, and thus they provide a second source for the detection of symbolic purpose in presidential politics.

Given President Clinton's own purposive declarations about the White House staff reductions and the media's strong reaction to them, there is, in this case, little difficulty in identifying the staff reductions as a symbolic act. The president's announcement of the reduction in staff at a press conference on 9 February 1993

[2] Barbara Hinckley, *The Symbolic Presidency* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 4.
[3] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 43.
[4] *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 12 L. Ed 803–804 (1964).

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dealt with the symbolic intent before discussing the substantive purposes of this exercise. The White House staff cuts were designed in part, the president claimed, to send a message to the American people that the government would be sharing the sacrifices made by them in recent years. The second paragraph of the president's statement said:

> We in Government cannot ask the American people to change if we will not do the same. Most families in this country have had to adjust their priorities and tighten their belts in the last decade. Just about every American business from the smallest hardware store to the largest conglomerate has had to change to meet increased competition. And so, too, the Government must do more and make do with less.[5]

President Clinton did claim a substantive, as well as a symbolic purpose behind the cuts. "I take these steps not simply to save the taxpayers' money," he said, "but also because I believe this smaller White House will actually work better and serve the American people better." But that sentence was followed immediately with a reinforcement of the symbolic purpose when the president stated that: "We have begun a process of revitalization and reorganization that must consume our entire government and not simply its most visible symbol here on Pennsylvania Avenue."[6]

The symbolism behind the White House staff reductions was further reinforced unintentionally in the follow-up to Clinton's media statement. White House reporters were given illustrative charts, a fact sheet, and a briefing by four members of the president's staff, including the then chief-of-staff, Thomas McLarty. In order to counter any possibility that the media might see this as only a symbolic exercise, the third paragraph of the fact sheet began with the terse statement: "The cuts are real."[7] But given the natural suspiciousness of the White House press corps and its rapidly deteriorating relationship with Clinton at the time, such a statement was an invitation to question whether there was any real substance in the proposal at all. Andrea Mitchell of NBC took up that invitation almost as soon as McLarty began responding to questions. "To what extent is this a shell game and more symbol than substance?" she asked. McLarty's reply was that "it is both real and symbolic . . . those reductions are real. They are setting an example. They are sending a clear message."[8]

The symbolic purpose behind the staff reductions was picked up in most of the media reporting the following day. Ann Devroy, who covers the White House for the *Washington Post*, managed to get it into the first paragraph of her story.

[5] "Remarks on Reduction and Reorganization of the White House Staff," 9 February 1993, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 29 (15 February 1993): 162.

[6] Ibid., 163.

[7] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "White House Reorganization: The Facts," 9 February 1993, 1.

[8] The White House Office, Office of the Press Secretary, "Press Briefing by Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty," 9 February 1993, 3.

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> President Clinton yesterday proposed a reduction of 350 people in the White House staff, using some creative accounting to send a symbolic message that his administration will share the sacrifice asked of other Americans when Clinton announces his economic program next week.[9]

Similarly, the *New York Times* also reported the symbolic intent behind the White House staff-reduction initiative and managed to encapsulate two different perspectives on the meaning of that symbolism through the voices of Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole and Fred Wertheimer, the president of Common Cause. After quoting President Clinton's line that goverment must do more and make do with less, Thomas Friedman wrote:

> But the move was greeted with skepticism by Republicans. Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, the minority leader said: "Let's face it, President Clinton's heralded cut in White House staff is primarily a symbolic gesture, especially when employees are merely being transferred and when he is reportedly requesting an additional $3 million taxpayer dollars to bring in dozens of new political appointees."[10]

Wertheimer's perspective was rather more positive. He saw the symbolism as the White House had intended it and told Friedman that: "There is symbolism involved here, which is probably valuable symbolism in trying to show a different approach and doing it by starting on your own home turf."[11] But Wertheimer was just about the only commentator who saw it this way. Almost all the media reporting treated the symbolic purpose of the White House staff cuts with the same skepticism that was expressed by Senator Dole, or with the cynicism hinted at in Ann Devroy's report when she mentioned that the staff reductions were dependent on "creative accounting."

While the media could not be accused of failing to recognize the staff reductions as a symbolic gesture, their understanding of symbolism was not in accord with the way the White House had intended the message to be received. The media took the symbolism to be a substitute for substance, and, because most reporters left the briefing with considerable doubt over the substantive aspects of the proposal, the actual symbolic message quickly became lost in the details of the proposed staff cuts. Indeed, a *Washington Post* editorial, reflecting the general suspicion about this initiative, argued that the symbolism would only be effective if the substance of the proposal was fully realized. "[T]he most visible and credible symbol of a changed White House," said a *Post* writer, "will be evident if Mr. Clinton actually produces, as promised, a staff that's leaner by 25 percent, or 350 real people, when the next fiscal year begins Oct. 1. To be credible, Mr. Clinton will have to pull this off without resorting to shell games, which his recent predecessors played so well."[12]

[9] Ann Devroy, "Clinton Announces Cut in White House Staff," *Washington Post*, 10 February 1993.

[10] Thomas L. Freidman, "Clinton Trimming Lower-Level Aides," *New York Times*, 10 February 1993.

[11] Ibid.

[12] "More White House With Less?" *Washington Post*, 10 February 1993.

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The Design and Presentation of Political Symbolism

According to Al Kamen of the *Washington Post*, Clinton's staffing initiative originated in a memo concocted in the early hours one morning in May 1992 by two campaign aides, Bruce Reed and John Kroger. An unnamed source told Kamen that the memo contained "some of their most wacky ideas," and this one was designed to show that candidate Clinton was serious about cutting government.[13] There is as yet no evidence that much was done to refine the proposal during the later stages of the campaign and transition. Indeed, the member of the Clinton transition team with responsibility for White House staffing, Harold Ickes, was not given a White House staff position when the president-elect announced his team in December 1992.

The symbolic message that the staff cuts were intended to convey was eroded at the initial presentation to the media at the 9 February briefing. The symbolism was swamped by the confusion over what exactly was being cut and undermined by the way the reductions had been calculated. Both the substance of the staff-cutting initiative and the presentation of it by Clinton and his staff led the media to believe that the president was, to use the *Washington Post*'s terminology, "resorting to shell games."

Definition of the White House Staff

The problems started with the confusion created by Clinton's definition of the White House staff. In presenting the proposed staff reductions to the media on 9 February, the president managed to come up with three different definitions of the White House staff in the space of one sentence. He told the press corps:

> The cuts come as part of a quite significant reorganization of the Office of the President. The reorganization will reduce the size of *the President's Office*, including *the White House* and *the Executive Office of the President* by some 350 people . . . *not counting, of course,* [the Office of Management and Budget] *OMB and the Trade Representative's Office* [USTR].[14]

Whatever the president understood by the White House staff, it was not what the media understood. Generally, the media consider the White House staff to be the president's immediate staff in the White House Office, or what Clinton seemed to mean by "the President's Office." What Clinton called "the White House" is more usually known as the Executive Residence, and his definition of the Executive Office of the President, excluding "of course" OMB and the Office of the United States Trade Representative, was completely original. Confusion reigned. OMB and USTR combined contain about 46 percent of the total staff in the Executive Office of the President, but were omitted from the reductions,

[13] Al Kamen, "Taking His Own Advice—Elsewhere," *Washington Post*, 19 July 1993.

[14] "Remarks on Reduction and Reorganization of the White House Staff," 162–163. (Emphasis added.)

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TABLE 1

President Clinton's Staffing Reductions

Division	Bush Staff 11/7/92	Clinton Staff 10/1/93	Clinton Difference
White House Office	470	430	−40
Office of Administration	236	189	−47
Office of Policy Development*	49	50	+1
Council of Economic Advisers	42	35	−7
National Security Council	179	147	−32
Council on Environmental Quality	31	0	−31
National Space Council	44	0	−44
National Critical Materials Council	2	0	−2
Office of National Drug Control Policy	146	25	−121
Office of Science & Technology Policy	51	46	−5
Vice President's Office	48	32	−16
Vice President's Residence	1	1	0
Executive Residence	95	89	−6
Subtotal	1394	1044	−350
Office of Management & Budget**	586	572	−14
Office of U.S. Trade Representative	214	191	−23
Total	2194	1807	−387

Source: Based on White House figures reprinted in U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, 103rd Congress, 1st sess., Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994*, part 3 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), 481–82.

* In the Clinton Administration, the Office of Policy Development covers the National Economic Council, the Domestic Policy Council, and the Office of Environmental Policy.

** Includes staff total for the Office of Federal Procurement Policy.

whereas as the staff of the Executive Residence (the ushers, housekeepers, kitchen staff, etc.) which is not usually considered to be part of the Executive Office of the President, were included (see Table 1). "What the cuts have become," wrote Ann Devroy some eight months after the president announced the plan, "is a study in creative definitions of what constitutes the White House staff."[15]

Numbers

In presenting the proposal, the Clinton team provided the media with very specific details of where the 350 staff reductions were to be made. Symbolic acts need to be dramatic "and empty of realistic detail," Murray Edelman once wrote,[16] but, alas, there was no one on Clinton's staff with expertise in the scholarly

[15] Ann Devroy, "Adding Up Clinton's Cuts," *Washington Post*, 30 September 1993. Had OMB and USTR been included in the total, then the Clinton reductions would have amounted to 16 percent, not 25 percent. Had the White House staff been defined in the generally accepted manner (that is, the White House Office), then the proposed reduction would have been just 9.1 percent.

[16] Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, 9.

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literature on political symbolism. The numbers were so full of detail that they provided all the ammunition a critical media would need to destroy any wider symbolic significance the staff cuts may have had.

There was considerable criticism of the manner in which the Clinton team had calculated existing staffing levels. As a starting point, it took as its baseline the total size of the Bush staff on election day 1992, but this was seen by the media as an artificially inflated level because of the tendency to supplement the White House staff during an election campaign.[17] Ann Devroy later suggested that the inflated base number was quite deliberate:

> The Clinton team also chose to use Election Day to establish its Bush baseline. A source familiar with the calculations said the reason, again, was to inflate the number. The day after the election many detailees went back to their federal agencies, so the Election Day figure was one of the highest employee figures available.[18]

Inevitably, there were questions about precisely which staff positions were being included in the Clinton count. In his 9 February briefing to the media, White House Chief of Staff McLarty made several emphatic statements to the effect that all staff were included:

> In making these calculations, we tried to avoid any budgetary gimmickry. Our definition of total employees includes full and part-time staff, employees borrowed from other federal agencies, detailees, White House fellows, and presidential management interns.
>
> It's a very straightforward calculation and a real one, just like you would do in a business sense. We wanted a head count and a total person count, and not some mathematical calculation. It's a real reduction.[19]

But, as Ann Devroy was quick to point out in her report in the *Washington Post* the following day, the real total of those who are employed in the White House had been glossed over, and thousands of government workers who provide support services for the president had been excluded from the calculations.[20] A subsequent Congressional Research Service report identified three major categories of staff who were not included and numbered in excess of 3,000.[21] Whether

[17] See Devroy, "Adding Up Clinton's Cuts." The criticism had some justification. President Bush did increase staff numbers significantly in the lead up to the election. For example, the staff of the National Space Council increased from eight to forty-four between September and November 1992.

[18] Ann Devroy, "Clinton's Vow to Cut Staff is Half Fulfilled, Aides Say," *Washington Post*, 5 March 1993.

[19] "Press Briefing by Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty," 1, 3.

[20] Devroy, "Clinton Announces Cut in White House Staff." Reporters kept coming back to this point. When President Clinton announced on 30 September that he had fulfilled his pledge to cut the staff by 25 percent, the question of the large number of staff excluded from the calculation was reiterated. See, for example, Gwen Ifill, "Clinton Says He's Met Pledge to Cut Staff by 25%," *New York Times*, 1 October 1993.

[21] Rogelio Garcia, "President Clinton's Proposed Reduction in White House Staff," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 93-476 GOV, 6 May 1993, 4–6.

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or not it was fair to criticize the Clinton proposal for excluding employees like the Secret Service detail, the gardeners who tend the White House grounds, and the White House engineers and maintenance staff, the change reflected a wider and long-standing concern on the part of the media and some members of Congress about the hidden costs of the presidential entourage, an issue that had attracted considerable attention as a consequence of Chief of Staff John Sununu's abuses of White House perks during the Bush presidency.[22] The numbers of staff included in the staff reduction plan thus triggered questions about the numbers not included, which turned out to be an important distraction from the symbolic purpose of the plan and one that made the proposal appear to be somewhat disingenuous, even deceptive.

Exclusion of OMB and USTR

The exclusion of OMB and USTR from the reductions was also highlighted in almost all of the media reporting following the 9 February announcement and in subsequent accounts about the progress of the staff reductions (of which there were a number). The reason why OMB and USTR were excluded from the calculations was alluded to by McLarty but not satisfactorily explained at the time. Not until the end of March, when Director of the Office of Administration Patsy Thomasson testified before a House Appropriations Subcommittee, was a clearer, although still not very convincing explanation given.[23] None of the journalists who stayed with the staff reductions story during 1993 either picked up or accepted the explanation that OMB and USTR were being excluded because those staff units were regarded as cabinet-level agencies by the Clinton administration and were being treated the same as other cabinet-level departments with regard to staff reductions. Journalists remained puzzled by the exclusion of these two large units, and in a follow-up story on the staff reductions in mid-April, Ann Devroy was still asserting that "[t]he White House has never explained why it chose to exclude those offices."[24]

[22] See Charles R. Babcock, "Hard to Pin Down What Taxpayers Give at the Top Office," *Washington Post*, 19 October 1992; and "The Hidden Costs of the White House," *Washington Post*, 3 December 1992; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess., Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, *White House Personnel Act of 1978: To Review Transportation Expenditures Under the Act* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1992).

[23] See U.S. House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st sess., Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994*, Part 3 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), 397.

[24] Ann Devroy, "Defining the Quarter Among the Dollars," *Washington Post*, 14 April 1993. In his 9 February briefing, Chief of Staff McLarty did offer the explanation in a very oblique way. What he said was: "These figures do not include personnel from the Office of Management and Budget and the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, two major Cabinet level agencies that will be directed, along with the rest of the Cabinet, to reduce their spending and streamline their operations." See "Press Briefing by Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty," 1-2. Interestingly, few journalists picked up that the

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The Significance of the Lost Positions

In addition to the arguments over how the cuts were calculated, there was also some doubt about what the actual number of reductions meant in terms of the type of positions that would be lost. This was another detail that McLarty addressed quite specifically in his 9 February briefing for the media: "These reductions will come throughout the White House at all levels. In particular, President Clinton will employ a significantly smaller senior staff than did his predecessor, approximately a 10-percent reduction in senior staff."[25]

Yet, again, there was a mismatch between intent and reality, and the discovery that almost all the positions earmarked to disappear were anything but "senior" further distracted from the symbolic purpose of the Clinton initiative. In this respect, McLarty's reference to reductions in senior staff positions invited particular suspicion, because just three days earlier dismissal notices had been sent to a number of nonpolitical, "career" staff in the White House correspondence unit who in no way could be regarded as senior.[26] The suspicion even got through to members of Congress, and when the executive secretary of the National Security Council testified on the NSC staff budget before the House Appropriations Subcommitee, he was forced to admit that all the staff reductions for the NSC would be drawn from the ranks of detailees working for the NSC. There would be no reductions at all in the number of permanent NSC staff.[27] Moreover, under unusually intense questioning from a freshman Republican member of the Appropriations Subcommittee, it was revealed that the NSC was planning a 38 percent increase in its senior staff.[28]

Savings

Apart from the distractions, suspicion, and cynicism triggered by the details of numbers, White House claims about the cost savings generated by the staff cuts also served to undermine the symbolic purpose of the staff-cutting initiative.

"Millions of dollars will be saved by this reorganization," claimed President Clinton when he announced his staff-reduction initiative.[29] The savings were to come from 350 fewer staff, a reduction in the salaries of the senior staff of between 6 and 10 percent, and a restriction on the use of some of the White House staff perks like portal-to-portal car service. In his media briefing, Chief

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Office of National Drug Control Policy was also to be given a seat at the Cabinet table yet was earmarked to lose over 80 percent of its staff under the Clinton scheme.

[25] "Press Briefing by Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty," 1

[26] Ann Devroy, "Clinton Releases 'Worker Bees,'" *Washington Post*, 7 February 1993.

[27] U.S. House of Representatives, *Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994*, part 3, 762

[28] Ibid., 786.

[29] "Remarks on Reduction and Reorganization of the White House Staff," 163.

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of Staff McLarty was more specific. He estimated at least $10 million in savings, and saw this as both substantive and symbolic:

> I think in any business, any organization, any governmental activity, you really have to start in a very real way, but in a symbolic way. These are meaningful reductions and will produce real savings . . . we expect to be able to achieve at least $10 million in savings as we submit the budget to Congress. Those are real dollars.[30]

The large sum of taxpayers' money to be saved by the staff cuts was a vital part of the symbolic message, and that was picked up by the media. The headline for the *New York Times* report the following day was "Clinton Trimming Lower Level Aides—Savings of $10 million a Year Seen at the White House."[31] But the symbolism stopped there. When the White House presented its budget request for fiscal year 1994 to the House Appropriations Subcommittee at the end of March, it requested increases, not reductions, in the annual appropriation for several EOP units. The damage this did to the symbolic purpose of the staff cuts was illustrated by the remarks of Ernest Istook, a Republican freshman member of the Committee on Appropriations, in an exchange with Patsy Thomasson:

> Ms. THOMASSON: . . . we are talking about real cuts, as we are in many agencies within the Executive Office of the President. When you are going down by 222 total FTEs [Full-Time Equivalent], that is a substantial cut.
>
> Mr. ISTOOK: Well, but again it depends on your definition of "cut" there on the overall dollars, because I think the White House has sought to give people the impression that cuts mean people removed from the government payroll and are dollars saved to the taxpayers.
>
> But do I understand correctly in the particular portions that you are here to speak about today, the Office of Administration has a $400,000 increase in its budget being sought? The Office of Policy Development is seeking about $1.4 million increase?
>
> The Special Assistance to the President, about $120,000? And then the White House Office itself, an increase of something like $3.6 million?
>
> That those are the round figures of what you are seeking for those parts of [the] White House budget.
>
> Ms. THOMASSON: Yes. But in terms of our $10 million savings, that is across the board within the entire Executive Office of the President.[32]

[30] "Press Briefing by Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty," 5

[31] *New York Times*, 10 February 1993.

[32] U.S. House of Representatives, *Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994*, part 3, 401.

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The president's spokesperson went on to point out in some detail that the overall budget request for the Executive Office of the President was more than $10 million less than the budget request submitted in the last year of the Bush administration. She identified specifically which of the EOP agencies were bearing the burden of the cuts imposed by President Clinton, but the fact that the White House had requested increases in the budget for other EOP units, and a large one for the White House Office, was sufficient to counteract the symbolism.

The damage was compounded when in May the White House created a precedent and went back to Congress for the first time in the memory of members of the subcommittee with a request for a supplemental appropriation of over $7 million for the White House Office and over $4 million for the Office of Administration.[33] Both the increases requested for fiscal year 1994 and the supplemental for fiscal year 1993 were prominently reported by journalists who had been following this story on a regular basis.[34]

There are always difficulties with attempting to reduce the presidential staff budget by reducing staff, because personnel compensation generally constitutes less than half the total of the EOP budget, and it is quite possible that the non-personnel compensation parts of the EOP budget (travel, transportation, rental payments, utilities, equipment, etc.) can increase when the cost of staff is falling. In the case of the Clinton administration, a lot of the increase requested was attributable to these other costs, but the fact that there was an element of increased staff costs, some of which was being justified by the need to increase the number of senior, professional staff,[35] was enough to provide a focus for critics and a distraction from the symbolic impact of the overall level of staff reductions and cost savings claimed by the White House.

Symbolism Encounters Symbolism

The final miscalculation in the presentation of the staff-reduction initiative was the most ironic and one that involved a conflict of symbolisms. It was an instance where the symbolic purpose of the staff reductions was counteracted by the symbolism associated with the target of the cuts.

Although during the election campaign and the transition period, the 25 percent staff reduction was cast in terms of the White House staff, when the initiative was announced on 9 February, the most significant cuts, at least numerically, came from second-order agencies within the Executive Office of the President, rather than the White House Office (see Table 1). The Office of National Drug

[33] Ibid., 821.

[34] See, for example, Devroy, "Adding Up Clinton's Cuts"; Devroy, "Defining the Quarter Among the Dollars"; Timothy J. Burger, "White House Agencies Ask Hefty Budget Hikes," *Roll Call*, 22 March 1993, 1.

[35] Especially in the case of the Office of Policy Development. See U.S. House of Representatives, *Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994*, part 3, 374.

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Control Policy was to carry over one-third of the total staff cuts, and another 20 percent of the overall reductions were to be realized by abolishing the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the National Space Council.

The oldest of these agencies, the Council on Environmental Quality, was itself little more than symbolic. Established in the EOP in 1969 by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, without much enthusiasm from President Richard Nixon, its work has been peripheral to the day-to-day concerns of Nixon and his successors. The council and its staff are even located peripherally in a small office in Jackson Place, not in the Old or the New Executive Office Buildings. The establishment of the CEQ was a symbolic gesture designed to show the environmental lobby that its voice would be heard at the highest level of government. But for the fear of offending the environmental lobby, the council's functions could easily have been absorbed within the Department of the Interior, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or, if it had to be in the EOP, the Office of Policy Development.

The fact that the strongly pro-environment Clinton administration proposed to replace the CEQ with a much more effective environmental policy coordination unit in the White House and also elevate the Environmental Protection Agency in a cabinet-level department,[36] did not satisfy the environment lobby. CEQ proved to be an excellent example of symbolism that worked. Not only was the abolition of CEQ opposed in Congress, but its opponents successfully threatened to hold up the passage of President Clinton's legislation changing the status of the EPA until he backed-down on the CEQ.[37] Moreover, Congress even refused to accept the staff reductions for CEQ and actually approved appropriations to cover ten CEQ staff that the president did not want.

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was not unlike the CEQ. Both agencies were established by Congress in response to difficult policy problems when there were no obvious policy solutions to those problems. ONDCP came into being on the first day of the Bush presidency, but it differed from the CEQ in that it was given substantial statutory responsibilities and a very large staff. However, ONDCP's performance did not match those responsibilities and resources, and as its staff numbers grew, all it seemed to be achieving was a reputation as a dumping ground for political supporters of the president.[38]

[36] See "Remarks Announcing a New Environmental Policy," 8 February 1993, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 29 (15 February 1993): 159–160.

[37] See Tim Kenworthy, "Clinton Plan on CEQ Sparks Tiff with Environmentalists," *Washington Post*, 25 March 1993; Gary Lee, "Bipartisan House Bill Backs Efforts to Elevate EPA to Cabinet Status," *Washington Post*, 4 November 1993.

[38] See, for example, the unusually critical comments of President Bush's director of ONDCP in House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess., Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1993*, part 3 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), 324–442. The charge that ONDCP was a dumping ground for political appointees was made by the Clinton administration. See The White House, "White House Reorganization: The Facts," 9 February 1993, 2.

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President Clinton proposed a drastic reduction of the staff of ONDCP from 146 to 25, but he also promised that the new director of ONDCP would have cabinet status and claimed the downsizing of the office was part of a deliberate strategy to make drug control policy more effective. As with CEQ, the Clinton initiative was resisted. Because of its location within the Executive Office of the President, ONDCP had become a symbol of the importance attached to the drug problem by the federal government, and this symbolism overrode the symbolism of the staff reductions. Again, Congress refused to accept the staff cuts and appropriated funds for an additional fifteen ONDCP staff posts over and above what the president wanted.[39]

Why the Staff-Cutting Initiative Failed

The symbolism in President Clinton's staff reduction initiative failed to have much impact, because the substantive details of the proposal obliterated the broader symbolic message. The symbolism on its own was simple, but the substance was complex. It invited questions, doubts, cynicism, and, eventually, disbelief. The reaction to the initiative by two key presidential constituencies—the media and Congress—was an indication that the relationship between the symbolic purpose and the real content had not been considered adequately in the design of the proposal, and because the content generated cynicism, one can reasonably assume that the symbolism was similarly tainted. Indeed, if the target of the symbolism was intended to be the mass public, then one might also reasonably assume that it never reached its destination at all.[40] An elite group from the media and Congress hijacked the symbolism and turned the symbolic message into what must have seemed to the nonspecialist an arcane debate about how large was the White House staff.

Much of what went wrong with the Clinton staff-cutting initiative stemmed from a lack of institutional knowledge and experience in the White House. The initiative was announced just twenty days after President Clinton's inauguration. It had been put together by a White House team that was primarily concerned with the symbolic aspects of the proposal and had little grasp of the substantive

[39] See U.S. House of Representatives, *Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1995*, part 3, 26.

[40] On this point, I depart from the conventional scholarly widsom on political symbolism. The literature ascribes a significant role to the receiver of symbolic communication. The definition of a symbol depends not so much on how the symbolic gesture is designed and presented, but rather on how it is received. According to Elder and Cobb, a symbol only arises "from the process of attributing meaning to an object." They claim that the symbol has no meaning beyond that which an individual gives it. "An object becomes a symbol when people endow it with meaning, value, or significance." See Charles D. Elder and Roger W. Cobb, *The Political Uses of Symbols* (New York: Longman, 1983), 29. Edelman goes even further, claiming that "the meaning of symbolic acts can only come from the psychological needs of the respondents; and it can only be known from their responses." See Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, 7.

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problems of calculating and cutting the size of the White House staff. Ann Devroy, who pursued the staff reductions story tenaciously for the *Washington Post*, found a White House aide who on the deepest of background told her that the staff cuts had become "the quintessential Washington game." Devroy reported that the view inside the White House was that "[a]n unrealistic pledge made by a candidate without knowledge of the White House operation must now be kept because of its symbolism and because otherwise Republicans in Congress would make an issue out of it."[41]

This is consistent with evidence contained in a lengthy article about Clinton's management of the White House written for the *Los Angeles Times* by Jack Nelson and Robert J. Donovan in which they reported among other things that Clinton's transition team assigned no one to study the workings of the White House and subsequently "made staffing decisions with an eye to rewarding loyal campaign workers instead of considering the broader task of governing." Like Ann Devroy, they managed to find "a senior Clinton aide" who told them that: "Failing to develop White House strategies was an insane decision. We knew more about FEMA and the Tuna Commission than we did about the White House. We arrived not knowing what was here, had never worked together, had never worked in these positions."[42]

But the symbolic side of the exercise needed management too. The assumption in the White House seemed to have been that, having decided on a symbolic gesture, the symbolism would speak for itself, because such is the potency and power of symbolic political action. In this case, that was an erroneous assumption. The particular symbol used by President Clinton on this occasion was not so obviously powerful in terms of its capacity to spread the message that government is doing more and making do with less. Judging by the public's cynicism about the ability of government to control itself, it may be that the basic symbolism was intrinsically weak. If it was, then the fact that it was riddled with detail and complexity did not help to impress that message on a skeptical public.

The need to manage symbolism carefully was particularly relevant in this case, because to some extent the symbolic impact of the White House staff cuts was undermined long before Clinton announced his initiative. In part, Clinton was the victim of a similar initiative launched by President Jimmy Carter some sixteen years earlier. Carter was exposed when he tried to cut the White House staff by one-third during his first year in office, because a large number of his proposed staff cuts were achieved by moving staff out of the White House Office and creating a new unit in the EOP to house them. Once that had been interpreted by one reputable journalist as a "book-keeping gimmick," Carter never recovered his credibility on this issue.[43] To what extent the Carter experience provided a

[41] Devroy, "Adding Up Clinton's Cuts."

[42] Jack Nelson and Robert J. Donovan, "The Education of a President," *Los Angeles Times Magazine*, 1 August 1993.

[43] See Dom Bonafede, "The Mystery of the Executive Office Budget," *National Journal*, 16 June 1979, 1006.

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cue for the media's treatment of Clinton's initiative is uncertain, but not beyond the bounds of possibility. The White House press corps covering Clinton was aware of the Carter precedent (it was mentioned at the 9 February media briefing), but the transcript of that briefing does suggest that White House Chief of Staff McLarty was not as familiar with it as the media was. Early on in the briefing, McLarty made the claim that "this is the first time, at least that I can recall, that a White House has reduced the size of its staff," and that prompted a reminder from one journalist that Carter had done much the same thing.[44] The cynicism that surrounded Carter's attempt at White House staff reductions may have established conventional wisdom about staff-cutting initiatives, and President Clinton may have suffered accordingly. In the eyes of the media, at least, the act of reducing staff numbers was associated with gimmickry and deception, and this was not the ideal environment for the launching of Clinton's symbolic gesture.

Finally, the fate of President Clinton's staff reduction initiative also invites some consideration of the lack of institutional memory and institutional continuity in the White House. What may be more disturbing than the treatment the president's initiative received from the media and Congress was the possibility that it was formulated with so little awareness and knowledge of the very institution in which the policy designers were operating. That may have been the fault of the Clinton team in not wanting to seek advice, but it also raises questions about the kind of advisory mechanisms within the presidential staff system. One might well ask whether there was any capacity in the White House that could have advised the new president, before he announced his plan, that one of his predecessors tried to do almost the same thing on presidential staffing in almost the same way and failed badly? If one did, the answer would be that, apart from a neglected and understaffed Executive Clerk's Office and a few nonpolitical appointees in the Office of Administration, there is nothing in the White House structure that is charged with advising the president on the institution of the presidency. And as long as there is more institutional memory among the White House press corps than the White House staff, incoming presidents are likely to be institutionally vulnerable when they try to do anything about the presidency.

The Consequences of Staff-Reduction Symbolism

The mismanagement of this exercise in symbolic politics hurt the institutional presidency more than it damaged the symbolic presidency. Indeed, this was not the first time that presidents have failed to manipulate symbolism successfully.[45]

[44] "Press Briefing by Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty," 4. In fact, when the journalist concerned mentioned Cousin Cheap—the nickname given to the President's cousin Hugh Carter—who was in charge of implementing the staff reductions, the White House press corps, so the transcript indicates, broke out in laughter.

[45] See George C. Edwards III, *The Public Presidency* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 68–70.

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If President Clinton drew any lessons from this early encounter with political symbolism, then the overused symbolic presidency may be the beneficiary in the longer term. But the institutional presidency suffered badly.

Perhaps the most unfortunate consequence of the response to Clinton's staff reductions was that it obscured some of the more positive aspects of the proposal, particularly the intention to abolish the Council on Environmental Quality and the National Space Council and to change the function of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. All three agencies had been dumped in the Executive Office by Congress largely to create the impression of a serious response to a major political problem of the time. In this respect, Clinton was the first occupant of the White House to challenge this practice and to say to Congress that gestures like these serve no real purpose, particularly when such bodies are subsequently ignored by presidents.

President Clinton proposed replacing the CEQ with an Office of Environmental Policy (to be part of the Office of Policy Development) that would have a much more central position in coordinating environmental policy and a much higher status than the CEQ had ever had. The National Space Council served no real purpose. It rarely met, was allocated just a handful of staff, and its only use to Bush was as a vehicle for employing additional staff in the run-up to the presidential election. While Clinton quite sensibly proposed to abolish the structure, the advisory functions of the council were transferred to the Office of Science and Technology Policy, which was an appropriate place to locate them. The Office of National Drug Control Policy, as it functioned during the Bush administration, also ought not to have been in the EOP. It had taken on policy implementation functions and was behaving more like an executive branch department than a presidential staff unit. The Clinton restructuring of ONDCP, of which the drastic reduction in staff was a part, was designed to improve the policy advice and coordination functions of the unit and hand back the implementation responsibilities to the relevant departments and to state and local authorities.

A second consequence of the way in which the staff-cutting proposal was designed and presented was the damage it did to the president's relations with Congress in respect to the usual way Congress handles matters of presidential staffing. In the past, the tradition of comity has governed the degree of congressional involvement in matters concerning presidential staffing,[46] but that tradition has come under challenge during the Clinton presidency. Since Clinton has been in the White House, the House Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations—the body that carries the major regular oversight responsibility for the presidential staff—has noticeably intensified its scrutiny of the EOP budget request and has been asking hundreds of detailed questions about presidential staffing arrangements that were previously not gener-

[46] See John Hart, *The Presidential Branch: From Washington to Clinton* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), chap. 5.

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ally regarded as a matter of concern. Part of this can be explained by a significant turnover in the membership of the subcommittee in recent years, combined with an unusual level of partisan aggressiveness from two of the Republican members of what had been a traditionally bipartisan body. But the Clinton staff reduction proposal gave the Republicans a peg on which to hang their partisanship, and as a consequence, relations between the subcommittee and the White House must be considered to be poorer than at any time since Watergate. During the 1994 hearings, the White House spokesperson, Patsy Thomasson, was subjected to a stream of complaints from the ranking Republican on the subcommittee about the failure to respond to inquiries made by the subcommittee, providing evasive answers to questions, and refusing to send witnesses that were requested to appear before the subcommittee.[47] Much of this was triggered by the presentation of the staffing reduction exercise the year before. One of those Republicans, Frank Wolf (now chairman of the subcommittee), took his complaints to the floor of the House later in the year where he charged that the Clinton staff reduction was a "lie" and was "unethical," accusations that he subsequently published as an op-ed piece in the *Washington Times*.[48]

On the Senate side, there was just as much criticism about the manner in which the staff reductions had been presented. Senator Dennis DeConcini, a member of the Appropriations Subcommittee, publicly vented his anger at being presented with the staff cuts along with the supplemental appropriation request and was particularly annoyed over not being consulted about the staff cuts for ONDCP.[49]

These observations are not meant to suggest that the tradition of comity is in danger of collapsing, but it has been weakening during the Clinton regime. The weakening of comity increases the possibility that Congress will intrude even more on what is regarded as a presidential housekeeping matter. Clinton has already seen the consequences of this in his inability to abolish the CEQ and to reduce the ONDCP staff as much as he wanted to. The scope for challenging the principle of comity is, of course, even greater under divided government.

One other consequence of Clinton's staff reductions was that it left the White House understaffed. Congressman Wolf's attack on the credibility of the staff cuts prompted a response from the president in which he admitted that the White House workload had been affected by the staff cuts and, unwittingly, contradicted an earlier claim about the efficiencies that would result from the cuts: "This

[47] U.S. House of Representatives, *Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1995*, part 3, 406.

[48] See Ann Devroy, "President Defends Claim of 25% Staff Reduction," *Washington Post*, 1 October 1993; Frank Wolf, "The White House Cuts Aren't What Was Promised," *Washington Times*, 4 October 1993.

[49] Kevin Merida, "Senate Panel Questions Cuts and Accounting at White House," *Washington Post*, 23 April 1993.

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smaller White House will actually work better and serve the American people better."[50] In responding to the Wolf charges that the cuts were a sham, the president said:

> We have cut it . . . I can guarantee people around here have been complaining about it because we're handling more mail, doing more work and carrying a bigger load than this White house has carried in more than a dozen years and we're doing it with fewer people.[51]

Symbolism and Staffing

The immediate lesson to be learned from Clinton's staff-reduction initiative is that symbolism and staffing do not mix. Indeed, the combined experience of Clinton and Carter should now provide a strong disincentive for future presidents to engage in these kind of symbolic gestures. Moreover, the Clinton experience of doing more and making do with less might lead to a reassessment of that part of the post-Watergate reform agenda that for two decades has been urging presidents to cut the size of the presidential staff. The problem of the White House staff is not a problem of size, but, as James Pfiffner has noted, "[t]he real issue is which functions should be handled in the White House and how to assure high quality advice to the President."[52] Smaller White House staffs are not necessarily the answer to these problems. In a number of respects, the Clinton experience raises the possibility that the presidential staff system is generally under- rather than over-resourced and may require expansion rather than contraction to deal with the institutional weaknesses of the contemporary presidency.

Symbolism and presidential staffing do not mix because the politics and management of White House staff reductions are complex and will always be cluttered with detail and numbers. In this instance, the detail and numbers generated a critical and hostile reaction from both the media and Congress, which obliterated the symbolic purpose of the president's initiative. This is not to say that all presidential efforts to engage in symbolic politics will meet the same fate, but there is one key element in this case study that may have broader ramifications for the symbolic presidency, and that is the differing conceptions of the notion of symbolism between the president and the media. While the Clinton administration embarked on this exercise using a *literal* definition of symbolism, consistent with the one outlined at the beginning of this article, the media quite clearly defined symbolism in a *pejorative* sense – that which is empty of content and substance. Within this framework the media destroyed Clinton's staff-cutting symbolism. The irony was that, although President Clinton's initia-

[50] "Remarks on Reduction and Reorganization of the White House Staff," 162.

[51] Quoted in Ifill, "Clinton Says He's Met Pledge to Cut Staff."

[52] James P. Pfiffner, "Cutting Staff No Easy Task for Clinton," *Maine Sunday Telegram*, 12 December 1993.

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tive was cluttered with details and numbers, the media interpreted those details and numbers as devoid of content and substance, hence the cynicism about the symbolic purpose of the staff reductions. If this should represent the general position the media would take in mediating presidential symbolism in the future, then presidents would be well advised to think again about the effectiveness of presidential leadership through symbolic politics.

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Ninth Amendment Rights and Wrongs—A Note on Noninterpretism

WALLACE MENDELSON

In 1921, long before Felix Frankfurter became a judge, he said, "The simple fact of the matter is that . . . the [Supreme] Court, under the guise of legal form, exercises political control."[1] However radical this view may have seemed at the time, sixty years later it had become something of a commonplace, thanks largely to the Warren Court. Judges had pushed beyond desegregation to integration via busing; they had undertaken to reapportion legislatures, to provide a detailed abortion code, to supervise police investigations, to outlaw capital punishment in effect and then to reinstate it with limitations, to supervise the supervision of children in their schools, to manage prison and mental institutions, to regulate private employment practices, to oversee any number of welfare programs, to direct credit policies of banks and credit-card companies, to monitor environmental quality, and even to supervise municipal land-use planning—all in the name of interpreting the Constitution![2]

That was make-believe. One of the dynamic movements in modern jurisprudence is led by avant-garde liberals whose formative years coincided with the "enlightenment" that Chief Justice Earl Warren inspired. Bemused by his sense of fairness, these so-called noninterpretists are too sophisticated to accept his simple-minded methodology. What they want is Warrenesque government by judges without Warrenesque make-believe. They want, for example, contraception and abortion "privacy" without the pretense that it comes from the Constitution. As one of their gifted leaders put it, they reject the Courts "resort to bad legislative history and strained reading of the constitutional language to support

[1] Felix Frankfurter, *Law and Politics*, E. F. Pritchard and A. MacLeish, eds. (New York: Capricorn Books, 1962), xiii.

[2] See A. Chayes, "The New Judiciary," *Harvard Law School Bulletin* 28 (1976): 23.

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results that would be better justified by explication of comtemporary moral and political ideals not drawn from the constitutional text."[3]

Obviously noninterpretation has no hope of achieving its utopia via legislation and constitutional amendment. Its plea for judicial oligarchy must be at least as whimsical as the opposing view, known as interpretism (or originalism), which looks for salvation in the words and the intent of the Founding Fathers.

Surely the decision in *Griswold*[4] (contraception privacy) is sounder than the opinions offered in support of it. Unwilling to indulge in forthright noninterpretation, the justices resorted to make believe – hardly a new development, especially in due process cases. *Plessy*[5] (upholding "separate but equal" treatment of blacks), and the *Lochner*[6] tradition (striking down a maximum-hour law for bakers) along with *Griswold* and *Roe v. Wade*[7] (abortion privacy) suggest that interpretism versus noninterpretism is a misleading dichotomy that does not get us very far. The real, the crucial problem is artifice instead of candor in judicial opinions.

Noninterpretism is so alien to consent of the governed, a written constitution, the rule of law, and the separation of powers that no member of the Supreme Court has ever openly endorsed or candidly practiced it. When the meaning of the Constitution is in issue, the justices always purport to interpret (even when they drop settled views in favor of radically different ones). Obviously the seventeen words of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, for example, can not rationally be read to mean all of the changing, contradictory things that judges since 1869 have said they mean.[8] The trouble with interpretism on the other hand is that we expect too much from the Constitution; most of it after all was produced by mortals who knew nothing of the world in which we live. Our most "peculiar institution" is that we have left "modernization" largely to judicial contrivance as in *Griswold*, *Roe*, and *Casey*[9] or *Lochner*, *Skrupa*, and *East Cleveland*.

In a book on *Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation* a once famous Harvard professor referred to judges "who seek to impress upon us in effect that it is not they that speak but the Constitution that speaketh in them. It will ever remain a mystery to me," he said, "how intelligent jurists can make these professions of nonparticipation in the judicial process. . . . [S]uch judicial denials of personal power made [him] doubt either the capacity or the candor

[3] T. Grey, "Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?" *Stanford Law Review* 27 (1975): 703.

[4] *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

[5] *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

[6] *Lochner v. New York*, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

[7] 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[8] See W. Mendelson, "James Madison's 'Triumph': The Fourteenth Amendment" in S. Slonim, *The Constitutional Bases of Political and Social Change in the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 201. The due process clause provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

[9] *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). (Qualifies *Roe* by permitting parental consent and waiting-period requirements.)

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of the men who made them."[10] Even so, he often quipped to his students (as though anticipating *Griswold*), the justices are not so foolish as their rationalizations suggest.

By the end of the old judicial regime in 1937, "substantive due process" (a classic noninterpretation) had been thoroughly discredited. The Roosevelt Court abandoned it completely,[11] and as late as 1963 the Warren Court in *Ferguson v. Skrupa* unanimously agreed:

> . . . Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy. . . .
>
> The doctrine that prevailed in *Lochner*, *Coppage*, *Adkins* . . . has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.[12]

The quarter-century tradition which this language reflects constituted, along with desegregation,[13] a return to the Court's original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.[14] This posed a problem for Warren Court activists in *Griswold*. There—hardly two years after *Skrupa*—the Court was invited to strike down an anticontraception law on substantive due process grounds. Obviously—as the Court plainly recognized—it was too late to do that:

> . . . we are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some arguments suggest that *Lochner* should be our guide. But we decline that invitation. We do not sit as a super-legislature.

Fourteenth Amendment activism needed a new rationale. Rising to the occasion, Justice William O. Douglas, for the Court, skinned the old cat with a new form of words. "Emanations" from the eighteenth-century Bill of Rights (made applicable to the states by a fair-hearing, [due process] provision in a Reconstruction Amendment) begot a privacy right with respect to recreational sex. Thus the "privilege" against self-incrimination, plus a partial ban on search and seizure, plus a qualified ban on quartering troops "in any house" entailed an absolute ban on anticontraception laws. Moreover, free speech and press led to freedom of association, which in turn led to contraception. Justice Arthur Goldberg's concur-

[10] T. R. Powell, *Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 28. While the book did not appear until 1956, it is largely a distillation of the author's wit and wisdom in the era of the "nine old men."

[11] *West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish*, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), marks the turning point.

[12] *Ferguson v. Skrupa*, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).

[13] *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

[14] *Slaughter House Cases*, 83 U.S. 36 (1973); *Munn v. Illinois*, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); *Strauder v. West Virginia*, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).

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ring opinion was equally imaginative. It breathed judicial life for the first time into the old Ninth Amendment:

> [A] judicial construction that this fundamental right [re contraceptives] is not protected by the Constitution because it is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution would violate the Ninth Amendment, which specifically states that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be *construed* to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
>
> . . . I do not mean to imply that the Ninth Amendment is applied against the States by the Fourteenth. Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth Amendment constitutes an independent source of rights protected from infringement by either the States or the Federal Government. Rather, the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive.[15]

Eight years later *Roe v. Wade*[16] undercut a lower court's Ninth Amendment semantics and based abortion privacy on "the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty. . . ." There, the Court said, "we feel it is" properly "founded," with help from the Bill of Rights. Justice Douglas, concurring, went out of his way to say: "The Ninth Amendment obviously does not create federally enforceable rights." Four years later *Moore v. East Cleveland* – vaulting over *West Coast Hotel*, *Skrupa*, *Griswold*, and *Roe v. Wade* – upheld a "family-privacy" claim on undisguised, substantive due-process grounds:

> Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court. There *are* risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the *Lochner* era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be members of this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint. But it does not counsel abandonment, nor does it require what the city urges here: cutting off any protection of family rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary boundary – the boundary of the nuclear family.[17]

Expanding personal rights via Amendment Nine parallels the old laissez-faire expansion of states' rights via Amendment Ten (via dual federalism). In this context, of course, states' rights was no more than a ban on federal power, just as the Goldberg Ninth is simply a ban on state power. Justice Goldberg's *Griswold* is to modern activism what *E. C. Knight*[18] (holding Sherman Antitrust Act inapplicable to manufacturers) was to old time economic activism; but it goes much

[15] *Griswold v. Connecticut*. (Emphasis added.)

[16] 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[17] 431 U.S. 494 (1977).

[18] *United States v. E. C. Knight*, 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Even Justice Salmon P. Chase's famous pitch in *Calder v. Bull*, 3 Dall. 386 (1798) for judicial activism does not mention the Ninth Amendment.

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further. For under it, judges could veto *any* governmental act (state or federal) simply by dubbing it a violation of unspecified "retained" rights. What *Knight*, *Lochner*, *Griswold*, and *Roe* have in common is that each of them promoted privacy (anarchy?) in the face of legislation, which, when enacted, satisfied traditional moral and constitutional standards.

Justice Hugo Black, the father of modern "incorporation,"[19] dissented in *Griswold*. For him, the goal of incorporation was to anchor the generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment in the more "clearly marked . . . boundaries" of the Bill of Rights, thereby restraining such fanciful flights as those in *Lochner* and *Griswold*:

> [T]o pass upon the constitutionality of statutes by looking to the particular standards enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution is one thing; to invalidate statutes because of application of "natural law" deemed to be above and undefined by the Constitution is another. "In the one instance, courts proceeding within clearly marked constitutional boundaries seek to execute policies written into the Constitution; in the other they roam at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and actually select policies, a responsibility which the Constitution entrusts to the legislative representatives of the people."[20]

Obviously Justice Black could not accept the evasion (via the Ninth Amendment) of what he understood as the *stabilizing* nature of the Bill of Rights in state due process cases:

> I discuss the due process and Ninth Amendment arguments together because on analysis they turn out to be the same thing—merely using different words to claim for this Court and the federal judiciary power to invalidate any legislative act which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or offensive. [If] these formulas based on "natural justice" [are] to prevail, they require judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary. The power to make such decisions is [that] of a legislative body. [No] provision of the Constitution specifically gives such blanket power to courts.
>
> [The Ninth] Amendment was passed [to] assure the people that the Constitution in all its provisions was intended to limit the Federal Government to the powers granted expressly or by necessary implication. [This] fact is perhaps responsible for the peculiar phenomenon that for a period of a century and a half no serious suggestion was ever made that the Ninth Amendment [could] be used as a weapon of federal power to prevent state legislatures from passing laws they consider appropriate to govern local affairs.[21]

Justice Potter Stewart joined his brother Black in these views.

[19] *Adamson v. California*, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), dissenting opinion in which Justice Douglas joined.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

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Over and over again, judges[22] and scholars[23] have identified the first eight amendments as the Bill of Rights. What of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments that were adopted along with the Bill of Rights in a single package? They were simply parallel efforts to reassure those—especially Anti-Federalists—who were fearful of federal intrusion upon, respectively, people's rights and states' rights. What the Court has said of the Tenth applies equally to the Ninth: it "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that . . . its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted. . . ."[24] As James Madison, the author of the Ninth Amendment explained, it was "inserted merely for greater caution" lest the Bill of Rights be thought to expand by implication the powers of *the federal government*:

> It has been objected . . . against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular *exceptions to the grant of power*, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned *into the hands of the General Government*, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to [the Ninth Amendment].[25]

Thus, for Madison a "right" is merely an exception to a "grant of power;" enumerated rights do not by implication put power "into the hands of the General Government." In his view a constitutional right is not a "brooding omnipresence

[22] See, for example, *Twining v. New Jersey*, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); *Palko v. Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); *Adamson v. California*, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); *Wolf v. Colorado*, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also notes 40–42, below, and related text.

[23] See, for example, E. L. Barrett, Jr., W. Cohen, and J. D. Varat, *Constitutional Law* (Westbury, NY: Foundation Press, 1989), 536; G. R. Stone, L. M. Seidman, C. R. Sunstein, M. V. Tushnet, *Constitutional Law* (Boston: Little Brown, 1986), 707; W. B. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar, J. H. Choper, S. H. Shiffrin, *The American Constitution* (St. Paul, MN: West, 1986), 286; C. Fariman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding," *Stanford Law Review* (1949): 132, 137–139; H. Flack, *The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1908).

[24] *United States v. Darby*, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).

[25] *The Debate and Proceedings of the Congress of the United States* compiled by Joseph Gales (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1834). In this passage, Madison does not distinguish between a right and a restriction on Congress that produces a right. In the Bill of Rights he speaks sometimes of rights and sometimes of restraints on Congress. For him the two approaches are interchangeable. This usage seems to be the cause of a great deal of modern confusion with respect to Madison's passage in question, his Bill of Rights, and his Ninth Amendment as they relate to one another. (Emphasis Added.) Note Virginia's usage in its proposed version of the Ninth Amendment: "[Be it resolved] that those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers, be not interpreted . . . to *extend the powers of Congress*. . . ." (Emphasis added). Jonathan Elliot, ed., *Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1901), vol. 3, 661.

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in the sky;"[26] it is merely the reciprocal of an altogether mundane constitutional restraint on government. As Madison observed in a letter to George Washington, "it would seem to be the same thing, whether the latter [rights] be secured by declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that the former [powers] shall not be extended."[27] Thus the Constitution says nothing of a right to free speech. We have such a right in the sense (and only in the sense) that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." The restraint defines and limits the right. Thus per the antebellum Constitution, our First Amendment rights are rights only against Congress—not against the world, nor against the states, nor against private censors. There is no reason to suppose that Madison's usage in the Ninth differs from his usage in the preceding eight amendments. Thus for him the rights "retained by the people" per the Ninth are simply the reciprocal equivalent of the restraints on the federal government that spring from the rule that it has only limited powers. The domain outside the scope of those powers (to the extent not denied to the states) is according to the Tenth Amendment "reserved to the states . . . or to the people," to be used by them to adopt such wise or foolish laws or constitutional amendments as seem to them appropriate, including laws like those at stake in *Lochner* and *Griswold*. In short, Madison saw the Ninth Amendment not as a repository of amorphous rights to be exploited by judges; rather, as he said, it was simply a safeguard against treating the Bill of Rights as an implied grant to the "General Government" of power that would otherwise be *ultra vires*. Justice Goldberg claimed that, while the amendment is not a "source of rights protected from infringement by either the States or the Federal Government," it "shows [never the less] a belief" that such rights exist—shapeless, undefined, and unrestricted. Treating the supposed belief as a constitutional prohibition makes a mockery of the Tenth Amendment, for the scope of the Goldberg impingement on the reserved power is open-ended and unlimited. Surely an amendment forthrightly expressing or thought to mean what this entails (unlimited national control of local affairs) would have been utterly unacceptable in 1787–1791. Indeed, it could not have been seriously proposed.

Moreover, if one reads the Ninth Amendment à la Justice Goldberg, it raises a political difficulty. For it would require courts to "enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking."[28] To put it differently: "Where are to be found the criteria for such a judicial determination?"[29] Since Amendment Nine provides no guiding standards or criteria, we are left—

[26] This is Holmes's phrase.

[27] 5 December 1789. *The Papers of James Madison*, vol. 12, C. F. Hobson and R. A. Rutland, eds. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1962–1991), 459.

[28] *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Court's opinion does say that "The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers [not of federalism]." "Primarily" perhaps, but not exclusively. See *O'Brien v. Brown*, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). "Primarily" perhaps in practice, but surely not in principle, for how can a court properly decide any case as to which standards or criteria for judgment are lacking?

[29] *Coleman v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).

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as we are by the Guarantee Clause of Article IV of the Constitution—with a nonjusticiable, political question.[30] The Goldberg alternative is in effect an unqualified delegation of power to hamstring government in any ways that might strike five justices as for any reason desirable. All this in the name of rights undetected by any of Justice Goldberg's eighty-nine predecessors on the Court.

The Tenth Amendment's "reservation" of power "to the people" and the Ninth Amendment's "retention" of rights "by the people" were not designed to increase or decrease constitutional powers or rights. They were designed rather to clarify by making explicit what was already implicit—namely, that anything not in the Constitution belongs to the people, by virtue of which they make, amend, or repeal constitutions. Perhaps the "retained" rights (and reciprocal powers) are best described not as constitutional, but as sovereign prerogatives, which under our system only "We the people" may rightfully articulate. If so, the Goldberg gambit treats a sovereign right as though it were a constitutional right subject to judicial review.[31] Only two other judges (William Brennan and Earl Warren) unequivocally endorsed it.[32] If Justice Douglas flirted with it in *Griswold*,[33] he repudiated it bluntly in *Roe v. Wade*. The Court too rejected it in *Roe*, and ignored it in *East Cleveland*. If alternatively, the retained rights are indeed constitutional rights, they entail at most what may be compendiously called a right to be let alone by the federal government in areas beyond the range of its given powers.

Resting on "original intent," Justice Goldberg ignores too much original intent evidence.[34] The problem may be posed differently. The only constitutional rights we have are those provided explicitly or implicitly in the Constitution. Of course we would "retain" all of them. We did not need a special amendment to proclaim what no one questioned. We did need one to placate those who feared (as *The Federalist*, No. 84 argued) that a Bill of Rights "would contain various exceptions

[30] *Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon*, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); *Luther v. Borden*, 7 How. 1 (1849).

[31] Apparently out of respect for sovereignty rights, the Supreme Court has never interfered with the amending process. It has been invited to do so many times. See the concurring opinion of Justice Black et al. in *Coleman v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 433, 456 at 458–459 (1939).

[32] Justices Byron White and John M. Harlan concurred in the judgment on pure substantive due process grounds. Justices Black and Stewart dissented. Justice Douglas (with Justice Fortas) in the opinion of the Court said of the Ninth Amendment nothing but this: it "provides," and then he quoted it verbatim. This is a noncommittal, if flirtatious, truism. There was no effort whatsoever to explain its relevance to the matter at hand. There was no effort to explain (as with the other amendments discussed) what it had to do with privacy. It seems to have been inserted in the opinion as an afterthought, presumably to make the two wings of the majority *seem* harmonious without really committing the Douglas two to the rationale of the Goldberg three. Later in *Roe v. Wade* Justice Douglas was close to rude in repudiating the Goldberg version of the Ninth Amendment.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Justice Goldberg's outlook can be rationalized with more sophistication than he displayed. See, for example, "Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment," 64 *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 1 (1988). See also, R. L. Caplan, "The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment," *Virginia Law Review* 69 (1983): 223.

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to powers which are not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext [for Congress] to claim more [powers] than were granted." Amendment Nine addressed that problem; its function, as we have seen, was to make clear the Bill of Rights did not by implication enlarge congressional authority. Accordingly (as suggested below on other grounds), it does not pertain to state regulation of anything. Of course, it left intact—"We the people" (not judges) "retained"—the sovereign prerogative of imposing new restraints and thus creating new rights as in the Fourteenth Amendment, which judges "noninterpreted" in *Plessy*, *Lochner*, and *Griswold*.[35] It is crucial that Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in *Griswold*, carefully avoided any commitment on the nature of the retained rights.[36] Later, free of the need to hold together a majority, he spoke quite clearly: "The Ninth Amendment obviously does not create federally enforceable [constitutional] rights."

Like Madison, *Barron v. Baltimore*[37] long ago made it clear that the first ten amendments restrict only the federal government.[38] It follows that the Ninth does not apply to cases like *Griswold* and *Lochner*. Does the incorporation version of the Fourteenth Amendment alter the Madison-*Barron* outlook? No, because incorporation implicates only the Bill of Rights; namely, the first eight (not the first ten) amendments. Justice Black (who dissented in *Griswold*) was after all the James Madison of modern incorporation.[39] His case in support of it rested heavily on the efforts of Congressman John A. Bingham, the chief architect of the Fourteenth Amendment, who said:

> Mr. Speaker, that the scope and meaning of the limitations imposed by the first section, fourteenth amendment . . . may be more fully understood, permit me to say that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States . . . are chiefly defined in the *first eight amendments*.
>
> Is it not clear that other and different privileges and immunities than those to which a citizen of a State was entitled are secured by the provision of the fourteenth article, that no State shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, which are defined in the *eight articles* of amendment. . . ?[40]

Justice Black relied also on Senator Jacob M. Howard, who sponsored the proposed Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate:

[35] Article V of the Constitution does not create the amending power, it simply outlines the procedure for exercising the sovereign power of "We the people." The sovereignty of "We the people" is of course the major premise of our system of government.

[36] See note 32, above.

[37] 7 Pet. 243 (1833).

[38] Even Justice Goldberg recognized that ". . . the Ninth Amendment . . . originally concerned restrictions upon *federal* power. . . ." *Griswold*, 493. Nor did he "mean to imply that the Ninth Amendment is applied against the States by the Fourteenth." Ibid., 492.

[39] His crusade began in *Adamson v. California*, 332 U.S. 47 (1946). Like Madison, Justice Black got much, but not all, of what he wanted.

[40] *Congressional Globe*, 42nd. Congress, 1st sess. app. 84 (1871). (Emphasis added.)

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> Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution [the Senator had just read from the old opinion of *Corfield v. Coryell*, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (E.D. Pa. 1825)]. To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these should be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the *first eight amendments* of the Constitution.[41]

Justice Black's response to Charles Fairman's criticism[42] was that "Mr. Flack, in at least an equally 'scholarly' writing surveys substantially the same documents [plus related press reports] . . . and concludes that the prime objective of Congress in proposing the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was '[t]o make the Bill of Rights (*the first eight amendments*) binding upon, or applicable to, the states.'"[43] For the James Madison of modern incorporation—as for the Marshall Court and the author of the first ten amendments—the Ninth (whatever it means) applies only to the federal government; it had nothing to do with the states.

Finally, Justice Goldberg seems not to have noticed that his innovation cuts two ways. If it justifies *Griswold*, it also justifies, for example, *Dred Scott*,[44] *Lochner*, and *Adkins*,[45] where the Court found a private-property right of slaveholders to infect the new territories and a privacy right for workers to immunity from maximum-hour and minimum-wage laws. Moreover, freed of the "person" limitation in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court could via the Ninth sustain a fetal right to life.

Perhaps in our circumstances it is permissible, even desirable, to noninterpret (rather than formally amend) the Constitution. But forthright noninterpretation is one thing: *Griswold* hocus pocus is quite another. As Plato observed long ago, even philosopher kings would find it necessary to justify their edicts by "noble fiction," lest their raw power be revealed for all to see. But we are now a long way from Plato. Governmental fiat camouflaged by fiction is hardly the ultimate morality. Surely *Griswold* would have been more satisfying intellectually if the Court had said a ban on marital use of contraceptives is bad social policy for such and such reasons; it is therefore unconstitutional. If this seems radical, it is precisely what the Court did—except that, instead of revealing its policy reasons, it papered them over with esoteric interpretation of assorted constitutional amendments. Four of them (the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth) address the kind of abuses Americans or their ancestors had suffered under British rule.[46] Another,

[41] *Congressional Globe*, 39th. Congress, 1st. sess. 2764 (1866). (Emphasis added.)

[42] "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding," Stanford *Law Review* 2 (1949): 5.

[43] In *re Winship*, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). (Emphasis added.)

[44] *Dred Scott v. Sanford*, 19 How. 393 (1857).

[45] *Adkins v. Children's Hospital*, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).

[46] Some Bill-of-Rights provisions came directly from Magna Carta (jury trial and the due process idea), from the Petition of Right (self-incrimination), and from the English Bill of Rights (excessive bail, cruel and unusual punishment).

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as we have seen, was designed by Madison to forestall an unintended implication of federal power. Finally the Fourteenth was adopted to reconstruct the South. As the Court said at the time, it had "one pervading purpose . . . the freedom of the slave race."[47] If *Griswold's* treatment of these amendments is permissible interpretation, who needs noninterpretation? In fact, candid, undisguised noninterpretation is unknown in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Plato was right after all on the role of "noble fiction," or so it seems at the judicial summit.

[47] *The Slaughter House Cases*, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).

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

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Third World Nationalism and the United States after the Cold War

DEEPA OLLAPALLY

Conventional wisdom from the dominant realist model of international relations suggests that the end of the cold war should lead to strong spillover effects on U.S. relations with Third World states. Specifically, with the dissolution of the superpower struggle, countries on the periphery can no longer be viewed with disapproval by the United States as dominos or Soviet clients or associates, thus paving the way for good relations between them and the remaining superpower. This article argues, however, that Third World nationalism can be expected to continue to exert an important influence on the nature of U.S.–Third world relations.

The optimistic prognosis tends to rest on the supposition that U.S.–Third World relations were largely derivative of the central conflict between the two superpowers. Such a view is found most among policy makers who are forced to make sense of a complex environment, but in important ways, it finds a resonance in realist analysis. This article argues that the approach was significantly misguided during the cold war, and it remains so now. A major problem is that the realist framework does not easily accommodate nonsecurity factors or the internal workings and motivations of countries that condition their foreign policies; at best, it offers only a partial explanation. I suggest that tensions in U.S.–Third World relations, ostensibly a result of U.S.–Soviet competition, cannot be understood in full without taking into account a deeper conflict emanating from the domestic politics and ideology of the Third World. This tension may be captured by an expanded and enriched version of the concept of nationalism, which allows phenomena ranging from the drive for postcolonial autonomy

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to religious revivalism. Recasting U.S.–Third World relations in this manner suggests that the much heralded break from the past may be more illusory than real.

Two caveats are in order. To the extent that the overwhelming majority of Third World countries gained their independence and formulated their foreign policies after 1945, it is admittedly difficult to control for the effect of U.S.–Soviet competition. Conversely, it is hard to judge whether U.S. policies in the Third World were anti-Soviet or antinationalist, since both motivations could produce similar actions.

I will utilize a historical case study of Indo–U.S. relations. The problematic relations between India and the United States in the past may be viewed as counterintuitive, given their shared status as the two largest liberal democracies and their lack of direct security problems. Most American analysts have tended to point to the superpower conflict and India's ties with the Soviet Union as having been the key impediment to warm relations.[1] Such a view suggests that the end of the cold war should lead to a major improvement in relations between the two countries. In contrast, this article attempts to show that this automatic conclusion may not be warranted if a richer bilateral approach including domestic political economy factors and ideology is taken. While India in many ways is atypical of the Third World, its experience on the issue under study is generalizable to other countries. India is also a good test case, because on all dimensions of foreign policy except relations with the Soviet Union, India and the United States should have had much smoother ties.

Third World Challenges: Home Grown or Imported?

The Simple Realist Model

The realist model, which informs the bulk of foreign policy analysis, simplifies reality so that the international geopolitics and power configuration become most determining.[2] Thus U.S. relations with the Third World in the postwar period were simply viewed as extensions of its policies toward the Soviet Union and a concern for the central power balance. Consistent with this, Third World states were accorded little autonomy in foreign policy, with their choices seen as essentially conforming to the preferences of one superpower or the other. Indeed, the so-called globalist viewpoint underlying the general U.S. foreign policy frame-

[1] See, for example, a noted authority on Indo–U.S. relations, Stephen Cohen, "India and America: Toward a Realistic Relationship?" *Asian Affairs* 15 (Winter 1988–89): 187–188.

[2] The best theoretical argument for the primacy of the international system is found in Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a comprehensive study applying realism to foreign policy analysis, see Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

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work found its best expression in the developing countries.[3] Therefore, challenges to the United States from Third World countries are seen to emerge from the nature of their security needs or alignments. But international alliance structures are often affected by internal drives, which tend to be left out in realist analysis. The bipolar prism through which the periphery was seen simply exacerbated the general realist problem of neglecting domestic factors.[4]

Despite the repeated problems associated with this kind of thinking in U.S. foreign policy over time, such flawed thinking has met with little serious revision.[5] During the Persian Gulf war in 1991, issues of peace and security, especially the violation of state sovereignty, dominated the American leadership's rhetoric as if political economy conditions and the role of ideology in Iraq could be abstracted away or dismissed. Stated simply, Saddam Hussein's geopolitical ambition was seen as the root cause of the conflict. True to tradition, international relations scholars tended to emphasize such factors as well. While this assessment might have the benefit of parsimony, it suffers from being too narrow in representing the sources of the conflict.[6]

The Force of Nationalism

An alternative approach to U.S.–Third World relations would require understanding the impact of Third World domestic factors on foreign policy. One useful way of capturing these factors in relations with the United States is to recognize the existence of what may be termed various manifestations of nationalisms. While the nature of Third World nationalism is complex, it most often tends to be a function of specific domestic political economy conditions and cultural-ideological predilections, as well as the country's location in the world system, particularly its historic position in the international division of labor within the capitalist world economy.[7] Differences in the type of nationalism

[3] For a discussion of globalism in U.S. policy toward the Third World, see selections in Peter Schraeder, ed., *Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

[4] This deficiency in realism has been particularly ably argued by Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984); and Daniel Garst, "Thucydides and Neorealism," *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (March 1989). Ashley attempts to rescue realism by revamping the way it is conventionally understood and by incorporating what he calls "practical realism."

[5] One of the most telling examples is the failure of U.S. policy in Iran, which came to a head with the Iranian revolution of 1979.

[6] For a rich discussion of the complex sources of the conflict, see Philip Knightley, "Imperial Legacy" in Micah Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., *The Gulf Reader* (New York: Random House, 1991); and Theodore Draper, "The Gulf War Reconsidered," *The New York Review of Books*, 16 January 1992.

[7] For discussions of emerging forces of nationalism such as Islamic movements, see Farrokh Moshiri, "Iran: Islamic Revolution Against Westernization" in Jack Goldstone, Ted Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri, eds., *Revolutions of the Late 20th Century* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); and J. Beinin, "Islamic Responses to the Capitalist Penetration of the Middle East" in Barbara Stowasser, ed., *The Islamic Impulse* (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1987). More generally,

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articulated are often strongly tied to the character and ideology of the ruling elite.[8]

Components of nationalism will vary according to specific historical and situational contexts and may include, for example, ethnicity, culture, religion, and even secular ideologies. Given the different possibilities, it is necessary to probe into the exact motivations and functions in order to make sense of the particularities of nationalist expression and how it interacts with and impinges on foreign policy. For example, the challenges to both socialist and capitalist Western-based models of development in Algeria in 1991 and Iran in 1979 and the search for a more domestically and culturally authentic alternative suggest one form of nationalism emanating from the Third World. Nationalism viewed in this fashion is neither static nor abstract and goes beyond nineteenth-century notions of nationalism drawn from Western experience.[9] This article does not attempt a full-scale treatment of nationalism as such and is essentially restricted to the type of nationalism as exemplified in India's relations with the United States. Theoretically speaking, it is important to recognize the realist framework's inadequacies and the need to transcend them; nationalism is one important way of pointing to such a gap.

Introducing nationalism in this fashion and taking an even cursory overview of U.S. policy toward the Third World during the cold war shows how faulty analysis has been relying on realism. The simple realist model used by policy makers, for example, failed to capture the nationalist ideologies of countries as different as China and Angola. In the Chinese case, not until 1971 did the United States recognize the folly of its earlier simplistic assumption about Beijing's ties to Moscow. In Angola, the United States resisted recognizing the government of Augustino Neto, which it viewed as a Soviet client, despite such companies as Mobil Oil maintaining good relations and business there.[10] A significant number of Third World countries that became the object of U.S. antagonism, ostensibly as a result of their relations with the Soviets, had invariably sought cordial ties with the United States at some point. Indeed, in many cases, the tilt or turn to the other superpower succeeded, not preceded, American rebuffs. Examples

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see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

[8] An interesting early elucidation of various forms of nationalism is found in Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 148–205. See also David Ruccio and Lawrence Simon, "Radical Theories of Development: Frank, the Modes of Production School and Amin" in Charles Wilber, ed., *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment* (New York: Random House, 1988). More specifically, see selections in Milton Israel, ed., *National Unity: The South Asian Experience* (New Delhi: Promilla, 1983).

[9] While noted historian Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990) suggests that nationalism is becoming an anachronistic concept, his conclusion appears to be based on a Eurocentric perspective.

[10] Richard Feinberg, *The Intemperate Zone: The Third World Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Norton, 1983), 106–109.

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include difficult relationships with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Egypt under President Gamal Abdel Nasser.[11]

An analysis of the record of U.S.–Soviet interaction in regional conflicts and tensions suggests that in practically all instances, the threat from the Soviet Union and communism was at best exaggerated or at worst manipulated by the United States.[12] A fairly consistent thread running through conflicts in countries as different as the Dominican Republic and Vietnam was various forms of nationalist struggles, even though they were not defined as such in U.S. policy declarations. The United States also opposed such nationalist leaders as Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and João Goulart in Brazil, pointing to their alleged links to the communist world.[13] A more moderate variant of such simplistic analysis has been particularly symptomatic of U.S. relations with India.

The United States and India: Bilateral Conflict or Third Party Irritant?

A constant source of tension between the United States and India in the past was India's close relationship with the Soviet Union. Seen in conventional power politics terms worsened by the cold war lens, U.S. policy makers could not separate India's foreign policy stands, which flowed from its own development needs, and ideology from the superpower rivalry.[14] The strained relationship that came to characterize India and the United States had much more to do with non-Soviet factors and rested on bilateral issues, but over time these came to be submerged under the central superpower conflict without disappearing or getting resolved. India, unlike Pakistan, refused to be a part of the anti-Soviet coalition. This earned it American antagonism, when in actuality India's and Pakistan's stands depended little on their views regarding the Soviet Union or international relations. Rather, much of their differences stemmed from domestic factors, especially differences in the nature of their respective nationalisms. The leading role of the military in Pakistan's politics and its narrow social base produced a

[11] On Cuba, see Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Scheer, *Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere* (New York: Grove Press, 1963). On Nicaragua, see for example, Peter Kornbluh, "Nicaragua: U.S. Proinsurgency Warfare Against the Sandinistas" in Michael Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., *Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Antiterrorism in the Eighties* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). In Egypt, the U.S. withdrawal of support for the Aswan Dam and the crisis it precipitated leading to Soviet involvement is discussed in Karen Dawisha, *Soviet Policy Towards Egypt* (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), 12–18.

[12] Such an analysis is undertaken in Deepa Ollapally, *Confronting Conflict: Domestic Factors and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993).

[13] A good discussion of the CIA-backed coup in Guatemala is found in Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (New York: Doubleday, 1982).

[14] Selig Harrison, "Dialogue of the Deaf: Mutual Perceptions and Indo-U.S. Relations" in Sulochana Glazer and Nathan Glazer, eds., *Conflicting Images: India and the U.S.* (Glendale, MD: The Riverdale Press, 1990), 47–49.

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fragile polity and indicated the lack of well developed countervailing structures in civil society.[15] Security assistance and economic largesse from the United States offered one route to maintaining the military's power.[16] Dependency on America in this manner could be tolerated and absorbed for a number of reasons, including the role of the military elite in shaping Pakistan's nationalism, the lack of a strong domestic industrial elite that would resist possible foreign incursion or competition, and the absence of democratic mechanisms for popular political and ideological expression.

India's nationalism stood in contrast to Pakistan's. India's leading party, the Congress, had emerged out of a strong anticolonial independence movement led by figures who emphasized self-reliance, almost as a virtue.[17] The economy had already produced such domestic industrialists as the Tatas and Birlas. These economic actors, who had strong political ties to the leadership partly as a result of their financial backing of the independence drive, cultivated state protection from outside competition. In terms of security, the Indian leadership was wary of entangling alliances that would have brought the cold war and its attendant policy rigidities to the subcontinent.

Clash of Worldviews: The Formative Years

A major Indian contribution to international relations was the promotion of nonalignment as espoused by Jawaharlal Nehru.[18] Given the extreme polarization of the world in the late 1940s and 1950s, India's vociferous championing of nonalignment was a bold step.[19] In eschewing the safest option of coming under the United States safety net, India's national interest would not appear to have

[15] For a good discussion of the development of Pakistan's fragile polity and implications for foreign policy, see Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 175–180. See also Hasan Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947–1986* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986); and Veena Kukreja, *Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan* (New Delhi: A. H. Marwah, 1985).

[16] Assistance from the United States in the late 1950s eased Pakistan's budgetary strains in expanding its army and upgrading weapon systems. See Onkar Marwah, "National Security and Military Policy in India" in Lawrence Ziring, ed., *India, the Subcontinent and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 73.

[17] Such thinking extended to both Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohandas Gandhi, although they differed on specific development strategies to follow, with the latter emphasizing India's traditional sectors and small-scale industries.

[18] For an excellent discussion of Nehru's nationalist ideology in general, including nonalignment, see Bhikhu Parekh, "Nehru and the National Philosophy of India," *Economic and Political Weekly* 26 (5–12 January 1991): esp. 42–45. See also K. P. Misra, a noted expert on nonalignment, *Nonaligned Movement: India's Chairmanship* (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1987).

[19] Indira Gandhi noted in 1982 that her father believed nonalignment was the best mechanism for achieving three key goals: liberation from colonialism and neocolonialism, lessening of tensions, and promotion of economic development. See Y. Etinger, ed., *NAM History and Reality* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1987), 2.

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been defined in terms of power alone along expectations of realism. Such a stand fits in much more with the ideological makeup of the Congress leadership.

Nehru's political education, which included strong exposure to Western thought such as Fabian socialism, was also heavily influenced by his search to understand Indian (and to some extent Asian) philosophy, practices, and past glory, which he tried to do during long periods of imprisonment during the anticolonial struggle. By the time he became prime minister, some close observers could conclude that "there was now a growing emphasis in Nehru's outlook on Indian-ness rather than on pragmatism."[20] In Nehru's words, "Nationalism is essentially a group memory of past achievements, traditions and experiences and nationalism is stronger today than it has ever been. . . . National progress can . . . neither lie in a repetition of the past nor in its denial. New patterns must inevitably be adopted but they must be integrated with the old."[21] Nehru's fascination with Asia's past and its lack of a legacy of conflict, unlike in Europe, tended to translate into a foreign policy that suggested that not only could India keep aloof from Western power alignments but also manage a much more prominent and independent role in international relations than its existing politicomilitary capability alone would warrant.[22]

This third force in international relations thinking, which was by conventional power measures extremely fragile, was nonetheless met early on with fairly strong opposition from the United States.[23] According to Nehru's highly respected biographer, S. Gopal, the prime minister's visit to the United States had led him to the realization that the "U.S. government had expected acquiescence from him on all issues and were unwilling to assist India for anything less."[24] Such submission went against Nehru's grain and was not palatable even at the expense of reduced assistance and increased national vulnerability. A small minority view in the United States represented by the U.S. ambassador to India was to make little impact. Ambassador Chester Bowles noted in his memoirs that, "One thing in my mind is clear. We cannot expect to see really friendly Indo-American relations until we are prepared to accept India's right to have a viewpoint of her own. The insistence of many Americans that anyone who 'is not for us must necessarily be against us' loses us many friends, not only in India but throughout the world."[25]

[20] S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), vol. 2, 56. See also R. C. Pillai, "The Political Thought of Jawaharlal Nehru" in Thomas Pantham and Kenneth Deutsch, eds., *Political Thought in Modern India* (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1986).

[21] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 515.

[22] Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru*, 56.

[23] H. W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 3–5. Brands includes a detailed case study of U.S.–India relations but a notable omission is the economic relations between them which makes the study incomplete.

[24] Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru*, 60–61.

[25] Chester Bowles, *Ambassador's Report* (New York: Harper, 1954), 233.

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The Drive to Industrialize: Reinforcing Nationalism

India's nonalignment was also strongly tied to the leadership's economic ideology. In his first public enunciation of nonalignment. Nehru defined it partly as a continuation of the stage of liberation war against imperialism.[26] Although the Soviet experience, especially its ability to leapfrog the process of development, influenced the thinking of the Indian elite and the concept of a socialist pattern of society was being articulated by the second Five Year Plan, in practice it was selectively applied to the Indian context. It generally reflected the limits placed by domestic political and economic factors. Congress leadership's espousal of a socialist pattern of society was in part an attempt to coopt the Socialist party's platform, even as important members of the latter accused the former of emasculating the concept itself.[27] Given the importance of key domestic economic actors, Indian socialism was significantly accommodating of private capital.[28] The Indian state had no intention of competing with the private sector or eliminating it; rather only the so-called commanding heights of the economy would be public. Foreign private capital, however, was another matter, with the state expected to exercise strict control in the interest of building national capacity.[29]

The Indian leadership's economic vision envisaged a tight linkage of economic and foreign affairs. In a speech in Parliament in late 1947, Nehru declared that "Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy . . . that will govern our foreign policy more than all the speeches in this House."[30] Indian economic policy, which stressed state intervention and protection of domestic enterprises, could not help disagreeing with U.S. stands, especially since the United States had acquired hegemonic status after World War II and was taking the lead in consolidating a liberal economic order worldwide.[31] This once again suggested India's willingness to take risks in the international system for the sake of domestic politicoeconomic reasons.

[26] Govind Srivastava, *India: Nonalignment and World Peace* (New Delhi: New Delhi Publications, 1984), 3-4.

[27] Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru*, 203.

[28] See The Planning Commission, *Second Five Year Plan 1956* (Delhi: Government of India, 1956), 21-24 and 45-50, for an explanation of what the "socialist pattern of society" entailed. For the symbiotic nature of state and capital envisioned, see ibid., 31-32.

[29] The most important regulatory mechanisms of domestic and foreign capital were the Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969, and the Foreign Exchange and Regulation Act of 1973.

[30] Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946 to April 1961* (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961), 24-25.

[31] The achievement of America's hegemonic status has been posited by the hegemonic stability theorists as the key to the post-1945 open-world economic order. For a discussion of hegemonic stability theory, see Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). For a critique of the theory, see Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization* 39 (Autumn 1985).

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The Indian leadership's attitude tended to be that foreign enterprise would have to come to terms with domestic business interests.[32] The U.S. government's displeasure with India's economic philosophy was clear on a number of occasions, when it took issue with India's state-led industrialization plans and was unwilling to aid crucial public-sector enterprises in the oil and steel industries in an attempt to steer India toward private capital.[33] Given the monopoly position of Western (mostly American) multinationals in these areas, India had little room to maneuver. Moreover, the World Bank had refused to fund two oil refineries, suggesting that India's industrialization policies were ideologically motivated and economically unsound. It was at this key juncture that alternative assistance came from the Soviet Union that proved to be extremely important in cementing Indo-Soviet ties.

Soviet assistance in critical areas facilitated the sort of development India's leadership had espoused at independence. It also allowed India to attain a certain level of bargaining power, which India has in fact utilized to bargain with the Soviets as well.[34] While there has been some debate as to whether the Soviets exerted undue political influence on India as well as whether Indian economic interests were harmed in terms of trade diversion, deficient technology, and hard currency, careful analysis does not fully support such a conclusion.[35]

To a great degree, the Indian leadership's original vision regarding international politics and economics continued to persist despite the waxing and waning of available alternative development conceptions. Under the long tenure of Indira Gandhi, for example, Indian industrialization relied upon consolidating and extending the public-sector companies along with safeguarding local capital. Specific criteria for foreign collaboration was legislated, and each proposal was no longer treated simply on an ad hoc basis. While assurances were given regarding the repatriation of capital subject to national foreign exchange considerations

[32] See, for example, speeches by T. T. Krishnamachari as commerce and industries minister and finance minister in the mid-1950s, cited in Sisir Gupta, "External Economic Relations" in M. S. Rajan, ed., *India in World Affairs 1954–56* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 626–627.

[33] For background discussion on this, see Vadilal Dagli, ed., *Two Decades of Indo–U.S. Relations* (Bombay: Vora and Co., 1969), 36; Stephen Clarkson, *The Soviet Theory of Development: India and the Third World in Marxist-Leninist Scholarship* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 173; Asha Datar, *India's Economic Relations with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 1953–1969* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 72; and generally, Padma Desai, *The Bokaro Steel Plant: A Study of Soviet Economic Assistance* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1972). See also Michael Tanzer, *The Political Economy of International Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries* (London: Beacon Press, 1969); and Biplab Dasgupta, *The Oil Industry in India: Some Economic Aspects* (London: Cass, 1971).

[34] Datar, *India's Economic Relations*, 74.

[35] In a detailed study of the influence question, Robert Horn found a remarkable lack of Soviet success in influencing India, with influence often flowing the other way around. See *Soviet–Indian Relations: Issues and Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1982). One of the most comprehensive and balanced treatments of the economic question is found in Santosh Mehrotra, *India and the Soviet Union: Trade and Technology Transfer* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

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and nationalization with compensation, working ownership and effective control were supposed to be in Indian hands except in special cases. In 1973, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) set a fixed ceiling for foreign equity holding at 40 percent. Even under the coalition Janata government between 1977–1979, which was widely expected to open the economy more and improve its ties with the United States, the main regulations were retained. In fact, tighter control led to the much heralded departure of Coca Cola from the Indian market during this period.[36] A common thread in the actions of India's leadership has been its apparent willingness to tolerate higher-cost, lower-quality production as well as antagonism from international capital and the United States for essentially domestic political and ideological imperatives.

Search for Security: A Mixed Strategy

As in the economic sphere, the Indian leadership's ideological predilections affected the manner in which it chose to safeguard security. Its antipathy to foreign dependency led India initially to eschew conventional power politics as practiced under bipolarity. Over time, India has had to fashion three types of tactics taking into account changing international and domestic contexts. These may be summed up as abstinence, partnership, and diversification. Its pursuit of maximizing autonomy was not a smooth process, especially via à vis the most important superpower.

The importance attached to rapid economic development by Nehru under conditions of scarcity initially translated into a trade-off in the military sector. The other option under such difficult economic circumstances would have been to clearly throw its lot in the United States or Soviet camp, like many of the newly emerging countries chose to do. Indeed, the overwhelming number of countries in the world joined the U.S. side, thereby giving rise to essentially bandwagon behavior rather than balancing, as realists describe it.[37] Abstaining for the most part from building up a large defense capability, key components of India's foreign policy plank were to insulate the region from cold war hostilities through nonalignment and to cultivate the good neighbor policy of *Panchsheel* (the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) directed especially at China.[38]

[36] The minister for industries, Socialist George Fernandes, had always favored even stricter regulation of foreign investment. The timing also coincided with a big push in domestic production of soft drinks.

[37] The problem of describing the postwar alignment as balancing by realists has been alluded to by Steve Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985): 34–35. However, Walt's explanation of why bandwagoning occurred is limited. Consistent with my argument here, it could be posited that underlying the scramble to the U.S. bandwagon was a calculation of expected economic costs and benefits in the liberal world system.

[38] See, for example, M. J. Akbar, *Nehru: The Making of India* (London: Viking, 1988), 534–551; W. F. Van Eekelen, *India's Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China* (The Hague: Nartinus Nijhoff, 1964); and P. C. Chakravarti, *India's China Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962).

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Panchsheel suggested a certain lack of attention to realist precepts and instead a faith that a common anti-imperialist and pan-Asian ideological orientation could overcome regional ambitions of two large and powerful neighbors. While the 1954 military agreement between Pakistan and the United States aimed at the Soviet Union alarmed Indian policy makers and tested existing policy, a counter alliance was ruled out. The tensions between India and China over disputed boundary terrain and the inability to avert a war in 1962, however, stretched Indian policy to the breaking point.

In the aftermath of the Chinese shock and humiliation, Indian policy tended to founder for lack of a coherent strategy. Indian leaders hastily boosted defense spending and were forced to turn to the United States and Britain for military assistance. But from India's point of view, American help proved particularly inadequate in terms of the conditions attached.[39] By the time the United States placed an arms embargo on both combatants after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war in which India viewed Pakistan as the aggressor, India was ready to seriously pursue greater military self-sufficiency. In this quest, the Soviet Union was again seen as relatively more forthcoming and, therefore, a more valuable partner over time, in large part because of the intrinsic importance the Soviets attached to India.[40] India's orientation toward Soviet arms was not immutable, however. By the late 1970s, a policy of diversifying arms suppliers was pursued in order to gain access to the most advanced hardware available as well as to reduce dependency on the Soviets. For example, the largest single weapons transaction until then was made with Britain to purchase deep penetration Jaguar fighter aircraft and Sea Harrier ASW and trainer aircraft, with license to manufacture in India and reexport.[41] In 1982, India bought forty Mirage 2000 fighters from France. In 1984, the Soviets had gone to the extent of offering MiG-29 aircraft that had not yet joined squadron service in the USSR.[42] Meanwhile, strong differences of strategic

[39] In exchange for this military aid, the U.S. put pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir problem with Pakistan. According to Chester Bowles, who had become undersecretary of state, "we had also—rather ineptly I thought—seized upon India's acute need for U.S. assistance as a lever to force India to make concessions to Pakistan in regard to Kashmir, which no democratic Indian Government could make and survive." *Promises to Keep* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 439. See also John Kenneth Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), 455. Galbraith, then ambassador to India, notes that a British suggestion that India enter a military alliance with the West for security guarantees led to much concern on the part of Indian leadership, who "had they been pressed seriously along these lines . . . would have been forced into an accommodation with the Chinese." Ibid., 433. This points to India's continued resistance to bloc politics even at this critical juncture.

[40] See Horn, *Soviet-Indian Relations*, 6–7 for the importance given to India in Soviet conceptions of relations with the Third World. See also Nihal Singh, "Why India Goes to Moscow for Arms," *Asian Survey* 24 (July 1984). A good example of the difference between the U.S. and Soviet treatment of India relates to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. While both superpowers were against India's refusal to sign the treaty, the Soviets never let it interfere with their bilateral relationship, whereas it has repeatedly been contentious in Indo-U.S. relations.

[41] Surjit Mansingh, *India's Search for Power* (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984), 164.

[42] From an estimated 80 percent in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet supply as a percentage of Indian military hardware had dropped to 60 percent. Lincoln Kaye, "Moscow's Indian Summer," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 February 1987, 51.

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opinion between the United States and India had continued to surface on such matters as the Bangladesh war; militarization of the Indian Ocean, especially American build up of Diego Garcia; development of nuclear capability; and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Tensions Old and New

The Indian leadership's world view and domestic political economy preferences have repeatedly run up against U.S. conceptions and interests in the international economic and political order. Since the mid-1980s and especially since 1991, changes have been occurring in Indian foreign policy that in principle favor better Indo-U.S. relations. However, they cannot be viewed in isolation from domestic political economy trends in the United States and their international impact or internal developments in India.

Late in Indira Gandhi's regime, some opening of the highly protected economy was initiated, which then promised to go much further under her son Rajiv. Despite Rajiv Gandhi's ambitious proclamations, what was most notable was how quickly he had to curtail plans for reform as a result of political obstacles.[43] The present government under Narasimha Rao has launched the most accelerated reforms, which are poised to liberalize the economy in an unprecedented manner.[44] Despite heading a minority-led coalition, Rao has managed to move ahead without eliciting the kind of opposition that might have been expected. This is partly the result of growing sentiment among the elite across a wide political spectrum that greater competition in the economy is desirable, as well as the lack of any well developed alternative. But behind the consensus on the need for reforms, especially to discipline the large monopoly houses that have emerged, there is less agreement on specific measures and acceptable thresholds of domestic costs.[45] One issue around which domestic opposition emerged early was the Dunkel Draft Text of the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on

[43] For an excellent discussion on the nature of domestic opposition to recent economic liberalization attempts, see Atul Kohli, "Politics of Economic Liberalization in India," *World Development* 17 (March 1989): 311-322. For a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the same issue, see Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. 303-338.

[44] The major reforms add up to a new import-export policy and a new industrial policy covering domestic as well as foreign investment and technology agreements, all diluting earlier regulations. For example, in a break with the past, 51 percent of foreign equity holding is being allowed. See *Economic Times*, 2 April 1992; and P. Swaminathan, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 21 September 1991, 2237-2239.

[45] The increasing consensus of malaise in the highly protected Indian economy and need for correction is exemplified, for example, by agreement on this in articles in the influential left-leaning *Economic and Political Weekly*. But by the same token, on the nature of remedies, the consensus is missing. See for example, Arun Ghosh, "India: Big World's View of 'Small World,'" *Economic and Political Weekly*, 18 June 1991, 1369-1371; and "Trade Reform for Restructuring the Economy," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 15 June 1991, 1437-1440.

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Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, particularly as it related to patenting of biological resources, which may have serious drawbacks for large sections of Indian farmers. The largest and most powerful opposition Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) called for rejecting the Dunkel proposals with resolutions passed by its national council to that effect.[46] Grassroots movements also sprang up in reaction, and as one influential Indian daily paper editorialized, ". . . it is clear that in India, the democratic system is the pre-eminent factor in determining not only the manner in which international negotiations can be carried out by Indians but also what can be pushed through in Parliament and with the people."[47] Although the government ultimately accepted the GATT accord, the opposition surrounding it may be viewed as a signal of potential constraints on the reforms.

Liberalization almost invariably exacts a high social cost in poor countries, and in a democratic polity like India, the repercussions could be serious. The leading Indian business daily, *The Economic Times*, warned early on that, "If belts have to be tightened, the rich must sacrifice more. . . ." and urged the leadership to formulate policies viewed as benefiting larger groups rather than just the urban middle and upper-middle classes.[48] Likewise, concern with India's acquiescence to the International Monetary Fund's "conditionalities" attached to its loans, which tend to hurt the weaker sections most, found Finance Minister Manmohan Singh promising what he termed, "adjustment with a human face."[49]

In late 1994 the Congress lost key elections in a number of states including the prime minister's home state, which indicated for many observers a negative reaction to the effects of the liberalization program. Prime Minister Rao acknowledged as much in his postelection public statements striking a more populist tone and expressing some doubt about allowing unlimited foreign capital. The party is also experiencing a serious division in its ranks, at least rhetorically challenging the economic drive and calling in one dissident member's words for a more "pro-poor and pro-India" policy.[50]

Along with such direct effects on sections of the populace, there is the potential for indirect negative impacts on the economy to become more severe. India's rise to being the world's fourth largest debtor country and its drop in credit rating leave it more vulnerable to outside pressure. The debt problem is in part a function of the ongoing internal drive to liberalize imports as well as U.S. pushes for India to raise capital in private markets.[51] India is counting on its new import-export regime for success in its macroeconomic policies, especially a breakthrough in exports to reduce its trade deficits. If success eludes the government

[46] *Times of India*, 19 June 1993.

[47] *Times of India*, 10 June 1993. See also P. K. Chandrashekar and S. Chatterjee, eds., *The Dunkel Draft* (Bangalore: Navakarnataka Printers, 1993).

[48] *The Economic Times*, 11 April 1992.

[49] *The Economic Times*, 29 July 1991.

[50] Zafar Agha, "Hemming in Rao," *India Today*, 15 May 1995, 41; Sunil Jain, "Changing Phase of Reforms," *India Today*, 31 January 1995, 66–69.

[51] C. P. Bhambri, *The Foreign Policy of India* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1987), 88.

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in the near to medium term and financial crises arise, it will be difficult to retain legitimacy for the bold departures from the past. Indeed, India would open itself to the charge that it was being buffeted by the vagaries of the international market and that the country was losing its historic autonomy.

Whether such a nationalist reaction would develop is in part connected to how much the Nehruvian paradigm has eroded. On this point, there is some evidence to suggest the existence of what might be termed a "perception gap" between large sections of the Indian elite and Westerners. While outsiders tend to emphasize slow growth rates and low per capita incomes, many Indians point to the achievement of the more ideologically-conditioned relative autonomy and self-reliance, in contrast to most countries in the Third World. Such sentiment still appears to hold some appeal.[52] For example, at the 1992 All-India Congress (I) Committee meeting, where the ruling party's new policies were presented for ratification, the resolution called for continuing self-reliance as a major objective, with the attendant proviso of making Indian industry competitive in the world market.[53]

In addition to the extent of domestic costs, the nature of the Indian response to the liberalization experiment will be affected by outside, especially U.S. positions in economic and security affairs. The current relative economic deterioration of the United States coupled with its near unipolar military ascendency does not necessarily bode well for emerging Third World powers. Countries like India, which have chosen a more assertive path to development, may increasingly find themselves the target of American opprobrium. This is in part a function of declining U.S. hegemony and the resulting "politicized state centric" decision making in which domestic protection becomes more important in foreign economic policy.[54] In the past, even though its hegemonic position allowed the United States to absorb some domestic costs for the sake of a liberal order internationally, it also displayed a tendency to take advantage of its position to the detriment of that very order.[55]

The persistent appearance of India on a list of countries regarded as having significant obstacles to American exports suggests the potential for continued Indo–U.S. divergences in the economic realm. Such countries could then face

[52] For an illustration of this perception gap, see analysis by Clive Crook, *The Economist*, 4 May 1991, as opposed to a survey of key economic actors in India conducted by William A. Stoever and reported in "The Assumptions of Indian Foreign Investment Policy," *Asian Affairs* 15 (Fall 1988): 137–148.

[53] *The Economic Times*, 10 April 1992.

[54] For this argument, see Peter Evans, "Declining Hegemony and Assertive Industrialization," *International Organization* 43 (Spring 1989).

[55] For example, U.S. lead in arranging nonmarket solutions in areas where it has fallen behind, such as textiles, ships, and steel, stands in contrast to the push for openness in services and suggests the selectivity underlying its positions. On nonmarket approaches, see Susan Strange, "The Management of Surplus Capacity: Or How Does Theory Stand Up to Protectionism 1970s Style?" *International Organization* 33 (Summer 1979).

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retaliation, with tariffs leading to a doubling of prices for selected U.S. imports from them in accordance with the Super 301 provision of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. The spotlight on India is particularly telling, since it is only the twenty-seventh largest export market for the United States. But as one U.S. trade representative put it, "We select our trade liberalization piorities on the basis of those countries which have maximum potential for U.S. exporters and the world at large."[56] Recent GATT talks have highlighted U.S.–Third World differences, especially on intellectual property rights and investment regulations.[57] The U.S. preference for a strict intellectual property regime that would secure it substantial foreign exchange transfers is opposed by many important Third World countries whose citizenry account for less than one percent of patent holders worldwide.[58]

The potential for continued divergence of opinion between India and the United States is also not insignificant in the security realm. India's successful testing of an intermediate-range ballistic missile in May 1989 brought a sharp reaction from the Bush administration, which called it a "highly destabilizing development."[59] Then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi cited the missile test as a major achievement in "our continuing efforts to safeguard our independence and security by self-reliant means."[60] The imposition of a two-year selective trade sanction in 1992 by the United States against India and Russia for the latter's agreement to sell rocket missile technology to the former brought on strong reaction in India.[61]

India maintains its refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its preference for a global rather than a regional approach to nonproliferation. The NPT review conference, which concluded in spring 1995 with a vote by acclamation to extend the treaty indefinitely, produced a reaction by the Indian government suggesting that the action was "conferring legitimacy on double standards," referring to the nuclear haves versus the have nots.[62] Despite the

[56] Clyde Farnsworth, "India Expected to Remain on U.S. Trade 'Hit List,'" *New York Times*, 27 April 1990. See also *Times of India*, 11 April 1993.

[57] Clyde Farnsworth, "U.S. Likely to Forgo Sanctions Against India," *New York Times*, 14 June 1990. For a discussion of contemporary North–South disputes on trade in which India is a key figure, see Jeffrey Schott, *The Global Trade Negotiations: What Can be Achieved*? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, September 1990), esp. 26–36.

[58] For a discussion of disagreements, see Kevin Watkins, *Fixing the Rules: North-South Issues in International Trade and GATT Uruguay Round* (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992).

[59] *Data India*, 22–28 May 1989 (New Delhi: Press Trust of India, 1989), 242.

[60] Ibid., 241.

[61] Sanjoy Hazarika, "U.S. Warns Russia India over Transfer of Technology," *New York Times*, 3 May 1992; and Barbara Crossette, "U.S. Imposes a Ban over Rocket Sale," *New York Times*, 12 May 1992. See also *India Abroad*, 24 April 1992, 18. Both the ruling party and opposition members of Parliament contested the United States position and suggested that it had a bearing not only on India's space program but on its autonomy of action.

[62] Sanjoy Hazarika, "Treaty to Curb Atom Arms," *New York Times*, 16 May 1995. For potential dialogue between India and the United States that is in the spirit rather than the letter of the NPT, see

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final vote, during the month-long conference, resistance to the U.S. drive for indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty had come from a number of important Third World states including Mexico, Venezuela, Indonesia, Egypt, and Nigeria. The U.S. also had to wage a strong campaign against the preferred position of a large number of states at the conference for secret ballots for voting on the treaty.[63]

The issue of nuclear proliferation, which figures prominently in U.S. security policy after a period of relative neglect under Republican administrations, could be viewed as a new-found commitment to global demilitarization or simply a renewed effort to check the rise of any challenge to U.S. military supremacy in the wake of the cold war. A high level Pentagon document leaked to the press soon after Clinton assumed office envisioned a world in which U.S. leadership "must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."[64] While this cannot be taken as indication of official policy, it presumably points to the kinds of options being considered seriously. Overall, the evolving shift by the United States from an East-West security orientation toward mid-intensity conflict involving recalcitrant regional powers from U.S. perspective is not likely to sit well with independent minded Third World countries.[65] Coupled with U.S. efforts to control the flow of conventional arms in the Third World, this could be perceived as shoring up American dominance.

U.S. positions should be seen in light of the fact that its post-cold war security framework is still not fully formulated. The gap between rhetoric and reality of a "new world order" based on international law and multilateralism however is not insignificant.[66] Weaker countries clearly stand to gain most when rules rather than force govern international relations. But if the first post-cold war conflict is any guide, serious questions must be raised regarding the ability of international organizations like the United Nations to go beyond the interests of its dominant members.[67]

Francine Frankel and Deepa Ollapally, "Bridging the Nonproliferation Divide" in Francine Frankel, ed., *Bridging the Nonproliferation Divide* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), 348–357.

[63] Barbara Crossette, "Treaty Aimed at Halting Spread of Nuclear Weapons Extended," *New York Times*, 12 May 1995. While the extension was a clear foreign policy victory for the Clinton administration, the conference also revealed persisting problems of legitimacy of the existing nuclear order for the longer term.

[64] The document was leaked to the *New York Times*, 8 March 1992. The document called for high priority to be given to proliferation in South Asia, including American willingness to destroy nuclear capability in any region.

[65] For a discussion of mid-intensity conflict model, see Michael Klare, "The Pentagon's New Paradigm" in Sifry and Cerf, *Gulf War Reader*.

[66] See for example, Michael Kinsley, "Taking International Law Seriously" in ibid.

[67] See, for example, the opinion of Clovis Maksoud, former ambassador from the Arab League to the UN in "The Arab World's Quandary," *World Policy Journal* 8 (Summer 1991).

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The end of the cold war has also witnessed the emergence of so-called liberal triumphalism centered in the United States and a renewed effort at spreading Western liberal democratic conceptions. While the Third World in many ways is experiencing what may be termed a crisis of vision, there is little evidence that it will easily embrace Western liberalism. In this context, the turn toward religious revivalism in many areas may be interpreted as a search for a more domestically authentic vision that transcends the twin ideologies of the cold war. More specifically, for example, even in the area of human rights, the particulars of the recent U.S. drive are likely to conflict with Third World societies where the social collective tends to be placed above the individual.[68]

Conclusion

Indo–U.S. relations tend to exemplify a U.S.–Third World relationship in which the key issue pitting the United States against the Third World has related to the pace and nature of those countries' integration into the liberal world order and the meshing of their world views with U.S. conceptions. The conflicts in Indo–U.S. relations have thus emanated from factors that are much more bilateral and deep seated than the realist model would allow. India's domestically conditioned nationalism, motivated by politico-economic and ideological aspirations, cannot be expected to dissipate simply as a function of the recent external power realignments.

Indeed, focusing on political-economy and ideology should point to problems for general U.S.–Third World relations in the future. The U.S.-sponsored liberal model's prescription for Third World countries has at its center the example of the export-led successes of the Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). But without a receptive and open economic order with the rich industrialized countries ready to absorb the exports, the results could be disastrous. Current indications are not promising in this regard.[69] Moreover, most likely to be hard hit by rising protectionism in the United States are assertive industrializers like India and Brazil.

Prospects for painless opening of Third World economies are also not good given that the international market usually exacts a high social price in poor countries.[70] In democratic Third World states like India, such costs may ultimately

[68] See, for example, Bidyut Sarkar, "Need to Redefine Human Rights," *Times of India*, 14 July 1993; see also Fareed Zakaria, "A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (March/April 1994).

[69] See, for example, Deepa Ollapally, "The South Looks North: The Third World in the New World Order," *Current History,* April 1993, 175–178; and R. Broad and J. Cavanaugh, "No More Nics," in Jeff Frieden and David Lake, *International Political Economy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

[70] Walden Bello and Stephanie Rosenfeld, "Dragons in Distress: The Crisis of the NICs," *World Policy Journal* 7 (Summer 1990) discuss the social costs of the NIC success and the underlying instability. At a unique conference on Social Policy and Economic Liberalization: Contrasting Brazilian and Indian Experiences and Strategies held at Sao Paulo, the prognosis was grim on both social and economic fronts. See Arvind Das, "Brazil and India: Comparing Notes on Liberalization," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 19 February 1994, 416–417.

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prove too much for the government to absorb. This does not bode well for the simultaneous push for democratization and liberalization by the United States. While the clear trend at this juncture is for countries to move toward the U.S.-led liberal model, part of the motivation for Third World countries to do so is that it is effectively the only game in town. However, it would be imprudent not to differentiate between the former communist states of Eastern Europe and the Third World. The market model is seen in Eastern Europe as an antidote to state socialism and a prospective solution for its ills. In contrast, in much of the Third World, it has been the historical experience with capitalism that has failed to provide answers. Indeed, disillusionment with both capitalism and socialism could give rise to more localized and variegated ideological and nationalist responses, which would require a much more nuanced and sophisticated analytical framework for understanding such developments than what conventional realism offers.[71] In terms of U.S. foreign policy, if the past is any guide, U.S. policy makers are not likely to be prepared to meet this challenge. Thus it would seem to be a mistake to make too much of the current ascendency of the market model and liberal ideology and accompanying expectations of significant and sustained improvements in U.S.–Third World relations.

[71] For a view that new global conflicts will be culturally rooted, see an essay by the prominent political scientist Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993).

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Classification and Consolidation: Some Lessons from the Greek Dictatorship

NANCY BERMEO

Recent scholarship on regime change has gone through three phases. In the late 1960s and the mid-1970s, the disintegration of democracies in South America, Asia, Africa, and Greece stimulated a wave of works on the breakdown of democratic regimes.[1] In the next decade, the collapse of the resulting authoritarian regimes led to a new wave of theory on the breakdown of dictatorship.[2] Today, in the 1990s, as the democracies that emerged from dictatorships evince a surprising durability, scholars are moving into a third area of research—that of regime consolidation.[3]

[1] The most often cited sources on the breakdown of democracy are Guillermo O'Donnell's, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); and Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978). See also David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); and James Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976).

[2] See the following works on the breakdown of dictatorship: Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule*, vols. 1-4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988); Enrique Baloyra, *Comparing New Democracies: Transitions and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone* (London: Westview Press, 1987); John Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping With the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982); James Malloy and Mitchell Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).

[3] For sets of essays on consolidation, see Ulrike Liebert and Maurizio Cotta, *Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe* (London: Pintern Publishers, 1990); Enrique Baloyra et al., *Lecciones Para Demócratas en Transición* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Belgrano, 1987); and John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

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This third move will prove more fruitful if we take some time to examine the intellectual baggage we carted along on our previous and related excursions. Following fast-paced politics in the real world (and an unfortunate faddishness in the social sciences), the agenda for studies of regime change has shifted so quickly that we run the risk of moving on to new terrain ill prepared. By re-examining and unpacking some of the key concepts that emerged in the earlier phases of our work on regime change, this article aims at making our next intellectual task less burdensome. By reconsidering these past conceptions in the context of a comparative study of the 1967–1974 Greek dictatorship, the article also aims at setting the record straight on a much discussed but poorly understood case of southern European authoritarianism.

Theories of Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism and the Realities of the Greek Dictatorship

Defining Terms

Guillermo O'Donnell's theory of bureaucratic-authoritarianism is probably the most important collection of insights to emerge from inquiries into the demise of democracy in the 1970s. In an effort to explain the breakdown of democracy in some of Latin America's most developed nations, O'Donnell offered a compelling critique of what were then widely shared assumptions about the positive association between economic development and democratization. His analysis of the collapse of democracy in Argentina and Brazil led him to two conclusions. First, the dictatorships he studied were so different from their predecessors that they warranted a specific name: they were neither personalist regimes nor totalitarian regimes but *bureaucratic-authoritarian* (BA) regimes. Second, there was "an elective affinity" between this new form of dictatorship and a certain type of development.[4] Bureaucratic-authoritarianism emerged because of capitalist modernization and the economic and political crises that accompanied a certain phase of this process.

Though the exact nature of the economic crisis that triggers bureaucratic-authoritarianism has been widely and fruitfully debated since O'Donnell's original formulation,[5] there remains a strong consensus that bureaucratic-authoritarianism is the fruit of an alliance between conservative elements in the military and a "highly oligopolized and transnationalized bourgeoisie" facing hypermobilization and economic crisis.[6] Though the specific descriptions of this regime type vary somewhat from author to author, the term has come to mean "a type of authoritari-

[4] O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*.

[5] See Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*.

[6] Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State" in Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism*, 292–293.

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anism characterized by a self-avowedly technocratic, bureaucratic, non-personalistic approach to policy-making."[7]

This form of dictatorship emerges in states with relatively "high modernization,"[8] and its originators typically have two clear missions from the outset. The first is to restore social order and, relatedly, business confidence. The second is to promote a highly transnationalized pattern of economic growth. Toward these ends, these regimes deliberately liquidate the institutions of political democracy, exclude considerations of the popular sector in economic policy making, and increase "preexisting inequities in the distribution of societal resources."[9]

Before the third wave of democratization began, the concept of bureaucratic-authoritarianism had such appeal that scholars dealing with the broadest possible range of noncommunist dictatorships hurried to fit their cases to the BA model. Likewise, scholars who had come to see the logic of the BA model in the Southern Cone states (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) used it as a ready lens to study and understand dictatorships that were in a figurative and sometimes literal sense very distant from the model's point of origin. In a discipline that discourages descriptive work and is starved for appealing theory, this two-way pressure is perfectly predictable, but it is also problematic. This comparative study of the Greek dictatorship suggests how and why.

The Greek dictatorship that began with a colonels' coup in April 1967 and ended with a military withdrawal in July 1974 is typically deemed a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime."[10] Yet a close analysis of the Greek dictatorship reveals an uneasy fit between the theoretical construct summarized above and the realities of the Greek state under the notorious colonels. Though there can be no doubt that the colonels erected a vile dictatorship, the regime they created differed in important ways from both the abstract definition of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state and from the classic examples of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Latin America.

Before beginning the analysis of the Greek case, it might be useful to consider why a misclassification such as this really matters. The social sciences are full of inflated and artificial terms that only serve to obscure simple truths. Why should the misuse of this particular term be worthy of discussion? Is this an inquiry into the misapplication of the meaningless? The first point to make is that the term bureaucratic-authoritarianism is highly meaningful in two senses: first, because it has meaning for almost everyone trained in comparative politics, and second, because its meaning is literally "full" of implications. Classifying Greece as a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime conveys a great many things to a great many social scientists. Getting the classification wrong not only distorts the realities of a given regime but leads us to make erroneous predictions about

[7] David Collier, "Glossary" in ibid.
[8] O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, 90.
[9] O'Donnell, "Tensions," 292–293.
[10] O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, 89–91, 206.

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its future. Unpacking this overloaded category will enable us to refine not only what we think we know about Greece, but what we think we know about dictatorship as well.

The Realities of the Greek Dictatorship

The Origins of the Regime

As stated above, classifying a regime as bureaucratic-authoritarian indicates not only that it has a specific set of qualities but that it has a specific origin as well. Robert Kaufman provides a succinct description of the origins of BA regimes in an essay on the classic cases of Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. He states that BA regimes emerge "in the context of accelerating prices," "falling growth rates," and "a decline in the inflow of direct foreign investment." They emerge as "problem solving devices" to abate severe capitalist crises and strong popular threats to public order.[11]

Though this is an accurate summary of the factors that preceded military intervention in Latin America's Southern Cone, it bears only a vague resemblance to the situation preceding the 1967 coup in Greece. Though there is no doubt that widespread political mobilization provided a challenge to the type of public order that had prevailed since the civil war, the methods that mobilized groups used to express their grievances were highly conventional. Strikes and demonstrations became increasingly common in the early 1960s, but there were few, if any, bombings, property occupations, kidnappings, or acts of revolutionary violence. Demonstrations increased and several fires were set after George Papandreou left office, but Panayotis Kanellopoulos himself (the civilian who led the Greek government before the coup) asserted that the period of high mobilization had ended long before the military intervention occurred. He believed that "the main battlefield" at the time of the coup was no longer in the streets but in "the Parliament."[12]

On the economic front, Greek capitalists confronted uncertainty, but they did not confront either a serious capitalist crisis or a serious challenge to capitalism from the state. As Figure 1 shows, prices were accelerating in the years before the coup, but not at the rates of comparable periods in the classic cases of bureaucratic-authoritarianism.

Most importantly, there is little empirical indication that accelerating prices were acting as a significant barrier to investment. The volume of foreign invest-

[11] Robert Kaufman, "Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule" in Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism*, 190–191.

[12] Solon Gregoriades, *Istoria tes Diktatorias* (Athens: Ekdoseis Kapopoulos, 1975), vol. i, 47; and Panayotis Kanellopoulos, *Istorika Dokimia* (Athens: s.n., 1975), 129. Many of the bombings which did occur were thought to be the work of people on the right. Kanellopoulos wrote to Karamanlis in March 1967 complaining that recent bombings were "the work of stupid brains from our own party." He goes on to reason (quite properly) that "the left and center have nothing to gain by acting this way" (that is using bombs) and that "they are afraid of provoking a reaction."

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

FIGURE 1

Rate of Inflation

ment in Greece increased five times between 1960 and 1964, and in 1965 and 1966 there was "a spectacular advance in foreign capital investment."[13] Capitalists were still quite willing to expand and even initiate new productive facilities on the eve of the colonels' coup. In the three years preceding the coup, the number of new production facilities increased 72 percent, while the number of permits issued for plant expansion increased 29 percent.[14]

Just as the number of new factories rose steadily in the years before the coup, the number of enterprises going bankrupt declined. The number of bankruptcies in Greece declined steadily from a high of over 1200 firms in 1960 to a low of 746 in 1966.[15] With new firms increasing and bankruptcies decreasing, one can only conclude that a sense of capitalist crisis must have been highly restricted, if indeed it existed at all.

This point is reinforced by the evidence presented in Figure 2. In the five years preceding the coup, the growth in gross domestic product (GDP) was always positive. There was some decline in the growth rate, as the classic explanation for bureaucratic-authoritarianism would lead us to expect, but in contrast with the classic cases of the Southern Cone, the decline was extremely modest. I.S. Pesma-

[13] Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships*, trans. David Fernback (London: New Left Books, 1976), 17.

[14] *Statiske Epeteris tes Hellados* (Athens: Ethniko, 1960–1980).

[15] Ibid.

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

Source: World Tables- 1976, 1980, 1983

FIGURE 2

Change in Gross Domestic Product

zoglou is correct in asserting that "the Greek economy was strong" in the beginning of 1967.[16]

When we consider the very different political contexts of the four sets of figures, the contrast between the Greek and the Latin American cases becomes even clearer. Two contextual differences deserve mention. The first is that Greece, unlike the Southern Cone states, was on its way to becoming a member of the European Economic Community (EEC) at the time that the military seized power. Since membership in the community was confined exclusively to democratic states, the coup constituted a serious setback for those members of the Greek elite who sought EEC entry. This fact undermines the strength of any supposed association between the coup makers and the "oligopolized and highly transnationalized" fraction of the Greek bourgeoisie.[17] Although oligopolies would presumably be harmed by EEC rules, truly transnationalized capitalists would welcome unimpaired access to foreign markets. Since the European market was much more important than any other market in the world—including the United States—exclusion from the EEC had especially important and negative implications for transnationalized capital in Greece.[18] Why this particular fraction

[16] I. S. Pesmazoglou, *Agonistika* (Athens: Ikaros, 1974) vol. i, 94.

[17] The phrase is from O'Donnell's already quoted description of the origins of the BA regime. O'Donnell, "Tensions," 292-293.

[18] By the time of the coup, the value of exports to the European Community states was more than double the value of exports to North America as a whole. Bank of Greece Economic Research Division, *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, 31 (April 1968): 81.

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of Greek capital would choose bureaucratic-authoritarianism as its instrument of rule in a European context is difficult to imagine. Certainly, the junta had some support from some fractions of transnational capital. (The Greek Shipowners' Association is said to have made Papadopoulos its president for life.) However, there is no evidence that any group of Greek capitalists knew of the coup in advance.

The domestic context of the Greek military coup was as unique and important as its international context. In Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, the military intervened to oust left-wing governments that seemed unable to change the downward trend in the GDP growth rates. Although George Papandreou's progressive Center Union party won the Greek national elections in 1963 and 1964, Papandreou was forced to resign from the premiership after a dispute with the king. When the Greek military actually took power the right-wing Kanellopoulos controlled the government. Kanellopoulos, as even his critics admit, was unambiguously opposed to the coup. This had serious implications for regime legitimacy, but it is highly significant that the leader of the largest conservative and highly pro-capitalist party in the country would take this position. Pro-capitalist parties in the classic BA regimes took an antidemocratic stance when the new regimes seized power.

The absence of a capitalist crisis is also evinced by the fact that in Greece there was no clear temporal relationship between the increasing electoral popularity of the opposition and the decreasing rate of economic growth. Rightly or wrongly, capital felt threatened by opposition victories in the three Latin American cases and acted accordingly. Greek capital behaved very differently. Though the Center Union won a plurality in 1963 and then a majority in 1964, the rate of economic growth actually rose in these years. Most impressive is the fact that private corporate capital formation rose over 20 percent during the opposition's first (and only) year in power.[19]

The Center Union (CU) under George Papandreou was radically different from Chile's Unidad Popular, Brazil's Workers party, and Argentina's Peronista party. Though all four political groups had redistributive elements in their programs, the scope of redistribution envisioned by the Center Union was much more modest than that of the other parties in question. Moreover, the Center Union simply "continued the ERE [National Radical Union] economic policy with respect to industrial infrastructure."[20] Despite its vocal left wing, the Center Union was a party that wanted to appeal to the political center, as well as to the left. Indeed, it was the success of its appeal to the center that lay at the root of its February 1964 electoral majority. As Constantine Tsoucalas maintains, "the real strengthening of the Centre [Union] did not come from the [left-wing EDA

[19] OECD, *National Accounts: Detailed Tables, Vol. II, 1965–1981* (OECD: Paris, 1982).
[20] Constantine Tsoucalas, *The Greek Tragedy* (London: Penguin Books, 1969), 182.

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or Democratic left] but from the [right-wing Radical Union] whose share of the poll fell from 43.1 percent to 35.26 percent."[21]

Nicos Mouzelis argues that the formation of a more open parliamentary regime led by the Center Union "posed no substantial danger for the bourgeoisie." The bourgeoisie may have viewed George Papandreou's "liberalization policies" with "apprehension," but it "was not sufficiently alarmed to opt for a dictatorial solution."[22] The economic data presented above demonstrate the veracity of Mouzelis's argument.[23]

In all the classic cases of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, the military acted in alliance with broad sectors of domestic capital, and under an accurate perception that a substantial sector of the civilian population would support their intervention. The connection between economic crisis, a capitalist-military alliance, and civilian support for military intervention seems so clear in the early cases of BA that scholars have become convinced that "all armed forces require a minimally favorable climate of national opinion before they can carry out a coup."[24]

Although it is hard to determine what a minimally favorable climate of national opinion might be, it seems that the colonels in Greece acted with almost no active civilian support.[25] The fact that the vast majority of the nation's capitalists did not seem threatened in the years preceding the coup helps to explain why. It also helps to distinguish the Greek dictatorship from the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America.

The Nature and Performance of the Colonels' Dictatorship

The fact that the Greek dictatorship did not originate in a period of profound capitalist crisis had important implications for the nature of the regime. Just as

[21] The Center Union won a plurality in the 3 November 1963 elections, but Papandreou refused to depend either on the right or the left for parliamentary support. Instead, he called elections for February 1964 and won an unprecedented 52.72 percent of the vote vs. 35.3 percent for the right wing Radical Union (ERE) and 11.8 percent for the left-wing Democratic Left (EDA). Tsoucalas, *The Greek Tragedy*, 180.

[22] Nicos Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism in the Balkans and Latin America* (New York: St. Martins, 1986), 141. On another occasion, Mouzelis argues that "neither the Greek bourgeosie nor any of its fractions should be shown as the 'creators' of the coup." See Nicos Mouzelis, *Modern Greece* (New York: Holmes and Meir, 1978), 132. See also Tsoucalas, *The Greek Tragedy*, 183.

[23] Mouzelis's perspective on this point is widely shared. See Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974–1983" in O'Donnell, et al., eds.; *Transition from Authoritarian Rule*; and "Athenian" (or Rodis Roufos-Kanakaris), the author of *Inside the Colonels' Greece*, trans. by Richard Clogg (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972), 67. He writes that "capitalists' interests have derived interesting benefits from the coup without having given it prior support."

[24] Charles Gillespie and Luis González, "The Survival of Old and Autonomous Institutions" in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1989), 219.

[25] See Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery*, 172; Yannopoulos, "The Opposition" 175; and Theodore Couloumbis's testimony in Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.

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the etiological components of the BA model fail to fit the Greek case, so the descriptive elements of the model fail to fit as well. If we compare the description of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state to the state that the Greek junta actually created, we see several important differences. Though elements of the original junta might have sought to create a nonpersonalistic state, the roles that George Papadopoulos and then Ioannides played in decision making gave the junta the air of a highly personalist government.[26] The regime was officially run by a revolutionary council, but Papadopoulos persistently avoided convening it so that even a right-wing newspaper questioned its existence.[27] Stylianos Pattakos, who was supposedly a member of the ruling troika, complained of Papadopoulos's "asphyxiating centralization of power" as early as November 1968.[28] Likewise, Colonel Dimitrios Stamatelopoulos, who supported the coup initially, felt forced to remind the dictator that he "was not an autocrat but only a first among equals."[29]

Despite public pretensions to the contrary, ministers had virtually no autonomy concerning important issues, and Papadopoulos was the state's "uncontested and seemingly incontestable leader" for six years.[30] The fact he had the slogan "Papadopoulos-Greece" painted "spontaneously" throughout the countryside indicates how much he sought and acquired a "personalist" form of rule. Ioannides sought the same sort of personal power but obviously did not retain it for long.[31]

The fact that the Greek dictatorship was more personalist and less dominated by a technocratic bureaucracy than the BA model would lead us to expect was partially a function of the regime's consistently low level of legitimacy. The vast majority of the nation's technocrats would have nothing to do with the regime. Presenting an image of an expert technocracy—an image intrinsic to the BA model—was impossible in the Greek case. Whereas the military governments of Chile, Brazil, and Argentina attracted economists from some of the most competitive universities in the world, the Greek junta attracted widespread derision from the Greek intellectual elite. This was true even in fervently pro-capitalist academic circles. This is why "the junta had trouble recruiting ministers who were even remotely presentable." Ministries were sometimes "offered to five or six people before finding a taker."[32]

House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st sess. *Greece, Spain and the Southern NATO Strategy* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1971), 18.

[26] For a related argument about the Chilean case, see Karen Remmer, "Neopatrimonialism: The Politics of Military Rule in Chile 1973–1987," *Comparative Politics* 21 (January 1989): 149-170.

[27] C. M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985), 20.

[28] Gregoriades, *Istoria tes Diktatorias*, vol. i, 234–6, as quoted in ibid., 55.

[29] *Vradyni*, 11 May 1970, as quoted in ibid., 77.

[30] "Athenian," *Inside the Colonels' Greece*, 169.

[31] Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*, 142–145. Woodhouse argues that the internal coup of 1973 was brought on by frustrations with the personalist nature of Papadopoulos's power and the writing of the 1973 Constitution, which officially institutionalized Papadopoulos's hegemony.

[32] "Athenian," *Inside the Colonels' Greece*, 78.

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The broad gulf between even conservative technocrats and the military government at least partially resulted from the unique manner in which the Greek junta moved to "liquidate the institutions of political democracy."[33] At first glance, the Greek case seems to conform perfectly to this dimension of the bureaucratic-authoritarian model, but there are some radical differences here as well. Papadopoulos and his junta behaved exactly like their dictatorial counterparts in South America by closing parliament, banning political parties, and trying to exert strong controls on trade unions and civil liberties. Like its vile counterparts in the Southern Cone, the Greek dictatorship terrorized, tortured, and jailed a great many civilians associated with the left and center-left. The Greek junta is unique, however, in its treatment of the parliamentary right. In none of the original cases of bureaucratic-authoritarianism were the leaders of right-wing parties immediately rounded up and jailed as they were in Greece. Although the net of repression was cast more broadly as the Southern Cone dictatorships met with more resistance, none of the South American counterparts of Kanellopoulos were arrested when the military seized power in the classic BA regimes. The military did not have to arrest right-wing politicians in these other cases, because it initially had their passive if not active support.[34] This was not the case in Greece. The majority of ERE deputies refused any cooperation with the colonels, and many publicly opposed the dictatorship from its inception through appeals to the Council of Europe and the American government.[35] S. Victor Papacosma is correct in stating that though "past military coups had politicians as collaborators or immediate beneficiaries," the officers who seized power in April 1967 ruled with "unprecedented independence."[36]

How did the dictatorship's policies affect pre-existing inequities? Did the regime exclude considerations of the popular sector in policy making? It is probably safe to say that the junta's principal acts of redistribution took the form of corruption and nepotism, but it is difficult to prove that the popular sector was materially worse off during the dictatorship than previously. As Figure 3 shows, employee compensation as a percent of GDP in Greece was extremely low by European standards (lower even than in Spain, which remained a dictatorship until 1977). However, the ratio of compensation to GDP actually improved during the junta years. Even the lowest figure for the dictatorship (30 percent in 1973) was more or less equal to the highest figure of the previous regime. Surprisingly, real wages in manufacturing rose consistently throughout the period from 1967 to 1974 despite an increase in inflation.[37]

[33] The phrase is from O'Donnell's description of the BA regime. See O'Donnell, "Tensions," 292.

[34] See Arturo Valenzuela and Samuel Valenzuela, "Party Oppositions Under Authoritarian Rule" in Valenzuela and Valenzuela, eds., *Military Rule in Chile* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), 208–210.

[35] "Athenian," *Inside the Colonels' Greece*, 133.

[36] S. Victor Papacosma, *The Military in Greek Politics* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1977), 189.

[37] World Bank, *World Tables 1988–1989* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); and *Trapeza tes Hellados, 1959–1974* (Athens: Ethniko, 1959–1974).

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TABLE 1

Industrial Employment in Years of Dictatorship (Index: 1980 = 100)

Year	*Greece*	*Argentina*	*Brazil*	*Uruguay*	*Chile*
1	68.0	130.2	41.3	119.0	128.0
2	65.7	122.2	44.1	121.6	122.7
3	66.9	110.7	44.5	125.9	114.2
4	72.1	108.3	46.5	132.7	106.3
5	75.3	100	49.4	138.6	109.5
6	77.8	87.7	53.7	152.1	107.4
7	82.4	82.9	69.8	160.8	105.7
8	87.1	85.6	73.9	100	100
9	89.9	87.9	77.1	95.7	93.1
10	—	—	82.1	77.9	73.5
11	—	—	86.7	73.3	73.2
12	—	—	91.9	75.1	81.6
13	—	—	95.4	76.3	85.7
14	—	—	100	—	—

Source: *World Tables*, 1988–1989 edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

The years denoted 1–14 represent the following calendar years: Greece: 1967–1975, Argentina: 1976–1984, Brazil: 1967–1980, Uruguay: 1973–1985, Chile: 1973–1985.

The picture presented in Table 1 shows how this increase in real wages accompanied an increase in employment in the industrial sector. This too distinguishes the Greek case from the Chilean, the Argentinian, and the Uruguayan, where the number of jobs in the industrial sector actually decreased during military rule.[38]

It is difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether the Papadopoulos-Ioannides regime included considerations of the popular sector in policy making. The regime's rhetoric was laced with populist themes, but most observers believe that the themes were meaningless in terms of concrete policies. Studying how the dictatorship allocated state resources gives us a sense of regime priorities and a sense of which social groups the colonels sought to please.

The regime seems to have shown little consideration for the popular sector in allocating resources for education. The percentage of the budget allocated for education dropped as soon as the military assumed power. The 8.89 percent budget allocation for education in 1969 was the lowest figure since 1957. Though expenditure rose somewhat as the regime encountered resistance, allocations never equaled the figures for the early 1960s.[39] Thus, compared to Greek regimes in the past, the dictatorship's educational policy was highly regressive. Papadopoulos is said to have stated privately, "we don't have all that much need of

[38] Ronaldo Munch et al., eds., *Argentina: From Anarchism to Peronism* (London: Zed Books, 1987); and Valenzuela and Valenzuela, eds., *Military Rule in Chile*.

[39] Government of Greece, *Statistike Epeteris tes Hellados*, 1960–1980 (Athens: Ethniko, 1960–1980).

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

FIGURE 3

Employee Compensation as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product

educated people."[40] This mentality and the regime's cuts in higher education are out of keeping with the supposedly technocratic content of BA policy making.

The picture becomes more complex if we consider expenditures on social services. The military government cut overall spending during its early years in power and then increased spending to historic highs from 1970 to 1973. A similar pattern occurs with general social welfare expenditures. Here too, the military decreased spending through 1969 but then increased spending to historic highs in 1970 and 1971. In the last five years of military budgeting, social welfare spending was higher than it had been under any government since at least 1960.

It is risky to speculate on the meaning of these figures, and I shall not argue that the Greek junta played any sort of benevolent role with the popular sector. This would overlook the highly self-serving nature of the regime. It would also involved putting too much faith in the statistics of a police state. But putting these spending patterns in their proper political context, we might draw the conclusion that Papadopoulos and his junta were aware of their total lack of legitimacy by 1970 and that they began to reverse their antisocial spending cuts (on paper or in reality) in an effort to dampen popular hostility.[41] In any case,

[40] "Athenian," *Inside the Colonels' Greece*, 88.

[41] John (I. S.) Pesmazoglou has argued that spending patterns reflect the regime's attempts "to acquire popularity by displaying concern about the interests of lower income groups." See "The Greek Economy" in Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos, eds., *Greece Under Military Rule* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), 77.

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TABLE 2

State Spending Under Three Dictatorships: Greece, Brazil, and Argentina (figures are a percentage of current expenditure)

Year of Dictatorship	*Greece*	*Brazil*	*Argentina*
Spending on Education:			
1	11.7	5.8	1.6
2	11.3	9.0	1.8
3	8.9	7.4	2.3
4	10.5	7.2	2.6
5	10.4	7.1	3.1
6	9.9	6.2	NA
7	10.1	4.7	NA
8	10.3	5.8	NA
Spending on Social Welfare:			
1	17.3	11.3	1.7
2	17.4	13.6	2.3
3	15.6	11.7	1.9
4	20.9	11.6	0.5
5	20.9	10.9	0.5
6	19.9	8.4	NA
7	19.7	6.5	NA
8	19.7	8.2	NA
Spending on Defense:			
1	19.1	9.2	13.5
2	18.9	15.6	16.2
3	17.6	14.0	15.8
4	20.1	18.3	17.9
5	17.9	16.3	14.4
6	17.5	13.8	NA
7	17.8	14.0	NA
8	21.6	18.5	NA

Note: Several ministries are aggregated under Social Welfare Budgets for both Brazil and Argentina. The figure for Greece is also a compilation exceeding the allocation for the Social Services ministry alone.

Sources: (Greece) *Statistike Epeteris tes Hellados 1960–1980*; (Brazil) *Orçamento Nacional*, 1964–1980; (Argentina) *Anuario Estadistico*, 1976–1984.

Figures for the budgets of Brazil and Argentina were compiled by Marie-Elena Angulo and Elizabeth Doherty.

the spending patterns of the Greek dictatorship were very different from the spending patterns of the BA regimes in Brazil and Argentina. Table 2 puts Greek spending in comparative perspective.

Myths and Misconceptions About Legitimacy and Performance

The preceding discussion illustrates how the Greek dictatorship differed from the bureaucratic-authoritarian model in both its origins and its internal characteristics. The fact that the colonels intervened for largely personal reasons[42] meant that

[42] Thano S. Veremis argues convincingly that the coup was prompted "by a sense of threat" to the "career prospects of officers who felt their positions endangered by popular participation." Veremis,

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they had few allies, even in the earliest days of their regime. Nikiforos Diamandouros has documented the "quasi-unanimous refusal of the parliamentary right to cooperate with the military" or to lend "their regime a badly needed mantle of legitimacy."[43] Almost all Greek-speaking scholars agree as well that the regime's legitimacy was extremely low outside the parliamentary right. Theodore Coloumbis argues that the regime was "almost totally opposed" in urban areas.[44] George Yannopoulos writes that the colonels were supported by only a "very small percentage" of the Greek people and the sales of pro-junta dailies hardly ever exceeded 10 percent of total sales."[45] Likewise, John Pesmazoglou concluded that five years after the coup the regime rested "on force" alone "without evidence that it had gained the support of any appreciable portion of the population."[46]

It is instructive to note that the regime's extremely low level of popular support coexisted with a relatively good economic performance. Here too, a study of Greece is highly illuminating, because many social science theorists assume that good economic performance enhances legitimation. The Greek case suggests that though money can probably buy votes, legitimacy is harder to come by.

Statements about a positive correlation between economic performance and legitimacy permeate the literature that deals with the foundations of stable democracy. Seymour Martin Lipset made the point as early as 1960.[47] Larry Diamond and Juan Linz reiterated the theme in 1989, asserting that there is a "strong correlation" between "economic performance" on the one hand and "legitimation," "consolidation," and "persistence" on the other.[48] James Malloy writes that "the shift from one type of regime to another" usually occurs because of policy failures and that economic failures are the most important of all.[49]

These generalizations may hold in other settings, but they do not help us understand either the origins of the Greek dictatorship or its demise. Scholars outside the Hellenic studies community have assumed that the performance of the Greek junta was a "resounding failure" comparable to the last dictatorships in Peru and Argentina.[50] There can be little doubt that the regime was disastrous

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"Greece: Veto and Impasse, 1967–1974" in C. Clapham and George Philip, eds., *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 32.

[43] Diamandouros, "Prospects for Democracy," 147.

[44] Subcommittee on Europe, *Greece*, 18.

[45] George Yannopoulos, "The Opposition Forces Since the Military Coup" in Clogg and Yannopoulos, eds., *Greece Under Military Rule*, 175.

[46] Pesmazoglou, "Greek Economy," 77.

[47] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man*, (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 61–71.

[48] Larry Diamond and Juan Linz, "Politics, Society and Democracy in Latin America" in *Democracy in Developing Countries, vol. 4, Latin America*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 1989), 44.

[49] James M. Malloy, "The Politics of Transition in Latin America" in Malloy and Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats*, 239.

[50] See for example, O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions*, 20. These authors are correct in asserting that "most of those within the regime concluded that the experience of authoritarian rule was a resounding failure," but the reasons for this sense of failure were not the same across the three cases compared. The Greek regime failed to meet its political goals, but its failure on the socioeconomic level is more ambiguous.

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TABLE 3

Economic Performance during the Greek and Argentine Dictatorships

% Change in GNP			*% Change in Gross Domestic Investment*		
Range	*Greece*	*Argentina*	*Range*	*Greece*	*Argentina*
1	6.11	6.49	1	10.68	20.96
2	9.47	−3.50	2	25.35	−15.93
3	7.92	7.08	3	11.45	10.23
4	7.72	1.55	4	6.26	9.17
5	8.80	−8.25	5	11.42	−23.40
6	7.40	−6.23	6	27.26	−19.72
7	−3.48	2.60	7	−23.34	−10.64

% Change in Fixed Investment			*Domestic Prices (Index 1980 = 100) (Overall − GDP)*		
Range	*Greece*	*Argentina*	*Year*	*Greece*	*Argentina*
1	21.34	20.89	1	24.9	3.0
2	18.63	−12.80	2	25.6	7.8
3	−1.38	6.77	3	26.5	20.2
4	14.02	5.37	4	27.5	51.3
5	15.41	−17.62	5	28.4	100.0
6	7.66	−27.53	6	29.8	207.6
7	−25.59	−5.20	7	35.7	592.2
			8	43.0	2661.0

Source: World Bank, *World Tables*.

The years denoted 1–8 represent the following calendar years: Greece: 1967–1974, Argentina: 1976–1983. (The ranges 1–7 represent change per year.)

on many scores. For one thing, the colonels, like their counterparts in Latin America, marched headlong into a spiral of foreign indebtedness. However, the economic climate in Greece under the colonels was very different from the economic climate in Argentina (1976–1983). The data in Table 3 highlight the dramatic differences between the truly disastrous cases of Argentina and the more ambiguous case of Greece.

The closest and most meaningful comparison to Greece under the junta was not foreign but historical. For the average Greek in the street, the junta's economy was not drastically different from the expanding economy of the previous regime. Even Pesmazoglou (a highly respected opponent of the dictatorship) believes that the steady improvement in living standards that started in the mid-1950s "was not discontinued after 1967."[51] As inept and corrupt as the colonels were, they could not reverse the momentum of economic expansion that existed previously. Table 3 highlights the fact that the economic performance of the junta was by certain important measures rather good.

The political effects of this economic performance were not as salutory as the junta hoped and as certain social scientists would lead us to believe. The junta

[51] Pesmazoglou, *Agonistika*, 75, 42–43.

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created what one author termed a "paradise" for capital.[52] Yet, "the bourgeoisie although it profited from the seven year period, joined, with few exceptions, the general anti-dictatorial movement." Moreover, it "furnished many members of the resistance movement, including leading monopoly capitalists such as Christophoros Stratos."[53]

Why did this fairly good economic performance not lead to regime legitimation and consolidation, even among those who seemingly benefited most in material terms? The answer derives from the fact that political loyalties do not always have a material base or perhaps that the material base of political loyalties cannot be assessed with the sorts of data I have focused on here. To understand why the colonels failed to legitimate their rule or to achieve even a temporary sense of regime consolidation, we must turn away from the measures and language of political economy. We must turn instead to the historical study of political institutions and to the extraordinarily difficult study of political culture. The real barriers to the legitimation of the Papadopoulos-Ioannides regime were less economic than institutional and cultural.

The Greek party system and the Greek military are the institutions that deserve the most attention in this regard. At the time of the coup, the Greek right still maintained a dynamic and viable political party, despite substantial changes in the class composition and politicization of the electorate.[54] One of the reasons conservative civilians and some military officers were opposed to the dictatorship was that democracy had served their interests so very well in the past. The right, as Diamandouros put it, "had succeeded in controlling Greek democracy almost without interruption since the Civil War."[55] Although Papandreou's Center Union had succeeded in gaining an electoral majority in 1964, the majority of ERE leaders were willing to take the risks that another electoral contest involved. Kanellopoulos is rumored to have conceded the ill-fated 1967 election to George Papandreou in hopes that the next electoral victory would be his own.[56] In any case, he stated publicly that "even if the Center won," he and George Papandreou "had already agreed on collaboration and efforts to maintain orderliness."[57]

As Diamandouros has pointed out, electoral competition was a more serious gamble than ever before because economic development had eroded the opportunities for clientelism and exclusion that had advantaged the Greek right in the past. Though some of the right's willingness to take the gamble was probably based on the conviction that elections could simply be manipulated in new ways, there was a willingness to tolerate fair competition as well, and this derived in large part from the unique qualities of Greek political culture and history.[58]

[52] Yannopoulos, "Workers and Peasants Under the Military Dictatorship" in Clogg and Yannopoulos, eds., *Greece Under Military Rule*.

[53] Gregoriades, *Istoria*, vol. 3, 337.

[54] Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery*.

[55] Diamandouros, "Prospects for Democracy," 147.

[56] "Athenian," *Inside the Colonels' Greece*.

[57] Gregoriades, *Istoria*, vol. 1, 48.

[58] For more on resistance from the parliamentary right, see ibid., vol. II, 53 and 297.

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Social scientists whose knowledge of Greece is confined to the period of the dictatorship alone are unaware of those aspects of Greek political culture and history that presented barriers to the consolidation of dictatorship. For example, most scholars outside the Hellenic Studies community are unaware of the fact that Greece instituted universal male suffrage decades before Britain (in 1864) or that the nation's nineteenth-century constitutions were "the most liberal and democratic in all of Europe."[59] Though, as Nicos Mouzelis readily admits, these constitutions were never fully implemented, the fact that they were written and passed at all suggests that at minimum there was a strong strain of interest in formal democracy among the Greek elite early in the development of the modern state. Though virtually every respected student of Greek politics admits that Greek democracy prior to 1974 was flawed and exclusionary, some would agree that "since the Constitution of 1844 and especially the Constitution of 1864, Greece has had a parliamentary system whose orderly operation and longevity could be rivaled by few European states."[60] The fact that there was at least a long-standing parliamentary—as opposed to truly democratic—culture among the Greek political elite does much to explain why the junta's demolition of parliamentary institutions was never legitimated. The coup was preceded by the "bankruptcy of the institutions of the anti-communist state and not a loss of faith in the democratic process."[61]

Understanding the Greek military as an institution is also essential to understanding the regime's failure to gain legitimacy. The Greek military was fraught with historical divisions: between upper-class high-ranking officers and the petit-bourgeois and peasant officers who actually seized power; between monarchists and republicans; between the various services and between democrats and authoritarians. These divisions lessened the likelihood of consolidation. The Greek armed forces also had a comparatively strong history of internal purges—related most recently to World War II and the civil war. This decreased the likelihood of consolidation as well.

Connecting the Past and the Future

The complexities of right-wing parliamentarism and elite political culture in Greece obviously deserve much more attention than I can give them here. My purpose in this context is simply to suggest that questions about regime legitimation and consolidation will not be resolved unless we give more attention to institutional and cultural analysis.

[59] Mouzelis, "Regime Instability and the State in Peripheral Capitalism: A General Theory and A Case Study of Greece," *Woodrow Wilson Center Working Papers* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1980), 1–39.

[60] Thanos Veremis, "The Military" in Kevin Featherstone and Dimitris Katsoudas, eds., *Political Change in Greece before and after the Colonels* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 214.

[61] Diamandouros, "Prospects for Democracy," 149.

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But prior to our musings about which method is appropriate to which research question, we must have a clear idea of exactly what we are studying. We should not ask how Greece as a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime is likely to behave; we should ask instead whether Greece is a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime at all. Political scientists must be certain that attention to history precedes attention to theory, or we are bound to make a whole series of errors. For example, misconceptions about the nature of the Greek regime led inevitably to misconceptions about the consolidation of Greek democracy. Five years after the collapse of the Greek junta, Guillermo O'Donnell wrote:

> [Greece] has made an incomplete but significant advance toward democratization [yet] it is not clear whether, as occurred [in 1976] in Argentina, the spring of democratization will be only an interlude followed by an even more strict bureaucratic-authoritarianism. Certainly, there are many reasons for seeing this as the probable outcome.[62]

O'Donnell was properly cautious. He was looking only at the first few years of the new Greek democracy when he made his prediction. It probably was "not clear whether . . . the spring of democratization would only be an interlude. . . ." However, a careful look at the real origins and nature of the last dictatorship would have led to a more optimistic and accurate assessment of the probabilities of consolidation. Argentina and Greece were not parallel cases. Unlike the Argentine military, which had left power in 1973 only to return again in 1976, the Greek military had not acted in concert with the Greek bourgeoisie or with any political parties of the right, or with any significant civilian support. The Greek junta started and ended its rule with no legitimacy and with only the narrowest base of support, even within fervently pro-capitalist circles. The military as an institution was gravely damaged by the experience of rule and ended military government with an internal coup. In the short run, at least, it was very unlikely to attempt such adventurism again. It was also unlikely to institute a more strict form of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, because it had failed to institute bureaucratic-authoritarianism in the first place. Political institutions and political culture militated against legitimation.

Putting the Greek dictatorship in comparative perspective certainly has its merits. Indeed, it is only through tracing the trajectory of similar cases that social scientists can construct anything approaching predictive theory. But it is essential to get the classifications right before the comparisons begin. Otherwise, the terms we use for classification take on a troublesome autonomy, distorting both our visions of the past and our musings about the future.*

[62] O'Donnell's pessimism extended to Portugal and Spain as well, which he also classified as BA regimes. See O'Donnell, *Modernization*, 206.

* The author thanks Anthi Diamantara and Geoffrey Herrera for research assistance. Princeton University's Center of International Studies and Program in Hellenic Studies deserve thanks for funding.

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Opinion:

The Enola Gay Saved Lives

In the debate over the Smithsonian's display of the Enola Gay and the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan, the *New York Times* published an op-ed article in October 1994 by Kai Bird, who wrote that it is now understood by well known scholars that worst case scenarios of an invasion of Japan anticipated no more than 46,000 American deaths. Thus, it was a humiliating spectacle, he wrote, "scholars being forced to recant the truth" regarding the bomb 'saving lives' since the widely cited figure of one million Americans saved by the bomb cannot be justified through historical research. Because of political pressure, Bird wrote, scholars agreed to censor their own historical knowledge. Thus, Bird concludes, it is a "feel-good myth" to argue that Truman approved the use of the atomic bomb in order to "save American lives."

In the January/February 1995 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, Stanford Professor Barton Bernstein writes that archival evidence shows that by pursuing "alternative tactics instead, [American leaders] *probably could* [my emphasis] still have obviated the dreaded invasion (of Japan) and ended the war by November (1945). . . . Put bluntly, Japanese life—including civilian life—was cheap, and some American leaders, like many rank and file citizens, may well have savored the prospect of punishing the Japanese with the A-bomb."

Of course, all of this "punishing" would have been totally avoided had the Japanese accepted surrender earlier. Bernstein and others like him are determined to ignore the fact that if there was a villain; it was the Japanese leadership that started the war in Asia and stubbornly refused to end it.

Bernstein cites comments from American wartime leaders from General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Admiral William Leahy to argue that surrender could have been secured without the use of the atomic bombs. But is it relevant to examine what Eisenhower or Leahy or other Americans thought was and was not necessary to effect surrender from the Japanese leadership? If we are to examine whether surrender was near or far by August 1945, shouldn't we be looking at Japanese attitudes? If so, there is no reason to believe the Japanese anticipated in July 1945 the war's end by early to mid-August. The Japanese were planning a defense of the main islands in the fall. Eisenhower and Leahy may have been right that surrender could have been secured later that fall without the bombs, but they probably would have admitted also that a later surrender would have meant a different strategic picture for postwar Asia and that many

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Japanese civilian deaths would have had to occur nevertheless by October or November without the use of the bomb.

Of course, it is true that alternatives to the bomb existed. But knowing for certain what your enemy will and will not accept before an explicit offer is made is irresponsible guesswork. In wartime, leaders do not second guess their opponents. How could American politicians possibly know for certain what it would take to achieve unconditional surrender from a nation that was fighting to the death? They might have strong suspicions and understand that the war was going well, but does a responsible wartime leader try a unilateral cease-fire before receiving an explicit surrender statement from an enemy because you believe you are about to win a war? Is not the goal in any war to end it as soon as possible?

During the recent public debate regarding what should appear next to the display of the Enola Gay, no one bothered to point out that the Japanese cabinet that met on 9 August 1945 to decide whether to accept the Allied terms for surrender was locked in stalemate. After two atomic bombs had killed more than 100,000 Japanese at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, plus the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan (ignoring Japan's overtures for Moscow to serve as mediator), those Japanese cabinet members wishing to continue the fight matched those ready to accept surrender. Premier Suzuki Kantaro and Foreign Minister Togo Shijenori reported to the emperor on 9 August 1945 that a decision favorable to a termination of the war could not be expected from either the Supreme Council or the cabinet. In front of the emperor that evening, Naval Chief of Staff Toyoda Soemu insisted that he did not believe Japan would be "positively defeated." For the first time in Japanese history, the emperor himself rose to break the stalemate and directed his cabinet to end the war to stop the suffering of his people.

How can anyone argue with confidence that the atomic bombs were not needed to help end the war or help hasten the surrender? Of course, Japan was militarily defeated by the summer of 1945; many recognized as early as 1944 that Japan was not the military threat to the United States that it was in 1941—but the war continued.

Revisionist histories can be provocative but not necessarily definitive or convincing. Such histories have no lock on the truth. Surrender was a moving target. Japanese Foreign Minister Togo, in fact, completely ignored the 26 July Allied Proclamation of Potsdam until after the two atomic bombs. Bird cites the fact that the Americans had intercepted a Japanese cable that revealed that the Japanese were about to surrender unconditionally—except for the condition that the emperor be retained. Yet the explicit offer never went to the United States.

In the still-definitive work on the end of the Pacific War, *Japan's Decision to Surrender*, historian Robert Butow notes that as late as 30 July, Japan's response to the Potsdam Proclamation was silence. After both bombs were dropped, Army Chief of Staff Umezu Yoshijiro even argued that although ultimate victory was not certain, the army was capable of one more campaign. "We will be able to inflict extremely heavy damage on [an invading] enemy." Japan may have been

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near defeat, but not near surrender. And that's the real historical point. And if that were not enough, loyal Japanese defeated a coup attempt by the more militaristic elements of the cabinet who were attempting to stop the emperor's decision to surrender—after two atomic bombs and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan.

It really is bad history to isolate one brutal act from a terrible war and play "was this event really necessary?" games. The war, like all wars, was a terrible tragedy. Yet there is no way to know what all the ramifications would have been had the Americans suddenly slowed the pace of the war and attempted to effect a surrender from Japan through a siege strategy of the home islands. Maybe such a change would have emboldened the Japanese. Further, while the Americans waited, Chinese, Koreans, Russians, British, and Southeast Asians would have continued to die daily in large numbers while the war dragged on in the larger Pacific theater.

Yes, it is interesting that the United States intercepted the fact that its militarily defeated opponent was trying to come up with a political formula to accept surrender. But so what? That is what all defeated nations do—try to save what they can and attempt some last ditch effort to inflict enough pain on the victor so that he will accept something short of unconditional surrender. If the Japanese leadership was ready for unconditional surrender in July 1945, why did it not bother telling the Americans who were continuing to kill Japanese on a daily basis?

Just six months after Pearl Harbor, starting with Midway, the United States countered with an unbroken series of military victories against Japan, including the capturing of the Marianas and Okinawa and the retaking of the Philippines. Beginning in April 1944, the Japanese leadership saw every major Japanese city virtually burned to the ground one by one through a strategic fire-bombing campaign that was just as catastrophic as the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet for sixteen months, despite no chance to win the Pacific war, Japan refused to accept the Allied surrender terms. Japan even refused to respond to them! A single incendiary attack on Tokyo on 10 March 1945 killed 100,000 Japanese—20,000 more than were killed at Hiroshima. More than 300,000 were killed through strategic bombing in the twelve months prior to the two atomic bombs. All told, three million Japanese were killed in the Pacific War. But the Japanese leadership continued the war. After having killed 300,000 Japanese civilians through strategic bombing, would it have been moral *not* to use the bomb, but continue to kill civilians by other means?

One could argue that the United States could have altered its unconditional surrender position or offered to continue the monarchy to achieve a brokered peace months before August 1945. Such an approach, however, was politically untenable and might have allowed—depending on the terms—a militaristic regime to remain in Japan. Further, if you have the means to continue the fight against your enemy to pursue your political goals, why not continue? Why accept something less than your optimal goal if you do not have to, especially since you were

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already in the nasty, terrible world of civilian bombing? We should indeed study very carefully how this war allowed civilians to become fair wartime targets, but we should not delude ourselves as to the mutual attitudes of the times.

Altering the U.S. policy of unconditional surrender was in fact considered before the bomb was successfully tested in New Mexico in late July 1945. On 2 July, Secretary of State James Brynes and his predecessor, Cordell Hull, vetoed a State Department draft to make clear that the imperial institution in Japan could stay after the war. To guarantee the institution at that time, they feared, would look like appeasement. Given the fact no one could possibly know what effect a promise to preserve the imperial institution would have on the Japanese, Hull feared that should the Potsdam Proclamation fail to result in Japan's unconditional surrender in spite of an Allied commitment to the emperor, the Japanese might be encouraged to continue the war as a result of the very promise that had been designed to hasten their capitulation.

Faced with only 46,000 American military deaths (Bernstein's revelation) in a fall 1945 invasion of the Japanese homeland, might an alteration of the U.S. surrender policy have occurred to avoid a protracted war? Perhaps, and this is about the most conspiratorial one can get and remain credible: the bomb made unnecessary any need to alter the U.S. unconditional surrender policy for at least the month of August 1945. The bomb provided a means for obtaining the emotional and political goal of unconditional surrender. There is nothing sinister, conspiratorial, or particularly evil about that. This was a nasty, total war. Continuing another month and using all available means to achieve your objective, is not illogical or immoral wartime policy. Given all the uncertainties surrounding the termination of a total war, it could be argued that the best approach was to end the war as soon as possible on Allied terms. Further still, why would the United States offer to alter the Allied surrender terms before it had heard any formal response from the Japanese? Presumably, Bird thinks the United States should have responded to intercepted cable messages – not good wartime or diplomatic strategy. And presumably Bernstein thinks the United States should have instituted a unilateral cease-fire against civilian targets rather than use the bomb and should have blockaded Japan for weeks or months to pursue an alternative surrender to avoid civilian casualties.

But if the Japanese were close to surrendering in July 1945, save for one major condition, why didn't they bother to inform the Allies? It is the responsibility of the defeated to protect their citizens and accept defeat; it wasn't the Allies' responsibility to second guess the minimum amount of force necessary to achieve various surrender possibilities.

It was remarkable that the Allies were able to effect a surrender from such a tenacious a foe as Japan without invading the Japanese homeland. Is it conceivable that Germany would have surrendered unconditionally without Allied forces on German territory? No. It seems more persuasive to argue that the use of the bomb was a necessary and fortunate shock to end the war abruptly rather than

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to argue that it was unnecessary. Can we criticize Harry Truman fairly, with any degree of historical certainty, who won a total war without ever having had to order the invasion of the enemy's homeland? His achievement was historically remarkable.

It was also a far better policy to demand the right to reconstruct Japan in the (Western) image through an Allied occupation led by the United States than to explore an ambiguous, brokered peace. Further, a Japanese surrender in the fall of 1945 might have allowed the Soviets to demand a coequal partnership in the postwar occupation of Japan. As it turned out, the U.S. occupation of Japan was the most benevolent and constructive in history. Today, Japan is one of the world's most stable and successful democracies in no small measure because of the enlightened occupation of the United States.

What is genuinely impressive is that the American leadership actually debated whether or not to use the bombs at all. It is rare indeed for a nation to hold a cabinet-level debate on the ethics of using a certain killing device in the midst of a total war. It is to the credit of these leaders that they questioned whether and how to use the bomb in the first place.

Critics of Truman's decision misunderstand both the political atmosphere at the time and concepts of ethics in wartime. Is there a pleasant way to kill someone? Did the 300,000 who died through fire-bombing appreciate being burned alive rather than incinerated through nuclear heat? Would revisionist historians have preferred that the United States not have used atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki but have used fire-bombs to kill the same number? Did either the United States or Japan debate the many ways they were killing each other on Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Saipan, the Philippines, or at sea and agree on some ethical criteria for their killing? Did soldiers fighting hand-to-hand hold discussions in advance to determine the minimum amount of violence necessary to perpetrate in order to achieve the political or strategic objective of the day? Some historians' approach to this issue is historically and sociologically fanciful, not to mention sanctimonious.

Further, the bombs kept Japan as one nation. Stalin had long schemed to enter the war against Japan for his own aggrandizement. On 10 August, five days before Japan officially surrendered, Stalin demanded from U.S. Ambassador Averell Harriman that the Soviet Union act as coequal in any occupation of Japan and that a Soviet occupation force be established in Hokkaido. After Harriman rejected the initiative, Stalin took his demand to Truman in a personal and secret message on 16 August 1945. Fearing a divided Japan, Truman also rejected the request.

On 18 August 1945, three days after Japan surrendered, the Soviet military attacked the Japanese fortifications on the Kurile islands north of Hokkaido and began to occupy the island chain. By 3 September, almost a month after Japan surrendered, the Soviets reached, by force, the northern main island of Hokkaido;

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yet at Yalta the parties had agreed that the Kuriles would be surrendered to the Americans and handed to the Soviets in compensation for entering the war against Japan.

Again in the fall, Soviet General Kuzmo Derevyanko, the Soviet representative to General Douglas MacArthur's occupation command, visited MacArthur and insisted on an occupation force in Hokkaido and said that Soviet troops would move into Hokkaido with or without MacArthur's permission. MacArthur showed him the door and reenforced Hokkaido.

Had the United States not dropped two atomic bombs on 5 and 9 August, so shaking the Japanese cabinet that the premier moved to take the issue directly to the emperor, postwar Japan would have been divided at Hokkaido. The bombs prevented "North" and "South" Japan and a completely communist Korea. Despite the bombs, Korea suffered the fate of Soviet military ambition. Had surrender not occurred on 15 August 1945, which permitted American forces to be rushed to southern Korea, the Korean peninsula would have been totally occupied by Soviet forces by the end of September. To argue that surrender could have been pursued with less strategic intensity, especially at the end, ignores the fact that each day surrender was delayed would have complicated the war dramatically or failed to have saved Japanese civilian lives.

Further still, had surrender not occurred in August 1945, the Soviets might have killed more Japanese than the two atomic bombs did in an ambitious land-grab of parts of China, Korea, and northern Japan. As it was, the Soviets worked 230,000 Japanese to death in post-surrender labor camps in Siberia—100,000 more than were killed during the war by the two atomic bombs. There is no evidence to suggest the Soviets had plans to cause a minimal amount of casualties to defeat Japan and participate in its postwar occupation.

It is not at all persuasive to argue that the United States should have prolonged the war to avoid civilian casualties and watch the Soviets occupy more and more of Asia throughout the fall of 1945 just to avoid use of the atomic bomb. Soviet military success against Japan would have severely complicated, if not thwarted, American plans for a total but benevolent American occupation that turned Japan into a Western democracy. It would have been foolish for the United States to have jeopardized four years of near unilateral war with Japan in order to avoid causing additional civilian casualties at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Did the bomb save lives? Yes, *thousands* of lives, tens of thousands perhaps, and perhaps many more Japanese lives had the army and naval chiefs persuaded the emperor to allow one last campaign against an invading American force. The bomb saved Chinese, Korean, Russian. British, American, and Southeast Asian lives by ending the war as quickly as possible. The bombs saved Japan from becoming a divided country and kept at least half of Korea open to the West. Without the bombs, the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would likely have suffered the fate of other urban Japanese—terrible death through fire-bombing.

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Given the totality of this war, second guessing whether the bombs were necessary is a poor attempt to rewrite history. Inasmuch as the use of the atomic bombs was specifically mentioned in the Japanese Supreme Council debate on 9 August 1945 on whether to accept the Potsdam Proclamation, and by the emperor in his surrender address to his people, it is historically accurate to state that the two atomic bombs helped hasten this terrible war's end—and that was unambiguously good.

JAMES R. VAN de VELDE

The writer served as executive secretary for the Defense and Space Talks, part of the Negotiations with the Soviet Union on Nuclear and Space Issues, in the U.S. Department of State from 1989–1991. He is now a dean and lecturer in political science at Yale University.

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

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

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Book Reviews

Shaping Political Attitudes: The Impact of Interpersonal Communication and Mass Media *by Silvo Lenart. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications, 1994. 192 pp. Cloth, $46.00; paper, $22.95.*

Silvo Lenart has attacked a research topic long overlooked by political scientists. Not since Elihu Katz and Paul Felix Lazarsfeld's pioneering work, *Personal Influence*, has a research project had as one of its major purposes exploration of the relationship between the effects of mass media coverage of politics and the influence of interpersonal political discussions. Toward this end, Lenart conducted three experimental studies and a three-wave panel survey during the 1988 presidential elections, all designed to investigate the effects of mass media and interpersonal discussion on levels of knowledge about and attitudes toward candidates.

The book's strength is its attempt to provide a comprehensive discussion of a broad area of research. Investigating a seldom studied topic made it necessary for Lenart to collect original data, and he has done so with an eye toward the benefits of methodological pluralism. The book is appropriately cautious in its attempts to draw conclusions and shows a clear awareness of many common pitfalls in research design. Its major weakness is in its tendency to get mired in a multitude of empirical findings without clearly articulating the theoretical premises guiding the inquiry.

The three-wave nonprobability panel survey of 176 Long Island residents relies on combined self-report measures of exposure to media and perceived bias in the content of media messages. Lenart uses the relationship between candidate preferences and this measure as a baseline against which to evaluate the relationships between candidate preference and self-perceived attitudes of a primary discussant, family members, and broader climates of opinion.

The three experiments comprising the author's original contribution consist of comparisons of experimental groups viewing portions of televised debates with groups participating in informal group discussions about candidates, or those exposed to a combination of debates and postdebate discussion. In a nutshell, these studies suggest that people learn a great deal from media exposure. Beyond this highly consistent finding, evidence is mixed and difficult to interpret. The experiments suggest that knowledge can be either helped or hindered by interpersonal discussion. The effects of mass and interpersonal communication on evaluations of candidates are highly inconsistent, influencing evaluations of some candidates in one direction, others in the opposite direction, and some not at all. Lenart tries to explain these patterns with references to the context in which the experiments took place (primary versus

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general elections, early versus late in the campaign, etc.). But with only three experiments and thus three contexts, it is virtually impossible to substantiate these claims.

More importantly, it is unclear what the theoretical expectations should be regarding how people are affected by fifteen minutes of informal discussion of candidates as opposed to twenty minutes of debate coverage on three specific issues edited from a larger ninety-minute telecast. Clearly the content of messages is not the same in these two cases. For those in the combined debate and discussion condition, interpretation becomes particularly difficult, since the content of discussions was no doubt influenced by the fact that the discussions took place *after* debate viewing in all cases, thus making these discussions substantively different from those in the discussion-only condition.

The goal of *Shaping Political Attitudes* is to shed light on questions such as whether mass media exposure or interpersonal discussion has a greater impact on attitudes toward candidates, and whether the influences of mass and interpersonal communication are competitive or mutually reinforcing. Ultimately, the problems the author runs up against in answering these questions are theoretical rather than methodological in nature. Although the studies are well executed as designed, it is often unclear what question they are designed to answer. For example, if what is theoretically interesting is pure channel effects—that is, which channel would be more effective if the same content were conveyed through one channel as opposed to the other, or which channel would be believed in the case of conflicting reports—then the experiments made little progress toward answering this question, since no attempt is made to hold content constant. If instead, the important question is which channel is more influential given the natural variations that occur in their political content, then one would need to compare the relative impact of representative samples of content from the two channels. In forging a compromise between these two approaches, it is often unclear what we learn about either question. Moreover, for general readers interested in understanding the dynamics of democratic politics, the book would be strengthened considerably by a clear statement of which of these research questions are important and why.

DIANA C. MUTZ
University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Power of News *by Michael Schudson. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995. 269 pp. $29.95.*

Fans of Michael Schudson's work will love this book. It presents a fine collection of his essays and research articles published from 1982 onward, along with a lengthy introductory essay. The published essays fall into three groups. The first group, titled "The News in Historical Perspective," encompasses essays dealing with the history of American newspapers, the history of news interviews, the nature of a reporter's job, and the ways in which reporters' narrative styles affect the interpretation of political events. These may sound like dry subjects, but Schudson's expert story-telling brings them to life. He captures the cultural climate of past ages by describing colorful people and incidents, by citing the wisdom of well known historical figures, and by sensitive philosophizing about what it all means.

The second group of essays is called "Myths of Media Power" and constitutes an attempt to deflate the overblown claims of media influence. Schudson argues that people

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see in televised images whatever they want to see or are told they are seeing, which is not necessarily what the screen actually shows. He follows with a discussion of the "illusion" of Ronald Reagan's popularity, citing polling data that register public disapproval. He blames the illusion on journalists who liked Reagan, projected their feelings onto the general public, and reported accordingly. The Watergate "myth" is next in line for deflation. Folklore to the contrary, *Washington Post* reporters did not single handedly unseat President Richard Nixon by reporting that sordid political event. Of course, these revelations are no longer novel, but, told by Schudson, they retain their freshness.

The final group of essays deals with "Citizenship and its Discontents." Here Schudson tackles a variety of issues related to the role that media presumably and actually play in American society. He points to the nationalization of general as well as specialized news media since 1960 and the nationalization of newsroom culture. He notes that this does not amount to homogenization of media experiences, however. Numerous new national arenas serving subcultural tastes have been created. But despite a floodtide of public policy-relevant information that appeals to a vast variety of tastes, the collective public has not recaptured the Camelot of civic wisdom and virtue that exists only in fantasies of the past and in hopes for the future. The Camelot of democratic theorists, Schudson argues, is and always has been a pipe dream.

The gist of the major arguments advanced in the older essays in crystallized and refined in the lengthy opening essay, which could just as well have been a concluding essay. There Schudson first neatly summarizes the current roles played by news media, reminding the reader that much contemporary analysis has produced caricatures—images that sketch major features, but are grossly out of proportion with reality. Believers in these images are likely to disagree. For instance, they may well contest his claims that the political significance of news media has been overblown. Schudson concedes that media publicity lends importance to selected issues and events, making them "news" and thereby transforming them into legitimate topics of public discussion. But he stresses that the media do not create the issues and events that they report. They are merely the midwife, rather than the parent. They may change the style of politics, but there is insufficient proof that they change political action.

The ideal role that Schudson maps out for the news media is also likely to arouse controversy. He recommends that news media write their stories to cater to disinterested, ill-informed citizens governed by self-interested elites, whose questionable activities media must scrutinize and report. Journalists should act as if democracy guided by rational public opinions is possible and lay an informational base for it. If that dream is nourished by sound reporting, it may yet become reality.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice and Public Policy *by Bryan D. Jones. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994. 277 pp. Cloth, $42.00; paper, $15.95.*

Although political scientists have embraced cognitive psychology to study individual behavior, the role of psychology in the study of both policy making and national institu-

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tions is minimal. Perhaps the only exceptions to this are the few studies that have employed psychological theories to study decision making by individual policy makers. In this pathbreaking book, Jones demonstrates that psychology can and should be employed to study national institutions and policy making. Jones's book is one of those few pieces of scholarship that has the potential to change the way we look at politics.

Central to the economic approach to the study of politics is the idea that policy outcomes reflect the decisions that individuals make within a constrained institutional structure. Individuals are said to be rational actors who hold fixed preferences. Jones argues that one of the central paradoxes of political science is that in spite of the fact that individual preferences tend to be constant and U.S. political institutions are relatively stable, the issue agenda and policy outcomes change over time.

Central to cognitive psychology is the idea that individuals have limited cognitive capacity. Individuals simply do not have the ability to process all information. Thus, we look for cognitive shortcuts. One of the most basic shortcuts is to focus on only certain facts. Jones maintains that even though preferences are constant, attentiveness is not. Individuals are attentive to only one issue at a time. What commentators and the press frequently attribute to preference change is really attributable to a change in focus. For example, individuals have a preference for both economic growth and for a clear environment. However, these two goals clearly have the potential to conflict. Nevertheless, individuals do not calculate the trade-off between these goals. Instead, they focus on either one goal or the other. Although behavioralists may question the logical consistency of a public that alternates between favoring growth and environmental protection, Jones maintains there is no inconsistency in preferences, only attention.

Jones's recognition that individual preferences are stable and attentiveness is not is an important argument, but it is not pathbreaking. What is pathbreaking is Jones's ability to show how these changes in attentiveness alter political outcomes. Jones demonstrates that as attention changes, politicians, interest groups, and institutions themselves respond. For example, interest groups rarely fight for the merit of their position. Instead, they fight for the attention of the public and the focus of policy makers.

This is a serious indictment of rational choice theory. Any effort to attribute outcomes exclusively to a combination of preferences and institutional structures is bound to fail. Instead, one needs to ask where the public's attention is focused. Nevertheless, Jones's theory does not deny a role for preferences or structures in shaping outcomes. Instead, Jones calls for a marriage of psychology and economics.

The power of Jones's theory stems from its usefulness in resolving so many debates that dominate our discipline. While one example is the inconsistency between constant preferences, stable institutions, and policy changes, there are others as well. For example, a debate has ensued among congressional scholars about the role of committees. Some scholars have argued that committees act as agents of the full chamber. Others have argued that committee members act as agents of their party caucuses. Of course, both of these approaches assume that either the party caucuses or the chamber care about the actions of a committee. Jones suggests that if attention to a particular policy area varies with time, the relative autonomy a particular committee enjoys will vary as well. Jones's approach should provide legislative scholars with a means of resolving some of their current debates.

Jones's book is both well argued and creative. It deserves to be read widely and cited often. While his book resolves many issues, it also raises a host of new questions.

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Perhaps most important of those questions is how we can account for changes in public attention and what role political actors and institutions have in shaping such change. Answers to such questions should move political scientists even further toward a fruitful marriage of economic and psychological approaches to the study of politics.

FORREST MALTZMAN
George Washington University

Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel
by Moshe Arens. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1995. 320 pp. $25.00.

Moshe Arens provides an account of his political life as Israel's foreign minister from 1988 to 1990, and as defense minister from 1990 to 1992. The basic thesis is that from about the beginning of the Persian Gulf War until 1992 the U.S. government interfered in Israeli domestic politics in order to bring about the election of a Labor government in 1992. Arens feels that the United States is mistaken in its belief that a Labor government is more likely to resolve Arab-Israeli conflicts. For example, he believes that by implying that Israel is willing to relinquish control of the Golan Heights, Yitzhak Rabin is creating the impression that Israel has lost its determination to defend itself. Arens's concluding statement is that one concession (such as that regarding the Golan Heights) will inevitably lead to demands for others and that "when the day comes on which even the most dovish of Israelis will refuse to submit to further demands, Israel, weakened by territorial concessions, may then not be strong enough to defend itself" (p. 307).

This is a lively volume, likely to be of interest to theoretically oriented analysts as well as those more attuned to substantive policy issues. The accounts provided by Arens provide a challenge to realistic approaches to foreign policy and international politics based on the assumption that states are unitary, rational actors. Even policy-oriented analyses typically focus on interactions between Israel and Egypt, or Israel and the PLO. The intensely personal view of policy processes offered by Arens often creates the impression that his dealings with and antagonism toward Egypt or the PLO were, relatively speaking, rather distant, abstract, and impersonal. Arens often seems more engaged in these pages in his rivalries with those in the main opposition (Labor) party, and most passionately of all involved in contests and rifts within his own Likud party. (His contempt for Ariel Sharon is particularly ill-concealed.) Once wonders also, how much Israel's foreign policies represented the "national interest" when they reflected to some important extent, policies and strategies of the Labor party, which in turn seemed to be (according to Arens at any rate) in such an important way a function of Yitzhak Rabin's "aversion to [Shimon] Peres becoming Prime Minister," (p. 115).

Arens asserts with obvious feeling that attempts by the Bush administration to interfere in Israel's internal politics were unprecedented in the history of U.S.–Israeli relations and "probably without precedent in the relationship between any two democratically elected governments" (p. 301). Such a statement reflects, perhaps, a lack of familiarity with certain activities sponsored by the U.S. government in Japan and Western European countries after World War II, or by the Central Intelligence Agency, for example, in Guatemala in the 1950s, or Chile in the 1970s. With that context in mind, and obviously encumbered by the biases of an American observer, this reviewer does not find so

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scandalous any of the maneuvers adopted by the American government to modify Israeli policies or even domestic political outcomes. This does not necessarily mean that the policy positions for which the United States exerted itself are optimal. Arens is quite convincing regarding his preferred strategies for dealing with the Palestinians. However, the weaknesses of current policies are more obvious now because they are actually being implemented. A peace process advocated by Arens involving more extensive consultation with a broader share of the populations of Israel, or in Judea and Samaria, would not necessarily be more promising. In any case, even if the American government's attempts to influence Israeli policies or domestic politics in 1991 and 1992 were not as illegitimate as Arens argues, he makes it clear that to the extent that U.S. policies did help bring about the election of Labor and Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, the United States will likely pay a price in the form of bitterness and mistrust among the ranks of the Likud.

JAMES LEE RAY
Florida State University

Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev
by James M. Goldgeier. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. 169 pp. $30.00

Goldgeier's compact study forwards a simple but important conjecture about the origins of bargaining styles in foreign policy. As almost all scholars of international relations now recognize, the combined structures of domestic and international politics constrain but do not determine actors' selection of strategies. How then do actors choose among available options? Goldgeier's answer, at least for the case of Soviet foreign policy during the cold war, is that leaders choose bargaining strategies based on salient episodes from their domestic political experience. Moreover, they are likely to choose suboptimal strategies and adhere to them doggedly in the face of evidence confirming their ineffectiveness.

The author probes the plausibility of his conjecture in four case studies (Joseph Stalin and Berlin in 1948; Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis; Leonid Brezhnev during the Middle East War of 1973; and Mikhail Gorbachev's diplomacy during German reunification). In each case, the leader applies the bargaining style that brought him victory against Kremlin rivals for power, the style soon proves inappropriate in the international setting, but the leader nonetheless pursues it to the detriment of his own goals. For example, Khrushchev's startling style of pressuring his policies forward by public personal commitment worked well against Georgi Malenkov and Vyacheslav Molotov, but when applied to the nuclear-superior United States in the Missile Crisis it brought diplomatic and domestic defeat. International pressures always trumped domestically-derived bargaining styles in the final analysis (Khrushchev changes his style quickly under the perceived threat of nuclear war), but not before inappropriate bargaining styles had produced suboptimal outcomes.

The book is a rewarding and pleasurable read. Its important contribution is made concisely and unpretentiously. Goldgeier clearly labored to pare his empirical chapters down to their essentials, sparing his readers all unnecessary details and superfluous footnotes. The chapters break no new empirical ground, but they are historically sound,

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combining reliable secondary works with more recent Russian sources. The theoretical chapters are also spare and delightfully to the point.

One cannot put this solid study down, however, without wishing that its author had made a more determined effort to test the complex empirical implications of his thesis. Goldgeier convincingly demonstrates the similarity between the domestic and international bargaining styles of the four leaders. But more evidence would be needed to pin down conclusively the role of domestic experience in causing selection of and dogged adherence to bargaining strategies. Under uncertainty, many strategies may be equally plausible. In the cases Goldgeier considers, the selected bargaining strategies always brought international success before leading to apparent setbacks: Stalin's wartime conferences, Khrushchev's successful bluster in the Suez and Syria-Lebanon crises, Brezhnev's superpower summitry, and Gorbachev's spellbinding disarmament initiatives. Given uncertainty and recent international success, Goldgeier's case would have been helped by more evidence demonstrating the direct connection between the selection of strategy and leaders' domestic experiences; the Soviets' consideration of alternate strategies; and their evaluation of the evidence generated by the selected strategy over the course of each case considered.

Goldgeier has opened the door to an important avenue of research. He has sustained a novel argument that helps to explain the most consequential episodes of postwar Soviet foreign policy and has made the case for its importance in other cases of foreign policy decision making as well. Since neither game theory nor structural theory can explain selection of bargaining style satisfactorily, Goldgeier's thesis should be applied to other cases of foreign policy decision making. Future researchers will owe an intellectual debt to this slim, pathbreaking volume.

WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH
Princeton University

The Political Behavior of Older Americans *by Steven A. Peterson and Albert Somit. New York, Garland Publishing, 1994. 188 pp. $30.00.*

The political behavior of older Americans is of significance mainly because of the growth in the size of the older population in the United States. Such growth will accelerate dramatically around 2012, when the large cohorts born after World War II begin to reach age 65. Along with such growth, the composition of the older population will change. Although older Americans will remain very diverse, on average they will have greater education, higher incomes, and better health. These factors are all associated with greater interest in and participation in politics. Thus, it is thought that in the future the interests of older Americans will shape politics and public policy to an even greater extent than they do today.

This book provides an excellent summary of what is known from previous research about the political behavior of older Americans. It breaks new ground by looking at the effects of life circumstances on political behavior. It also looks at the political behavior of understudied subpopulations—older Afro-Americans and older women.

The authors use data from the 1987 National Opinion Research Center (NORC) survey, filtering the sample to include those age 60 and older (age 55 and older for Afro-

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Americans, to increase sample size). The survey is one of the few that includes a comprehensive set of questions on political orientations and participation along with measures of sociodemography and life circumstances. The authors employ the well tested socioeconomic model of political participation as a baseline model. The key independent variable in this model is education, which is a cause of civic orientations. These, in turn, have an impact on political participation. In extending the base line model, they look at the effects of age, measures of life circumstances, and other variables. In pursuing this approach, they avoid problems of misspecification that result whenever variables are omitted from an analysis, because the survey did not include items to measure them.

The authors main findings confirm the socioeconomic model for older Americans. The largest effects are between education and political interest (their measure of civic orientations), and political interest and political participation. Group memberships and education have large direct effects on political participation. Extending this model, however, the authors find that life circumstances also have an impact on political participation, both directly and indirectly. There is a direct link between happiness and political participation. Health has effects both on political interest and happiness. Age has a modest positive effect on happiness, being a widow a modest negative effect. Older women participate somewhat less than older men, partly because of lower interest in politics.

Separate models are developed for older Afro-Americans and for older women. The model for older Afro-Americans is far simpler than for older whites. Age, which has a negative impact on political interest, education, and group memberships, is more important for Afro-Americans; life circumstances are less so. Similarly, the model for older women, which shows larger effects for education, is simpler than that for older men. Rates of political participation among older Afro-Americans are more likely to go up as a result of improvements in socioeconomic status than as a result of increases in racial consciousness or empowerment.

The authors conclude that ignorance about the actual political behavior of older Americans has led to misperceptions about the potential for growth of gray political power. Older Americans, although they will grow in numbers and will participate at higher rates, lack political cohesion. They are extraordinarily diverse in terms of sociodemographic characteristics and in terms of party attachments and issue opinions. Elected public officials, fed by media stereotypes, fear gray political power because of a paralyzing terror (mostly irrational) of electoral defeat. Plainly, there is no single, coherent, unified voting bloc of older Americans, and this is true even on issues that are of direct, tangential concern to them.

The book is concise, well written, employs sound methods, and should be valuable to anyone interested in aging and political behavior. There were limitations, however, in what the authors could do. With data from a single year—1987—they could not analyze and attempt to disentangle the separate effects of age, cohort, and period. For older Afro-Americans, samples sizes were small, so that it is difficult to know whether small effects might be statistically significant (different from zero) in a larger sample. The authors also might have provided a counterpoint to popular journalistic accounts that tend to scapegoat the aged. From the perspective of democratic theory, a more educated, prosperous, healthier, and politically active older population is a positive. Is there evidence that an older population, bound to their children and grandchildren through ties of kinship, would deliberately neglect the interests of those generations?

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The sociodemographic characteristics of the older population are changing in a direction that will lead to greater, not lesser concern for future generations.

JOHN STRATE
Wayne State University

Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British, and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State *by Sven Steinmo. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1993. 280 pp. $32.50.*

This ambitious book explores the fiscal revolution that transformed the modern state. In a thoughtful and sweeping analysis of a century of policy change in three countries, Steinmo provides a much needed overview of tax politics. His narrative weaves together two intricate stories. The first, which focuses on commonalities, emphasizes how the art of generating revenues without provoking a popular outcry developed over time in Sweden, Britain, and the United States. In all three countries, tax systems became more streamlined while the government's take increased dramatically. This transformation was linked to industrialization and the resulting demands for social welfare, but Steinmo rightly emphasizes the critical role of modern warfare. Threats to national security weakened resistance to higher taxes. Government revenues expanded greatly during both world wars and never returned to previous levels.

Steinmo's second concern is the substantial cross-national differences within these broadly similar historical processes. The American tax system is distinguished by its heavy use of subsidies for particular interests, the British by the dramatic fluctuations in tax policy that accompany changes in government, and the Swedish system by its relative efficiency and stability. To account for this cross-national variation, Steinmo develops an important argument about the impact of formal political institutions. The power of a decentralized Congress produces a loophole-ridden tax code. British electoral laws, which translate small swings in votes into large swings in the composition of Parliament, generate radical discontinuities in policy. Sweden's electoral rules, which gave Social Democrats enduring but not hegemonic power, encouraged compromise and incrementalism.

Steinmo's argument that these institutional differences have had substantial consequences for tax politics is convincing. How substantial, however, is hard to tell. A central problem concerns the data presented, which is far from systematic. Furthermore, the effects of institutions seem more variable than Steinmo's theoretical perspective allows. It is only when an outcome conforms to Steinmo's initial expectations that we are reminded of the role of institutions. As his narrative suggests, many other factors are involved in tax policy. For instance, electoral reversals in Britain sometimes produce big changes, but not always. The author's theoretical argument would have been strengthened if it had stressed, as the actual case studies do, the interaction of institutional variables with other political factors such as the role of economic actors and the nature of party competition. Steinmo acknowledges this in a rather free-wheeling conclusion, which offers a much more contingent argument about institutional effects than that presented in the opening chapters.

Finally, while Steinmo quite rightly calls our attention to the understudied politics of taxes, his account strongly suggests the need for integrated analyses of taxing and

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spending. This issue is briefly addressed in a stimulating but underdeveloped conclusion. Contrasting Sweden and the United States clearly reveals the dangers of looking at taxes alone. Steinmo provocatively claims that the American tax system is in many ways more progressive than that of supposedly egalitarian Sweden. Even if one accepts his rather thin comparative evidence on progressivity, however, one can only make sense of the finding by placing it in a broader context. The biggest difference between the two tax systems is that the Swedish system raises twice the revenues—two-thirds of GDP instead of one-third. Very progressive taxes cannot produce such extraordinary revenues. Poor and working-class Swedes have supported such policies because the combined effects of high taxes and a very extensive welfare state have produced dramatically lower income inequality than in the United States. Looking at taxes and spending together restores the more orthodox picture that Steinmo's analysis challenges: the main source of Sweden's unusually big and redistributive public sector was a powerful coalition of Social Democrats and organized labor.

In a project of such scope, however, there will inevitably be room for disagreements. Steinmo has produced an impressive analysis of a critical and poorly understood aspect of modern democratic politics. His accounts of the individual countries and time periods are richly detailed, and his comparative analysis is undertaken with great skill. Students of the modern state will want to consider the lessons of this important book.

PAUL PIERSON
Harvard University

Incapacitation: Penal Confinement and the Restraint of Crime *by Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 188 pp. $27.95.*

In 1992, some 6.6 million violent crimes were committed in America. But only half of them were reported to the police. Barely 165,000 led to convictions, over 90 percent of which were achieved via plea-bargaining. About 47 percent of violent felons convicted of one crime and 23 percent convicted of three or more crimes were not sentenced to prison. Those who were sent to prison would spend on average less than half of their time incarcerated. Murderers released from prison in 1992 served on average only 5.9 years of a 12.4 year sentence. Up to a third of all violent crimes, including murders, are committed by persons who are on probation, parole, or pretrial release at the moment they offend. Today about three times as many violent criminals are in the community with little or no supervision as are in prison.

One need not be coerced by such data to the conclusion that America is suffering from a bad case of crime without punishment. But Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, Berkeley law professors who rank among the nation's most prolific criminologists, are capable of believing that America is a punitive society and that too many rather than too few violent and repeat convicted criminals are incarcerated for too long.

As columnist Ben Wattenberg has quipped, "A thug in prison can't shoot your sister." Not even Zimring and Hawkins doubt that if we emptied out the prisons tonight there would be more crime tomorrow. But how many serious crimes are averted each year by keeping convicted criminals locked up? Measured solely in terms of its incapacitation or public safety value relative to the costs of keeping a criminal behind bars, does prison pay?

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This book is marred by a self-serving logic. On the one hand, Zimring and Hawkins usefully catalogue some of the shortcomings of benefit-cost analyses of imprisonment. On the other hand, having counseled that researchers cannot define an optimum point of incarceration, they are nonetheless confident that America overincarcerates and that a "moderation in the recent emphasis on restraint as a penal purpose can benefit both policy and research" (p. 172).

Zimring and Hawkins target an already much criticized benefit-cost analysis published in 1987 by the National Institute of Justice and challenge a much cited 1988 study of the human and financial toll of crime on its victims. They rightly complain that some studies rely on data on crime commission rates that are two or "three decades old" (p. 92). But their criticisms are largely irrelevant to more recent studies, including those by economists who need no instruction from law professors about quantitative analysis.

Based on a 1990 prisoner self-report study in Wisconsin, Harvard economist Anne Piehl and I have estimated that state prisoners committed a median of twelve nondrug felonies in the year prior to their imprisonment, a finding replicated in our 1993 New Jersey prisoner self-report survey. National Bureau of Economic Research economist Steven D. Levitt has found that incarcerating one additional prisoner reduces the number of crimes by approximately thirteen per year, a number in close accordance with the level of criminal activity reported by the median prisoner in surveys. Likewise, economists Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody, Jr. of William and Mary College have estimated that in the 1970s and 1980s incarcerating each additional state prisoner averted at least seventeen serious crimes per year and that for recent years a better estimate may be twenty-one crimes averted per additional prisoner.

Studies show that each year crime victims lose tens of billions of dollars in direct costs—losses from theft or property damage, cash losses, medical expenses, and lost pay from work. Zimring and Hawkins assert that the "only defensible cost-benefit analysis in dollar terms would be confined to the economic impact of crime," where "economic impact" is narrowly conceived (p. 154). Oddly, they ignore the excellent economics literature on labor market evaluations of life and limb. And they ignore relevant empirical studies in health journals, including a 1993 study that estimated the monetary value in 1987 due to death and injuries, physical and psychological, resulting from violent crimes. The study conservatively estimated that the total cost over the lifetime of victims of all violent crimes 1987–1990 was $178 billion per year.

Zimring and Hawkins assert that those "who wish to use prison to incapacitate . . . come to no natural stopping point in their claim on penal resources as long as there are criminals to punish" (p. 74). That is completely wrong. For example, my aforementioned work with Piehl suggests that the incapacitation value of incarcerating offenders whose only crimes are low-level drug crimes is insufficient to justify keeping them behind bars. And a 1994 RAND Corporation analysis of the impact of California's new law mandating life behind bars for any thrice-convicted felons (not just violent felons) estimated that the policy would spare Californians 340,000 serious crimes a year and cut crime by 28 percent, but at a prohibitive cost of $5.5 billion a year.

In chapter four, Zimring and Hawkins made a case for a "jurisprudence of incapacitation" predicated on the principle that "it is desirable to maintain some notions of desert in punishment that are independent of the need for incapacitation" (p. 73). Here they are in agreement with average Americans, most of whom believe that retribution is a legitimate reason to imprison persons who have violated the life, liberty, or property of innocent others. But they fail to acknowledge how the desire for just deserts bolsters

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the case for incarceration. Purely for the sake of retribution, most Americans would be willing to spend some fraction of what it costs to incarcerate convicted violent, property, and drug offenders even if they knew that prison would do little or nothing to incapacitate, deter, or rehabilitate the criminals.

If Zimring and Hawkins want incapacitation to "be recognized as an important, though by no means exclusive, means of social defense against serious crime" (p. 172), then they should admit that benefit-cost analyses of imprisonment will do more to reveal than to obscure the opportunity costs and diminishing marginal returns of three-strikes laws and other get-tough measures. Likewise, they should take more seriously what scholars in fields other than sociology, law, and other traditional tributaries of criminology know, rather than offer straw man arguments that only speed the steady drift of criminology to the fringes of social science respectability and policy relevance.

JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR.
Princeton University
Brookings Institution Center for Public Management

Pitching the Presidency: How Presidents Depict the Office *by Paul Haskell Zernicke. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1994. 192 pp. $49.95.*

The symbolic nature of the presidency is highlighted in this investigation of how presidential candidates, office holders, and former presidents depict the presidency. Questions raised include: Why do presidents refer to the office? Are there patterns to these references? How does referring to the presidency influence events or public expectations? Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy Carter are the focus of this study, because they were "the first three who campaigned and served full terms in the age of televised politics and the plebiscitary presidency" (p. 6).

A brief discussion of inflated public expectations and significant presidential limitations leads to the conclusion that the president uses rhetoric, specifically about the office, to build public support. The major role presidents play in promoting public respect is supported with the interesting, if marginal, example of the birth of baseball's seventh-inning stretch. When President William Howard Taft lifted his 300 pound frame from the seat during a game, the crowd followed suit. Although not contending that the population always follows the president's example, Zernicke overemphasizes a president's ability through rhetorical depiction of the office to alter events and popular support.

Types of depictions are explained through a framework of presidential roles. While depictions of chief of state, commander-in-chief, chief executive, and public opinion leader are used by presidents, the role of party leader and chief legislator are less prevalent. Why certain roles predominate is addressed in the discussion of when presidents refer to the presidency. While "only about 20% of all presidential communications contain a reference to a presidential role" (p. 41), some patterns do emerge. According to Zernicke, depictions are most "intense and frequent when a crisis is accompanied by declining presidential popularity at the polls, press hostility and party dissension in Congress" (p. 41). The linkage of reduced presidential popularity and increased

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presidential depictions would have been strengthened with the use of tables to organize systematically the poll data.

The chapter on Lyndon Johnson used the civil rights actions and Vietnam policy to build an interesting argument that this insecure president found depictions of an overburdened presidency useful. But in the process of blurring the lines between personal actions and the presidential office, the presidency was hurt.

Richard Nixon as campaigner and president was concerned with projecting a conception of the presidency consistent with his goals. Nixon's rhetoric regarding Vietnam, Cambodia, and Watergate led Zernicke to conclude that Nixon was both honest and manipulative in viewing himself and the presidency as one. The office of president, praised and elevated by both Johnson and Nixon, was diminished by their rhetoric.

Jimmy Carter depicted the presidency as an office heavily reliant on popular support and actions. According to Zernicke, the moral, open presidency depicted in the 1976 campaign became less popular when juxtaposed on the problems of energy, the economy, and the hostages in Iran. Carter's rhetoric, as opposed to Johnson and Nixon's, did not hurt the presidency but did hurt his chances of reelection.

The monarchical Ronald Reagan and George Bush depictions of the presidency led to the popular based Carter style used by Bill Clinton. Since the cycle and attendant problems recur, Zernicke suggests seven reforms. Unfortunately, his earlier arguments build a strong case for why the desirable reforms would not be feasible.

The description of how recent presidents have depicted the office is both interesting and well supported. The linkage of depiction to events or popular support for the president is much more difficult to accomplish.

KATHY B. SMITH
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The State and Labor in Modern America *by Melvyn Dubofsky. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1994. 321 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $14.95.*

The division of professional labor has it that historians establish the story of what happened and political scientists interpret it. Well and good, if political scientists read the story. But many have yet to absorb David Brody's observation, twice quoted by Melvyn Dubofsky and a theme throughout his very useful book, that "power and interest can be issues of deadly conflict even in a system in which men agree on fundamentals" (p. 38). Dubofsky argues that the patterns of American union growth and decline do not easily submit to consensus cultural explanations nor to functionalist theories of the state. This book is a realist political history in two ways: it presents a succinct narrative of the ways in which the policies and actions of federal officials shaped the labor movement; and it balances an account of repressive state actions with an appreciation of the ways in which the state helped unions. The book engages the work of such political scientists as Karen Orren and Ira Katznelson as it assesses the mild virtues of New Deal responses to the dynamic disparities of power between employees and employers.

The scheme of explanation is the appearance and disappearance of countervailing power to managerial control of work, which depended on partisan dynamics in a federal

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state. Dubofsky's narrative covers the era from the industrial struggles of the 1870s to the union collapse of the 1980s, but he devotes most attention to the first half of the twentieth century when unions gained political influence to legitimize their right to participate. Dubofsky begins with the problem of persistent union disruption for government officials and public law. In liberal theory the law protected workers' rights to organize (as it did entrepreneurs' rights to form corporations). But officials intervening in industrial disputes to protect private property routinely used law to undermine unions. Policy makers failed to understand, as one federal judge distinctly in the minority on the bench put it, that the struggle between capital and labor "is a condition and not a theory" (p. 48).

Eventually, some political leaders argued that the corporate economy necessitated pragmatic cooperation between employers and unions. President Theodore Roosevelt urged judicial reform to end ex parte injunctive relief and exempt unions from antitrust prosecution. The reformers' project was enormously difficult, not because unionists did not support capitalism, private property, and individual freedom, but because representing workers' interests forced unions into conflict with employers who were almost entirely opposed to an independent voice for labor. Business organizations did not concede the legitimacy of labor organizations. Thus, Dubofsky rejects the "corporate liberal" thesis that farsighted capitalists understood that their interests would be served by conservative unions rather than no unions at all. The real corporate liberals were government officials and labor leaders. Dubofsky's presentation of the New Deal labor reforms makes connections to the Progressive Era pragmatists' reform project, and he is insightful about the continuing role of judges. Franklin Roosevelt was an erratic supporter of labor, but the broader New Deal officialdom was staffed with pro-union personnel who pushed the White House to back laws that compelled employers to bargain with unions, which organized under the New Deal's cover. Dubofsky dismisses claims that labor reforms more far reaching than the pluralist industrial relations that emerged in the postwar decades were possible.

Dubofsky authoritatively tells the story of labor policy development. But he does not clarify why Democrats repeatedly abandoned the unions at critical moments. Also in need of more attention is why American employers are so hostile to labor and get away with it for long stretches of history. To an historian not looking for logic in events, it is not incoherent that the postwar pluralist system was both a real achievement for America's workers and an elite-managed project. He rightly rejects the pluralists' own conception of industrial relations as voluntaristic; the state continuously managed the system to make it work and the AFL-CIO worked mightily to maintain Democratic control of the executive branch. Dubofsky notes that the pluralist system established union authority to participate in routines of redistribution, but by 1980 the American movement had receded to a quarter of the labor force (and less in the private sector). However, to explain the connection between the problems of unions reeling from corporate restructuring and the type of labor relations established by the New Deal would require a closer examination of what workers actually won the right to participate in. Despite these reservations, this expert historical essay should be read by all political scientists.

STEPHEN AMBERG
The University of Texas at San Antonio

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The Union Inspiration in American Politics: The Autoworkers and the Making of a Liberal Industrial Order *by Stephen Amberg. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1994. 354 pp. $44.95.*

Recent critiques of the American auto industry have centered on its lack of flexibility and innovative capacity, a rigidity often blamed on the industrial relations system created by the New Deal. Stephen Amberg intends to show that in fact the potential for flexible specialization, creative and skilled workforces, and labor participation in rising productivity was nascent in the industrial order being constructed by the New Deal political coalition; but political events and choices of the 1940s and early 1950s foreclosed this option. Building upon the work of Charles Sabel and Michael Piore, Amberg employs extensive archival research to show "a less uniform march to mass-production industrial organization . . ." (p. 174).

The "union inspiration in American politics" is a vision of "social democratic producerism" (p. 92): unions and management make joint decisions about production and investment, while the federal government provides policies for full employment, rising purchasing power, and social insurance. This program, "Keynesianism Plus," came to the forefront as Democrats incorporated labor rights and union legitimacy into their new program for economic management in the 1930s.

Through an excellent, detailed account of the political contests over wage-price policies, inflation, and planning for full employment from 1945–1950, Amberg shows how progress toward "producerism" was stymied. Democrats vacillated, while Republicans and employers quickly rebuffed the CIO's political agenda. Once Keynesianism Plus was rejected, collective bargaining became severed from national economic policy making. Without political support, collective bargaining turned out to be negotiated managerialism. Chapters on the 1960s and 1970s argue that with each failure by the Democrats to enact labor-oriented economic policy, auto manufacturers moved closer toward "managerialism." Management continually subdivided and simplified jobs, ultimately reducing their own ability to adapt when competitive conditions changed.

Thus the book is more than a recapitulation of the rocky partnership between the Democrats and the union, for Amberg attempts to connect developments in legislative politics and internal union politics to changes in the organization of work, technology, and production. A major consequence of labor's loss of real political power, Amberg argues, was the loss of high-skilled, flexible modes of production as alternatives to low-skilled, hierarchical Fordism. Two key chapters are supposed to demonstrate this point. First, Amberg traces the fate of the skilled tool and die makers in the United Auto Workers (UAW). Second, he presents a remarkable case study of the Studebaker Corporation. According to Amberg, Studebaker had "an incipient flexible specialization strategy" (p. 209) and South Bend, a potential producers' community. He then analyzes the political struggles that ensued when Studebaker decided to conform to Fordist production strategy after a merger with Packard in 1954. He concludes that flexible specialization lost out, because "the political conditions for flexible-specialist policy were missing . . ." (p. 227). Although the Studebaker chapter is an intriguing story of one firm, it is difficult to believe that the 1940s represented a technological industrial divide for the entire industry. Mass production had triumphed at General Motors and Ford long before this period. Neither policy makers nor the labor movement intended to change that.

The book also contains a subtext on the impact of local-level communitarian institutions on labor markets and working conditions and the need for vital community democracy. This point is suggested in the second chapter, a brief comparative history of Detroit, Chicago,

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and Milwaukee prior to the New Deal, and then again in the final chapter. Unfortunately, the links between Chapter 2, South Bend in the 1940s and 1950s, and the prescriptions for the future are somewhat attenuated; this point remains an unrealized subtext. Moreover, his analysis of workers' political participation in national elections is insufficient. For Amberg, workers identified with the Democratic party for specific programmatic reasons: policies that sustained collective bargaining. He assumes that when the links broke down at the policy level in the 1960s—certain macroeconomic reforms failed to pass that would have bolstered organized labor's bargaining position—workers' partisan identification evaporated. As social historians and political theorists have shown, however, party identification is much more complex than simple programmatic response. Amberg needs more social history in order to weave these developments into his story.

Despite these lapses, the important message does come through: when workers are not politically organized, they lose the ability not only to affect politics but to affect work. This book is an ambitious and worthy attempt to combine theoretical projections and archival research, and in any such innovative work, the connections have yet to be fully worked out. As the last remnants of the New Deal political economy are dismantled, Stephen Amberg contends that successful creation of a new industrial order will depend on reintegrating the workers' point of view into decisions about work and economic policy.

JENNIFER KLEIN
University of Virginia

Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy *by B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1994. 190 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $19.95.*

Bureaucracy is seen by many today to be a threat to democracy in this country, an unelected elite out of touch with the values and preferences of the public and its elected representatives. The task the authors set themselves in this book is to discover whether the facts support this gloomy view of American political life, to which so many leading politicians today subscribe with such extraordinary fervor.

In order to get at the truth of the matter, they undertake a set of empirical studies of policy development in eight national regulatory agencies during the Carter and Reagan administrations. These studies show that changes that occur in the pattern of each agency's enforcement decisions closely correspond with shifts that are simultaneously taking place in the political climate in which it operates. The conclusion they arrive at is, therefore, an unambiguous one: "we find that bureaucracies are highly responsive entities, adapting to many distinct and diverse political signals" (p. xiv). Contrary to the belief of bureaucracy's many critics, political stimulus does indeed bring about an administrative response in this country.

The book also examines the relative strength of the various political forces that help to engender such compliant behavior on the part of bureaucrats. Among the most important of these is the president's appointing power. Legend has it that presidential appointees are commonly captured by the bureaucratic personnel in the agencies they are asked to lead. They "go native," in the vernacular of the White House, and soon begin to parrot the views of their bureaucratic subordinates.

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The authors present a far different picture of the relationship between career officials and presidential appointees. Changes in an agency's political leadership quickly lead to corresponding alterations in the behavior of its bureaucrats. If capture occurs in this critical frontier between politics and administration in American government, it is an agency's bureaucrats who are taken prisoner rather than its executives. In the case of one regulatory agency the authors study, its staff began to adapt the organization's policies to fit the expected preferences of a new set of political chiefs even before these executives had arrived on the scene.

Many other forces compete with presidents for the right to maintain bureaucratic responsiveness in the American political system, and the book examines the strength of each of these forces. Included in this discussion are the varied weapons available to Congress for exercising oversight over bureaucracy, the ability of the courts to nullify or restrict agency decisions, the constant vigilance of the media, and the presence in every agency's environment of interest groups highly attentive to its every decision and action. In addition, the authors note that responsiveness is sometimes secured by changes in the tone of relations between an agency and its environment. This they choose to call "tonal stimuli," which apparently signifies something resembling an agency's reputation.

Having made a convincing case that executive agencies are in fact responsive to a pervasive pattern of political control, the authors drop the other shoe. They proceed to demonstrate that bureaucrats can be quite effective in shaping both the political climate in which their agency operates and the direction of its policies. They do so by presenting a study of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, where professionals in the agency have long been insulated by law from political pressures, and by describing the successful resistance of career personnel in EPA to White House efforts to trim the organization's powers during the Reagan administration.

Fine a book as this is, it may thus leave some readers with an Orwellian image of bureaucratic power in the United States: while all bureaucracies are under equal political control, some bureaucracies are more equally controllable than others.

FRANCIS E. ROURKE
The Johns Hopkins University

Democracy in the Fifty States *by Kim Quaile Hill. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1995. 170 pp. $32.50.*

Cynicism about government and politics appears to be a feature of modern America. Trust in our political leaders and the system that chooses them seems to be diminishing. This is the context in which Kim Quaile Hill argues the importance of democracy and our responsibility as citizens and political leaders to strengthen it. We must have faith in democracy and its promises: "We must give a damn about our government" (p. 132).

But this slim volume, while ending in a call for renewal, is more than a plea to take democracy seriously. Hill's objective is to compare the fifty states with regard to specific measures of democracy developed from the political science literature and to track changes in those measures in the states from the late 1940s to the early 1980s. To accomplish this, he defines democracy as an ideal set of procedures—popular sovereignty, popular equality, popular consultation, and majority rule. He uses three basic

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criteria for state by state comparisons—the availability of the right to vote, degree of two-party competition, and the extent of citizen participation in elections. Using available statistical data and the work of other scholars, Hill produces a rank ordering of states based on these criteria in the 1940s and in the 1980s.

Hill concludes, contrary to the views of many political commentators, that state laboratories for democracy remain far from the democratic ideal. In fact, no state even approaches it, and some states, based on his criteria, are quite undemocratic. The comparison made at the two different points in time seems to show that while some states, particularly in the South, have become less undemocratic, a number of states rated higher in his scales in the 1940s have undergone a democratic degeneration. In effect, while this period of over thirty years has seen a reduction throughout the states, again particularly in the South, in obstacles to voting, participation has declined, and average party competitiveness (using Austin Ranney's formula of measuring party competition) of states actually declined between the 1940s and the 1980s.

But other questions also concern Hill. After a brief review of research relating degree of democratization to public policy (issues of the level of public welfare, attention to civil rights guarantees, and the relationship to bigger government), Hill applies available data and measures to test the consensual hypothesis that the level of democratization is positively related to growth in public welfare, expansion of civil rights, and a larger role for government. His results provide support for a positive direct linkage between democratization and the first two (but not the third), a finding that supports his concluding argument that the level of democratic elements in a political system has real policy consequences for a society.

Hill's effort at theory-building relies on empirical data as well as relevant literature (there is a substantial bibliography), which he integrates into his discussion in a concise fashion. His language is clear and so devoid of jargon that a layman in political science can easily understand his conclusions and the path he follows to reach them. His use of statistical methodology is explained in a remarkably intelligible manner for those who are statistically disadvantaged.

Hill's argument is intended to counteract the popular view that the method of making political decisions matters very little. It is also a modest call to arms to strengthen those behaviors that enhance the ability of a political system to increase the involvement of citizens with their government. It is persuasive.

HOWARD E. DAVIS
Randolph-Macon College

The Welfare of Children *by Duncan Lindsey. New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. 404 pp. $29.95.*

Had this stimulating book been published two years earlier, it might have had a real impact on the recent welfare reform debates. Now, unfortunately, it is more likely to make readers somewhat nostalgic about the days when progressive proposals for change could have a fair hearing.

The author's main thesis is that the traditional residual perspective on delivery of child welfare services, which assumes that services should be provided only when parents

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are unwilling or unable to fulfill their normal role obligations, has become totally dysfunctional. It should be replaced, Lindsey argues, by a system of economic security that administers to the needs of all impoverished children. He develops this theme by dividing the book into two major parts. The first provides a historical review of the development of the child welfare system, focused primarily on its recent transformation into a child protective system and the relationship between poverty and service utilization. The second part of the book examines the current economic conditions of children and lays out proposals for long-term solutions designed to break the cycle of poverty.

It is almost impossible to disagree with Lindsey's insightful critique of the child welfare system. As long-term editor of the premier journal in the field, *Children and Youth Services Review*, he is well acquainted with current research and issues in this arena and discusses them in a compelling manner. His creative proposals for structural reform through adoption of a Guaranteed Child Tax Exemption and Children's Future Security Account are equally persuasive. He should be applauded as the first scholar to frame current deficiencies in the child welfare system squarely in the context of the recent epidemic of child poverty.

Unfortunately, the book suffers from several flaws that detract from the author's important message. First, in his effort to emphasize the historical importance of child welfare research, Lindsey tends to overemphasize the impact of questionable research on casework effectiveness and to ignore the many political forces that have also shaped developments in this field of practice. Second, he inexplicably fails to include any discussion of sample size or source in his statistical analyses designed to demonstrate the questionable validity of foster care placement decisions.

Finally, there are a number of minor but distracting factual errors. To illustrate, the Children's Bureau was established in 1912, not 1910; and since Mary Richmond's 1917 publication, *Social Diagnosis*, makes no reference to Freud, this book could not have symbolized the "transition from Darwin to Freud" (p. 27).

Given the current political context, perhaps the most troubling question posed by this book is whether readers concerned about the welfare of children should heed the author's call to shift responsibility for serious cases of child abuse to the criminal justice system and concentrate on developing an economic security net for poor children. As Lindsey argues, increased reporting of child maltreatment has not led to any decline in child fatalities. And the more energy child welfare workers devote to child abuse investigations, the less time they have available to help families in crisis. However, there is no evidence available to suggest that resources saved from dismantling the child protective system would be used to create stronger family supports. In fact, recent federal assaults on child survival programs suggest that many in Congress would be only too happy to eliminate the right of children to be protected from abuse. Therefore, a wiser course at the moment might be to concentrate on maintaining available protections for children. Despite this caution, readers must hope that Lindsey's compelling proposals, like the early plans for Social Security, will be kept on reserve. They deserve widespread debate when we have national leadership ready to consider alternative means of insuring the welfare of children.

BRENDA G. MCGOWEN
Columbia University

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The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching toward Washington *by David B. Walker. Chatham, NJ, Chatham House, 1995. 384 pp. Paper, $29.95.*

For most scholarly authors, topicality is a two-edged sword. It attracts attention, but at the same time it creates expectations often difficult to meet. (It also attracts reviewers who are not published experts.) This call for a reform of American federalism, for example, was clearly in press before the 1994 campaigns and elections; there are no references to Newt Gingrich or the "Contract for America." Its problems, however, extend beyond being overtaken by events.

From the outset Walker is critical of the increasing centralization and general disorderliness in American federalism, and he concludes with a deeply felt plea for reforms that reflect greater confidence in the states and localities. But in the end, the reader is strangely unprepared for both the judgments and the passion. In part that is because a major part of the book (132 pages) has been devoted to a detached and detailed history of American federalism, which bears only indirectly on current issues. But it is also because, even in the chapters on contemporary complaints, the author's case for reform rarely is focused on specific outcomes, specific consequences, specific problems. Pages pass without an illuminating detail, a crucial event or actor. The reader's impression is primarily one of generalized disorder and complexity in federal relationships, especially in grant programs.

The author has chosen to emphasize the movement of money within the American federal system ("fiscal federalism") and judicial interpretations of power and authority within it. Perhaps a single book can do no more on so protean a subject, and what Walker does he does very well. But I missed a treatment of the politics and public policy of federalism—the political and policy reasons for the disorderly centralization in it, the political support for various configurations of it, the sheer potency of its symbols, especially those of states' rights and government close to the people. Above all, ought one not to evaluate the conjunction of federalism with the urge to reduce the public sector? Federalism has for so long masked the intentions of those opposed to public authority in the American experience that federalism, not patriotism, may well be the last refuge of some scoundrels.

Finally, if I am to support a new federal balance, I especially want to consider questions of capacity for public action. Unhappily, there is little here about political will, fiscal ability, and regulatory independence in the states. To be sure, Walker asserts that the states have collectively pulled up their socks in recent decades—reformed constitutions, better staffing of legislatures, administrative reorganization, and so on. But such reforms do not address the politics of public policy or support for the public sector. Nor do they address the policy issues that spring from varying will and ability to act in the states. One need only mention the diversity of welfare benefits among the states and the issues that follow: poverty and justice, interstate migration, and the nation's interest in the care of children, for instance. In other words, there is a case for centralization and national policy, and it needs to be examined. No one wants to defend disorder or anomaly, but greater decentralization is not the only way to deal with them.

In brief, Walker offers an authoritative and convincing survey of fiscal federalism. Ditto the discussions of the Supreme Court's defining role, which will illuminate the Court's recent reexaminations of national authority. But as a call for reforming Amer-

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ican federalism, it is less convincing, both as a description of the problem and as a proposed solution for it.

FRANK J. SORAUF
University of Minnesota

Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences *by Richard Betts. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1995. 280 pp. Cloth, $36.95; paper, $16.95.*

Military readiness is an increasingly controversial and confusing issue. Although questions about readiness seem to rely on technical reasoning, they do not inspire technical agreement. Richard Betts has written a book that helps us understand why. He points out that questions about readiness always rely on political judgments, so technical disputes often reflect political disagreements. Betts's analysis sorts through the different levels of reasoning about preparedness and demonstrates their often contradictory tendencies, all the while making it impossible to ignore the political nature of choices about military readiness.

Military preparedness often inspires contention because of the traditional trade-off between guns and butter, money spent preparing for war is money that cannot be spent (or saved) in the civilian economy. This trade-off is complicated by the security dilemma, or the danger that preparing for war may provoke an attack. Betts, however, points to an additional trade-off between structural preparedness, or mass (investment in hardware to be ready for war in the midterm) and operational preparedness, or efficiency (short-term spending to keep troops and weapons ready for war tomorrow). Optimal readiness, he demonstrates, depends on when policy makers think they need troops to be ready. Furthermore, creating readiness for the short run often damages long-term readiness and vice-versa. Betts argues that the best readiness policy requires political estimates of when capabilities will be needed to combat what threat and what type of capabilities.

The first part of the book is focused on different conceptualizations of readiness. A linear conception, for example, works best when the environment moves from peace to crisis to war. Other times, when there are repeated crises, readiness fluctuates or ebbs and flows like a wave. The wave analogy demonstrates how hard it is to stay ready over a long period of time. In this environment the trade-offs between operational and structural readiness are most acute.

Betts examines the history of readiness in the United States, mostly focusing on the cold war, but with occasional references to the period before World War II. He points to a plethora of issues, ranging from shifting and inconsistent standards of readiness to readiness criteria that are often irrelevant for evaluating the task at hand, which complicate the evaluation of preparedness. But he also shows how many of the problems and controversies have had to do with policy makers arguing past one another, because they are referring to different levels of readiness. In the Reagan years, for example, the president called for greater readiness (meaning structural readiness) and then was accused by Congress of letting readiness (meaning operational readiness) fall by the wayside.

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Finally, the third part of the book examines the lessons of U.S. performance in the Gulf War and the challenges of readiness in the uncertain post-cold war era. He brings up some interesting proposals, particularly with regard to reserve forces and U.S. performance in the Gulf. His analysis of the future, however, does not quite do justice to the complexity of his analysis of the past. For example, he argues that peace-keeping missions promise to undermine readiness for the next big war. But to the degree that peace keeping plays a role in undergirding the international institutions that reduce the potential for rising threats and ameliorate security dilemmas, participation in peace keeping may diminish the prospects for war at the same time. Nonetheless, by illuminating the relevant questions to ask about readiness, Betts has made a valuable contribution that will direct attention toward the most important issue for post-cold war U.S. security: before we can evaluate the state of American military preparedness, we must place a bet on what threatens U.S. interests and when.

DEBORAH D. AVANT
George Washington University

Reinventing the Pentagon: How the New Public Management Can Bring Institutional Renewal *by Fred Thompson and L. R. Jones. San Francisco, CA, Jossey-Bass, 1994. 298 pp. $29.95.*

The reinvention of large public and private organizations has become popular in recent years. The Defense Department (DoD) seems to offer an ideal candidate for reinvention given its enormity and the changes in its mission wrought by the end of the cold war. Fred Thompson and L. R. Jones apply the "new public management" to develop administrative reforms that would increase the Defense Department's effectiveness and efficiency through such mechanisms as decentralization of authority, changing control mechanisms, altering the budget process, and many others.

The first part of the book examines the development of the Defense Department since 1947 in an effort to show the roots of the current administrative problems. The authors assert that the Department "has failed to clarify administrative boundaries and roles and mission responsibilities and to delegate authority accordingly" (p. 24). Consequently, the Defense Department and the Office of the Secretary of Defense grew into a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy during the cold war. Thompson and Jones claim that American military superiority after World War II "was crucial to management's failure to make farsighted choices about defense organization or to understand the need for those choices" (p. 26). This inefficiency is contrasted with the Strategic Air Command (SAC) under General Curtis LeMay, who was accorded great autonomy in organizing and equipping the command. Unfortunately, the authors base their analysis of this early period almost exclusively on decades-old scholarship while ignoring recent works, both academic and governmental, which have had access to declassified records. These more recent studies would have helped provide a more balanced picture of the DoD and SAC during these years.

Thompson and Jones show how the Defense Department structure gave rise to repeated reorganization attempts over the past four decades. These reorganization efforts failed, the authors conclude, because political leaders "did not go far enough" and

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"were not ambitious enough" (pp. 65, 90). While the book provides an excellent review of defense reorganization, absent is any discussion of the forces that make reorganization difficult and thus frequently unappealing for political leaders. Additionally, the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986—by far the most successful defense reorganization—is addressed in only a cursory manner, which ignores why the legislation was enacted and how it has been implemented.

The second part of the book develops a series of administrative reforms to improve the Defense Department's relations with industry, streamline procurement, restructure the control systems within the department, and reduce the costs from the infrastructure of bases. Thompson and Jones advocate a reduction of the Pentagon's acquisition bureaucracy coupled with higher quality personnel who would possess more authority and autonomy. The larger defense bureaucracy also needs to be trimmed, the authors argue, because it denies these bureaucrats "the discretion they need to do their job" (pp. 136, 139). The last chapter calls for more sweeping changes in the Defense Department, such as an increased role for the combatant commanders, greater delegation of authority, creation of a matrix organizational structure, better reporting and accounting systems, as well as reform of the congressional budget process.

Thompson and Jones provide a very useful and effective overview of the debates over defense within the public management field. Unfortunately, there is little discussion of the political dynamics that influence the reorganization process. Finally, the major sections of the book are not integrated effectively, which hampers development of the arguments.

PETER J. ROMAN
Duquesne University

Regional Integration: The West European Experience *by William Wallace. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1994. 142 pp. Cloth $28.95; paper $10.95.*

William Wallace's book is a contribution to the highly useful Brookings Institution series on Integrating National Economies: Promise and Pitfalls. This series examines how different countries or issue-areas have been affected by the growing economic interdependence of national economies. The impact of the "deep integration" of national economies is the central focus. Wallace's contribution focuses specifically on West European integration. He examines the historical roots of the European Union (EU), looking at factors both internal and external to the region that drove the integration process. Suzanne Berger adds an interesting set of comments at the end.

Wallace makes a series of important claims. He argues first that European integration was driven above all by *political* factors. Containment of Germany and a lasting peace in Western Europe motivated the Europeans and the Americans to support integration. Out of these political goals arose a set of institutions, beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In addition to political concerns, the close geographic and cultural community of Western Europe and the strong sense of elite cohesion after World War II were crucial in promoting integration. Now, however, Wallace sees economic pressures driving integration and worries about the end of a Western European community with the end of the cold war. Quite pointedly, he asks what constitutes the "European

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region" today? German reunification, American decline, and the demise of the Soviet Union portend ominously for European integration. Can the EU still perform its political functions in this new environment?

Because of this historical context, Wallace doubts that any lessons can be drawn from Europe for other areas of the world. Europe has forty years of institutionalized structures now upon which to build, it has a unique geographic and cultural closeness, and it has a political mission accepted by all of the countries. Are these conditions present elsewhere? Berger, for one, challenges this point, suggesting that the initial conditions for European integration may be approximated elsewhere. Moreover, if Wallace is correct in asserting that economic pressures and technological change are pushing integration today, then these conditions certainly apply to other countries.

Wallace, among others, also suggests that the drive for integration conflicts with the role of the nation-state. Economic and technological change press states to relinquish their independent policy making for more cooperative modes of behavior in order to satisfy domestic pressures for economic growth. On the other hand, the loss of national governmental autonomy and capacity is resisted and puts limits on the drive to integration. The contradiction between national autonomy and political and economic integration creates great underlying tensions within the EU, despite its highly institutionalized structure. Wallace suggests that these contradictory pressures are creating a "postmodern state" (p. 29) in Western Europe. Berger and others once again dispute this, claiming that nation-states remain as robust and central to all politics – international and domestic – as ever.

Wallace raises a number of critical issues in his survey of Western European integration. His historical resume of the development of the EU is also well done. Wallace's book will be a very useful guide for those wanting a succinct historical discussion of the key issues faced by West Europeans in their efforts to devise a peaceful region over the past forty years.

HELEN MILNER
Columbia University

Beyond the Liberal Consensus: A Political History of the United States Since 1965 *by Ivan W. Morgan. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994. 276 pp. Cloth $39.95; paper, $18.95.*

The author calls this book "a work of synthesis" and lists in a bibliography some 130 books and a dozen articles as the principal secondary sources on which he has drawn. As a synthesis, it succeeds. It relates twenty-seven years of history through 1992 clearly, if undramatically, and the interpretations may reflect faithfully those of the leading American historians, political scientists, economists, journalists, and memoirists whose works he has consulted. And the book benefits from the detachment that a British historian brings to his treatment of American history.

The opening chapter discusses the two decades prior to 1965 as a period of extraordinary consensus in U.S. society and politics, built upon a strong economy and confidence that prosperity would continue and grow; a national commitment to vigorous internationalism to stem the advance of communism; and acceptance by Republicans as well

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as Democrats of the basic measures of the New Deal and of the objective of guaranteeing civil rights for blacks. To those who recall some divisive issues of those times—Taft-Hartley, the Korean War, McCarthyism, the policy conflicts between President Dwight Eisenhower and the Democratic Congress—the portrayal of political and social harmony may seem a bit overdrawn. But certainly in comparison with what came later, the period was one of relative calm.

The remaining chapters treat the conflict-ridden years from Lyndon Johnson to George Bush after, almost all at once, Vietnam disrupted the agreement on foreign policy, stagflation destroyed satisfaction with the economy and public confidence in the ability of government to manage economic affairs, and backlash against the civil rights revolution and Johnson's Great Society tore apart the consensus on domestic policy.

Despite its many merits, the book may not quite meet the needs of any group of readers. It does not serve as an introductory text on recent American history, because it presupposes, in referring often to events that are not directly recounted, that the reader is already well informed. But the knowledgeable reader will find the book overladen with detail, mostly familiar, and necessarily treated too skimpily to add much to understanding. The student who wants to dig deeper may find the volume useful as a starting point, with events placed skillfully in historical context, but the digging must be done elsewhere.

The critical and most annoying flaw in the book is the complete absence of notes. A reader intrigued by any of the many morsels of public opinion poll data is not told where the wording of the questions can be found. Provocative quotations cannot be traced; often the sources remain anonymous. And the same with interpretive comment. When the author writes, for example, that "scholarly opinion is generally agreed" that Johnson's War on Poverty should have provided public employment and guaranteed income rather than services to improve the employability of the poor (pp. 45–46), one would like to know who those scholars were (especially since the agreement on welfare reform in the 1990s seems to be just the opposite, aimed at ending cash handouts). Similarly, from what source does the author learn that "The Great Society . . . conceived poverty principally as a matter of race rather than class" (p. 47)? How did he find out how Jimmy Carter "regarded himself" (p. 159)? When he accuses Paul Volcker's Federal Reserve Board of deliberately manipulating the money supply in 1980 "to assist . . . Carter's reelection" (p. 199), what is the documentation?

And so on, throughout. A bibliography, even when slightly annotated, is no substitute in a scholarly work for direct citation.

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST
Brookings Institution

Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing" *by Norman Cigar. College Station, TX, A&M University Press, 1995. 247 pp. $29.95.*

The unceasing human tragedy in Bosnia has captured the world's headlines for over three years. At the same time, there has been a serious void in the Western scholarly literature concerning the Balkans. As an American of mixed Bosnian background, I

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eagerly anticipated greater attention in the literature to this part of the world. Norman Cigar's book attempts, albeit unsuccessfully, to address the lacuna.

There are serious flaws with Cigar's research design and argumentation. At the outset, one important question the scholarly literature has yet to address is the relationship between genocide (the systematic annihilation of a group) and ethnic cleansing (one group's expulsion of another from territory as a means of acquiring or consolidating political control). The author uses the two terms interchangeably without exploring the distinctions and points of tangency between these two phenomenon. Whether the posited identity between the two is valid or not would be a proper subject for inquiry in itself. Predicating an entire book upon an unexamined premise, as Cigar does, augurs badly.

Indeed, unquestioned assumptions and slapdash research are the twin threads that run throughout the work and tie it together. One example is the author's use of the following casualty figures for Bosnian victims: 140,000 to 200,000 dead and 2 million forced to flee. This ignores the work of analysts such as George Kenney, the U.S. State Department official who resigned in protest over American inaction on the Bosnian question (and whom Cigar otherwise relies upon). Kennedy argues that the most reliable estimates come from the Red Cross (20,000 to 30,000 dead). Such casual use of facts is even more egregious when one considers a further fact: Cigar's figures add up to 2.14 to 2.2 million Muslim victims, which is curious given that the 1991 census of Bosnia-Herzegovina only counted 1.9 million in total. Not only does Cigar base his argument upon the fate of several hundred thousand apparently as yet unborn Bosnian Muslims, but he leaves unanswered a further question: whom, then, are the Bosnian Serbs besieging in Sarajevo?

Further oversights bedevil the author's research. Cigar writes that "nothing the Muslims could have done—save perhaps arming themselves—would have made a difference to their fate" (p. 44). The author appears to be unfamiliar with Adil Zulfikarpasić, the representative of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović, at the autumn 1991 negotiations with Serbian President Slobodan Milošević. Zulfikarpasić has testified that Milošević had granted all the concessions that the Bosnian leadership had asked for, laying the groundwork for a peaceful transition; however, the agreement was abrogated by Izetbegović. Later, largely due to Western encouragement Izetbegović pulled out of the Carrington-Cutillero plan of 18 March 1992, before war had broken out. This point raises serious questions about the West's role in engendering the Bosnian tragedy by, in effect, seducing and abandoning the Izetbegović regime. Nevertheless, there is no mention of it in the book.

No less important, Cigar frequently is, quite simply, wrong. For example, he states that while Western politicians hesitated over the Bosnian conundrum, "[p]ressure from the public actually goaded policy makers to do more" (p. 142). To the contrary, while there certainly has been an active pro-intervention lobby, poll after poll has consistently demonstrated that the public at large was and remains unwilling to pay a price in blood and treasure to force an end to the Bosnian crisis. This domestic political factor undoubtedly served as a constraint upon politicians harboring hopes of reelection.

There needs to be serious academic work on a vital question: when does ethnic strife translate into peaceful political competition, and when does it lead to war? Cigar focuses on a unitary and indeed deterministic factor: Milošević. The only alternative explanation Cigar considers is the "tribal animosities" argument, which he justly rejects. But what about the other factors at play, such as Yugoslavia's military structure, its profound economic disaster during the 1980s, the lingering legacy of colonial domination with

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its divide and rule tactics, and most saliently of all, post-war Yugoslavia's failure to democratize? A comparative analysis with other countries subject to similar variables, such as Rwanda, South Africa, India, and Northern Ireland would have yielded far more fruitful results. Instead, Cigar subscribes to a variant of the great man theory of history (be he good or evil), and this focus takes the place of scholarly analysis. Those in the academic community who are interested in learning more about the Bosnian war would do better to look at Misha Glenny's *The Fall of Yugoslavia*. A scholarly investigation of ethnic cleansing has yet to be written.

SANYA POPOVIĆ
Barnard College

Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution *by M. Steven Fish. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 300 pp. $39.50.*

Why did the opposition groups that brought down the Communist party in Russia fail to create a civil society? For this societal outcome Steven Fish offers a statist explanation—the institutional legacy and policies of the Soviet regime.

Fish carefully assesses the utility of the concept "civil society" as a description of the last years of the Soviet Union, finds it wanting, and formulates an alternative. For Fish, civil society consists of nonstate institutions that pressure and control the state. He measures the strength of civil society in the late Soviet period by the capacity of opposition groups to aggregate, represent, and articulate interests and by their autonomy; on all four dimensions Russia's new political organizations scored very low. As an alternative description, Fish offers the concept "movement society": Russia's new political organizations were less like parties, trade unions, and interest associations that engage in lobbying and negotiation with the state and more like political campaigns offering abstract programs of transformation and advancing sweeping, nonnegotiable demands.

This is a carefully crafted study that offers a close examination of an important, if brief, moment in history (1989 to August 1991) and of a few pioneering organizations that played significant roles in this period, although most were quickly marginalized by subsequent events. In examining the dynamics of six organizations, Fish explores the process of identity formation; their largely failed strategies to locate distinctive constituencies; their reliance on crippling, hyperdemocratic internal procedures; and their frustration, radicalism, and expressive mobilization in confronting the regime. These failures to develop democratic parties appropriate to civil society and the failure of these organizations to cooperate with one another Fish attributes to the legacies and policies of the Soviet regime.

This careful study of developments at the national level is matched by an equally fine study of four provincial capitals. To explain the development of political organizations in each capital, Fish stresses the continuing influence of the "breakthrough event" (first success of the opposition) and the response of local authorities to the challenge of the opposition. He convincingly argues that local political opportunity structures shaped the strategies of opposition political entrepreneurs, the resources available for popular mobilization, the internal structure of individual opposition organizations, and their relations with one another.

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Fish's analysis of civil society emphasizes the causal effect of the state; he stresses the ways in which the state structures society and its patterns of collective action. His explanations of developments in the late Soviet period emphasize the timing of reforms and elections inaugurated by the government of Mikhail Gorbachev; the structural inflexibility, intolerance, and rapid decay of the Soviet state; and the absence of a market economy. Although Fish claims that his cases show how the initiative for change had shifted from state to society, throughout his study officials within the state remain the prime movers.

Despite its title, this book does not describe the creation of a democracy. Fish actually never analyzes the larger systemic attributes that constitute democracy, in either its formal or substantive definition. Fish does describe a constraint that influences the probability a state will become or remain democratic. According to Fish, this does not support unbridled optimism about the probability of Russian democracy: by 1991 Russia had not yet developed a "civil society." Fish's speculations about prospects for the post-1991 period are very cautious, if not gloomy.

This is a smart book that speaks to the concerns not only of area specialists but to students of democratic transitions around the world. It shows how authoritarian legacies may shape the breakdown of authoritarianism and constrain attempts to craft democracy.

PHILIP G. ROEDER
University of California, San Diego

Making Health Reform Work: The View from the States *edited by John J. DiIulio, Jr. and Richard P. Nathan. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution 1994. 179 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $11.95.*

In what was certainly a bit of unintentional foreshadowing, Frank Thompson writes in his chapter on quality that "The dance of legislation in Washington may ultimately produce . . . no legislation at all" (p. 86). As much as anything, this book illustrates how much the health care reform debate has changed over the last year. A short year ago, serious consideration was being given to plans like the president's Health Security Act that involve considerable expansion of federal government spending and activity. In sharp contrast, the current debate centers more on how over the next seven years the federal government's role in financing health care can be drastically reduced.

One might think that a book that uses the Health Security Act as a benchmark and springboard for discussions runs the risk of being quickly outdated. However, many of the discussions in this book were written in a way that keeps them timely and relevant. For example, the focus on the role of states is particularly appropriate given that the health reform "action" seems to be occurring at the state rather than federal level. Evidence of this is seen in the exploding interest in using Medicaid Section 1115 waivers to expand coverage to the uninsured.

The pendulum of health care reform could potentially swing back toward more comprehensive strategies if, as predicted, a serious consequence of the proposed budget cuts is a considerably larger number of people becoming uninsured. Reductions in provider payments, utilization, and covered services together may prove insufficient to

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reach the specified legislative budget cut targets—$270 billion from Medicare and $182 billion from Medicaid. Cutbacks in eligibility will also be necessary. Furthermore, the size of the proposed reductions—about 20 percent over seven years, based on current projections—could result in an escalation of private insurance premiums due to provider cost-shifting. When private insurance premiums start another upward climb, serious health reform will be back on the table.

There are a couple of recurring themes in *Making Health Reform Work* that are worthy of specific mention: the inadequacy of our existing data and measurement abilities and the unevenness in the capabilities of states to guide or produce meaningful reform. The need for considerable investment in developing and collecting a wide-range of data is discussed in several different contexts. For example, in his chapter on cost containment and rate setting, James Fosset indicates that at the most basic level, national expenditures can be estimated with a fair degree of accuracy, although "the ability to measure [health] expenditures in individual states currently ranges from limited to non-existent" (p. 77).

When moving beyond the simple measurement of expenditures to more sophisticated information needs, Dilulio, Nathan, and Donald Kettl suggest in their discussion of administrative principles, that "not a single state now has a data-based management system approaching what would be necessary to conduct [meaningful evaluations of competing health plans and providers]" (p. 36).

Most of this book provides useful discussions of issues that remain applicable regardless of the ambitiousness and direction of health care reform. In particular are the chapters on cost containment, quality, and work force issues. Other discussions, for example the chapter on health alliances, provide important historical markers of what might have been.

LAUREL HIXON ILLSTON
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Experts and Politicians: Reform Challenges to Machine Politics in New York, Cleveland and Chicago *by Kenneth Finegold. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 264 pp. $39.50.*

Much attention has been devoted to understanding the politics of reform during the Progressive era (1900–1919) because the protracted battles waged by reformers against the political machine redefined the political structures and social cleavages that have since shaped city governance in the United States. This volume explores a compelling question about reform politics: Why were reformers successful in some cities but not in others?

As the author rightfully points out, this question has not yet been convincingly answered. Much of the literature on reform is comprised of case studies of particular cities and reform organizations, providing little comparative analysis. Studies that look beyond particular cities often have not been sufficiently sensitive to variations in the politics of the reform movement. Finegold undertakes comparative study of New York City, Cleveland, and Chicago during the Progressive era when reform candidates chal-

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lenged the status quo, but with very different results. They succeeded modestly in New York City; they triumphed in Cleveland; but reform was an almost complete failure in Chicago.

In accounting for these different outcomes, the author creatively looks at the interplay of ideas, organizational development, and electoral politics. He identifies three major patterns of support for reform candidates. Traditional reformers mobilized native-stock voters and business elites. Municipal populists were reformers who drew their support mainly from foreign-stock immigrant groups, who were often excluded from the dominant Irish machines (such as Jews, Germans, and Italians) and workers. Finally, progressive reformers won the support of coalitions made up of traditional reform and municipal populist voters.

Finegold's thesis is that reform victories depended very much on building and maintaining progressive-type voter coalitions. A necessary condition for this was the ability of political entrepreneurs to incorporate into their campaigns and governments experts who avoided being merely business mouthpieces and who were policy advocates. Finegold believes that these "political experts" enabled reformers seeking elective office to sustain programs that stressed economy in government as well as improvements in social welfare. The former appealed to the traditional reform wing, while the latter attracted municipal populists, placing both under the banner of classless politics.

Accordingly, reform triumphed in Cleveland City, not only because of the fluidity of mass electoral politics there, but also because many expert policy advocates institutionalized themselves in the city's reform movement. That type of successful coalition-building at the mass and elite levels was achieved less in New York City and hardly at all in Chicago.

Some readers may be quick to question this rendering of the complex dynamics of reform politics on the basis of the study's limited quantitative data and rather thin survey of the reform-machine battles in the three cities. Nevertheless, all readers will find this a provocative work that casts doubt on some of the received wisdom about reform politics. Finegold's analysis reveals a reform politics that often defies traditional ethnic-class stereotypes, and he shows how reform victories were linked to the strategies of local political entrepreneurs. It is an interesting attempt to explore the linkages of politics at the mass and elite levels.

Least convincing is the author's argument that the incorporation of experts somehow had powerful effects on the outlook of reform leaders and on their appeal to the voters. Evidence to support this is sketchy, and the logic often seems strained, since political entrepreneurs are in the habit of using experts for their own purposes, rather than the other way around. Nevertheless, this is a rich work that will interest all students of urban politics and history.

PAUL KANTOR
Fordham University

The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries *by Forrest D. Colburn. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994. 135 pp. $19.95.*

Although I do not know Forrest Colburn well, I should note at the outset that I have met him at more than one professional meeting, where I have heard him present some

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of the ideas about revolutions that he has now pulled together into a book. I must report, with considerable disappointment, that this book is similar to many of the countries that the author writes about: full of potential, yet underdeveloped.

Part of the problem is brevity. The book claims to offer a comparative analysis of the origins, processes, and outcomes of no less than twenty-two revolutions that occurred between 1945 and 1990. And yet its text is all of 103 pages. (A chapter on revolutionary seizures of power is thirteen pages long, one on revolutionary state-building runs fourteen pages, etc.) This obviously does not allow for much historical detail or analytic complexity. Of course, a long, impressionistic essay would be welcome if it presented a new or compelling approach to revolutions. But I did not find the main argument of this book to be either new or compelling.

Colburn is unhappy with purely "structuralist" accounts of revolutions. But who is not? In fact, more or less sophisticated critiques of structuralism appear regularly in academic journals and monographs, many of them aimed at Theda Skocpol's influential *States and Social Revolutions* (1979). Colburn's own position is that "While the origins of contemporary revolutions are rooted in social, political, and economic conflict, the outcomes of these revolutions have been determined by the political imagination of revolutionary elites" (p. 5). This political imagination, it turns out, is Marxism-Leninsim—the real "vogue" of the book's title.

Colburn's argument is remarkably similar to the views recently and independently advanced by Jack Goldstone and Eric Selbin: revolutions may have a variety of structural or "material" causes, but their outcomes are determined by the ideological projects of self-conscious revolutionaries. Instead of structural determinism, in short, we have a sort of ideological reductionism, at least as far as revolutionary outcomes are concerned. In my view, this is not a persuasive theoretical position.

In fact, the best chapter in Colburn's book—and one of the most garrulous, at fifteen pages—emphasizes how the project of "building socialism" has been severely constrained in poor countries by a variety of cultural, social-psychological, economic, and transnational factors. All sorts of perverse and unintended consequences have resulted therefrom. This chapter would seem to demonstrate conclusively that the outcomes of contemporary revolutions have not been exclusively or even mainly determined by the ideas of revolutionaries.

Ideas certainly matter, but Colburn's emphasis on the specifically Marxist-Leninist ideas of revolutionaries is also problematic. First, some of the most important revolutions on his list simply were not led by Marxist-Leninists, including those in Bolivia, Egypt, Algeria, and Iran. (The Cuban revolutionary movement, moreover, only turned to Marxism-Leninism in midstream.) Second (and conversely), the influence of many ideas associated with Marxism-Leninism has by no means been limited to revolutionaries. Indeed, what Colburn describes as the "most important" commitments of revolutionaries—"authoritarian government and a state-led strategy of economic development" (p. 14)—were until quite recently very widely accepted among Third World political elites, whether they attained power through revolutions or otherwise and whether they explicitly adhered to Marxism-Leninism or not.

In sum, this book is better at articulating a now familiar critique of structuralism than at advancing a superior theoretical alternative. Whatever that alternative turns out to be, scholars of revolutions clearly need to move beyond one-sided structuralist and idealist perspectives toward an analysis of the ways in which carefully conceptualized structural forces (which may include cultural systems) and ideological projects (not all

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of them initiated from above) variously shape, constrain, enable, and preclude one another in particular historical contexts.

JEFF GOODWIN
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Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan *by Odoric Y. K. Wou. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1994. 477 pp. $49.50.*

This is an extremely important but at times frustrating book. Its great strength is prodigious research, most of it in previously inaccessible Communist party archives; these new documents tell us much that is new about Chinese Communist party (CCP) strategy, tactics, and dealings with various nonpeasant groups. Its principal weaknesses are first, a too great willingness to follow those documents in assuming that when peasants failed to respond to party initiatives, they were being "passive," "timid," or narrowly economistic, rather than pursuing alternate visions; and second, a consequent failure to examine ways in which the party may have been genuinely influenced by rural norms and institutions, rather than simply using them.

Wou makes an utterly convincing case that high politics were far more important to the revolution than some recent accounts suggest; in particular, a shifting series of temporary alliances allowed the CCP to organize without repression and often provided the financial wherewithal to sustain popular participation. His account of the crucial roles of "progressive" schoolteachers, the reform-minded "gentry" (a term he leaves unfortunately vague) of commercializing areas, and other such "petty elites" are likewise very illuminating and lead to an interesting hypothesis about the special importance of the "immediate urban hinterland" (p. 383) in rural revolution. His account of military matters—particularly the importance of Communist overtures to low and medium level enemy officers during the Civil War and the heretofore unknown tensions between the party and its own Red Army in the 1930s—are fascinating and fit well with his basic thesis that "it was not *only* [emphasis added] rural discontent and peasant rebelliousness . . . that made the revolution a success" (p. 326).

But Wou continues that rather than "overemphasizing the inner dynamics of the peasant class[, o]ne should focus *instead* [emphasis added] on the creative and adaptive roles of the CCP" (p. 326)—and here he gets into trouble. Not only is his spontaneity vs. organization binary too simple: there is much literature pointing to the importance of rural agendas that the CCP at least temporarily embraced. For instance, while Wou dismisses the work of "moral economists," he appears to do so on the basis of no work later than James Scott's 1976 *Moral Economy of the Peasant*. Meanwhile, his own conclusion that peasants often became far more militant once they were confident that the Guomindang would not return to power suggests the existence of the very sort of "hidden transcripts" that Scott's later work highlights. By the same token, chapters two through four show beyond a doubt that neither Red Spear sectarians nor other rural residents embraced the program the party had in mind for them. But other scholars (most notably Elizabeth Perry) had already shown this, and Wou's assertions about what particular peasants did want are too often based on what appears to be the testimony of a single Communist cadre or claims about peasants in general.

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Thus, while Wou does much to illuminate how the CCP created opportunities for mass mobilization and adds a great deal to existing works which focus on when, why and how peasants acted on (or passed up) these opportunities, he does not convince this reader that these issues of motivation has been overemphasized or that we can answer them better than we have by citing without qualification the comments of frustrated cadres. Wou's exemplary research takes us toward a new understanding of the revolution, but to go still further, we will need to read these new documents more skeptically.

KENNETH POMERANZ
University of California, Irvine

Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract *by Timothy D. Sisk. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 342 pp. $39.50.*

Timothy Sisk, program officer at the United States Institute of Peace, has provided the first book-length scholarly study of the South African negotiations that led up to the founding democratic election of 1994. Given how unlikely this outcome appeared to almost all analysts during previous decades, charting the path of the early 1990s has intrinsic interest to scholars of South Africa, negotiations, and conflict resolution. Sisk ably meets this need, providing an in-depth description and analysis.

Sisk begins by asking how it was that the major political actors in South Africa came to "converge on a political system that is mutually acceptable," given past conflict (p. 6). In setting forth in this manner, he admirably avoids the pitfalls of "examining the best outcomes, as opposed to looking at the ways these (actual) outcomes evolve through bargaining processes" (p. 18). Sisk thus abstains from the imposition of ideal models, preferring instead to focus on the nitty gritty of the negotiations and their outcome. This is a suitable approach to what was a highly pragmatic process. For instance, while scholars debated the merits of constitutency-based representation, the framers of South Africa's constitution abandoned such a design simply for lack of a voters' roll. Sisk captures this reality.

Before proceeding to discuss the actual negotiations, Sisk places them in the context of South African history. He demonstrates that opposing elites were in effect forced to the negotiating table for lack of alternatives, caught as they were in a stalemate. And then he pulls back from analysis of initial talks to outline usefully the constitutencies and positions of the major actors.

At least two significant points emerge from Sisk's analysis which provide important correctives to prior studies. He agrees that South African elites did engage in pact-making similar to that which produced the return to democracy in many Latin American countries and elsewhere. But he explains that such pact-making did not preclude, and was instead further propelled by, continued violence. He thereby punctures the theoretical image of a transition peacefully engineered from above and distinguishes South Africa's experience from those relatively imposed. Sisk also demonstrates how the negotiating process developed a life of its own, from which vying elites could not withdraw and which they could not fully control. Again, the image of an orchestrated process is corrected.

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This study does suffer from some flaws stemming from its conclusion before the final act of the 1994 election. Had Sisk come more current, he might have been a bit less sanguine in his characterization of an emerging social contract. Not only have ethnic divisions and economic disparities not been addressed or resolved, they may have been further entrenched by the negotiated "deal" and now pose real threats to future stability. Nor have the "rules of the game" been fully observed in practice, for the 1994 election was flawed by significant "irregularities" (p. 297). Sisk is too quick to accept the notion of negotiations having proceeded behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" (p. 257)—the major actors well understood their strengths and weaknesses, including pressures from below. The parties were prepared to deal under the table to increase their control and to achieve the desired balanced outcome. Sisk's concern with analyzing the reality rather than engaging in abstract theorizing would have been reinforced by greater attention to these issues.

Nevertheless, Timothy Sisk provides a highly informative study of an historic set of events, usefully drawing on the scholarly debates. Whether the author's expectation that his study will help other "deeply divided societies" (p. 21) to find similar resolution is questionable, for conflicts remain context specific. Sisk's own analysis suggests that general models of conflict resolution are unreliable and that South Africa had to find its own way. While others may not follow the same path, hopefully they will at east be inspired by the South African experience.

ANTHONY W. MARX
Columbia University

The Cost of Living: How Market Freedom Erodes The Best Things in Life *by Barry Schwartz. New York, W. W. Norton, 1994. 393 pp. $25.00.*

The theme of this book is captured in its subtitle. Because of our market system, it is likely that "in the course of [an] ordinary day, [everyone] is cheated or exploited about a half a dozen times" (p. 30). And this substantial "deception, abuse, and dishonesty . . . will only get worse" (p.41). The problem, it is alleged, is that the market corrupts otherwise honest people into cheating, either because the temptation is too great or because they must do so to survive. Moreover, "love, friendship, family, education, meaningful work, and political freedom—lose much of what makes them so good when the market gets too close to them" (p. 22).

These allegations are not new. Indeed, they are probably nearly as old as markets. Note *Ecclesiasticus* 27:2: "As a stake is driven firmly into a fissure between stones, so sin is wedged in between selling and buying." Indeed, it is only in the past few hundred years that widespread opposition to market expansion has begun to abate. A first disappointment with this book is that it reveals little familiarity with, and hence fails to clearly locate itself within, this long tradition of suspicion, wariness, and downright hostility toward markets.

A second disappointment is that the author—a professor of psychology at Swarthmore College—provides too little of what the latest research in psychology reveals about the impact markets have on humans. At times this is quite disconcerting. For instance, in a section entitled "What is Human Nature?" the answer is sought among the contrasting

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views of centuries-old thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, Adam Smith, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Jefferson, as opposed to the latest findings in psychology, sociology, or anthropology. Indeed, after it is noted that evolutionary biology is supportive of the view of humans as selfish and therefore well suited for a market society, the author suggests that we give attention to an alternative vision, such as set forth by Rousseau! That may be a good idea, but how does it hold up against the latest research in psychology?

In spite of these disappointments, Schwartz must be commended for braving a topic of extraordinary complexity and very great importance. Markets are expanding into practically every crevice of society, and in the wake of the fall of Eastern European socialism, markets can be expected to spread ever more robustly into every corner of the globe. Should societies, alone or in alliance, in any manner slow, limit, or control this phenomenon? Without knowledge of just what this market expansion does to humankind (beyond making it materially better off), we cannot answer the question.

And there are good parts to this book. Perhaps the best has to do with the psychology of consumption. A great deal of research suggesting the futility of pursuing happiness through consumption is adroitly surveyed. Also well done is the discussion of how the form of rationality generated by the market—that expressed most rigorously in neoclassical economics—is spreading into all domains of life, even the most intimate such as friendship and love.

The author believes that market expansion and market mentality have gone too far. They must be restrained. However, it is pointless to appeal to the state for this function, because it "has already given itself over to the market. It has become a part of the problem" (p. 318). What then? The author suggests that we turn to our religious institutions. I suspect that it will be difficult for many readers to imagine this as a likely or effective response to the extraordinary power and momentum of market expansion.

JON D. WISMAN
The American University

Conflict of Loyalty *by Geoffrey Howe. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994. 736 pp. $35.00.*

The author of this substantial British political autobiography may be remembered especially for his parliamentary speech that contributed mightily to the departure of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in November 1990. A key phrase from the speech constitutes the book's title, and a full text is in an appendix. Howe portrays the speech, following his resignation from Thatcher's government, as the dramatic end of a long and vexed relationship. As he recounts his experience in her cabinets, he often explicitly counters views that Thatcher recorded in her memoirs.

Nevertheless, the book is much more than a review of Howe's disagreements (and agreements) with Thatcher. It is a fairly detailed report of a significant Conservative ministerial career, and it includes observations of policy making and policy makers in several fields. Only brief early chapters describe his professional middle-class family background in Wales, education at Winchester and Cambridge, work as a barrister, and a few other nonpolitical matters. Nor is much space given to Howe's first two years

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in the House of Commons—elected in 1964 and defeated in 1966. The real governmental career begins in 1970 when Howe, age 43, returned to the House as one of a new Conservative majority led by Edward Heath. Howe then became Health's solicitor general and later, in 1972, minister for Trade and Consumer Affairs (with cabinet status). Continuously thereafter, until 1990, Howe was a leading Conservative politician, notably as Thatcher's shadow chancellor of the exchequer from 1975 to 1979, while his party was out of power, and successively as her chancellor (1979–1983), foreign secretary (1983–1989), and deputy prime minister (1989–1990). Over two-thirds of the book are devoted to the decade of service as chancellor and foreign secretary. Understandably, Howe takes pride in that service, but modestly. He admits mistakes and gives credit to colleagues and occasionally to the prime minister, too. Howe describes his tough, unpopular budgets of the early 1980s as the product of his long-standing commitment to a market economy while acknowledging Thatcher's steadfast support. He plainly enjoyed being foreign secretary and resented Thatcher's decision to dismiss him from that position. Becoming deputy prime minister, while officially lord president of the council and leader of the House of Commons, turned out to be a less satisfying experience.

Differences over the substance of policy can, as Howe argues, account at least in part for the ruptured relationship with Thatcher. Clearly, Howe wanted to move more fully than did Thatcher into the European Community and particularly into the monetary arrangements designed to lead eventually to a common currency. Even on domestic matters, where Howe and Thatcher shared an aversion to a socialist order, Howe appears to have been more tempered and conciliatory in pursuing their objectives. Howe believed that Thatcher was sometimes unnecessarily confrontational in dealing with trade unions; though he accepted the same goals, he would have tried to achieve them through face-saving agreements. Here the difference seems more stylistic than substantive. It can be understood in light of Howe's remarks, from time to time, about Thatcher's dogmatism, impetuosity, lack of organizational instinct, and discourtesy during discussions with him and others. Howe sees himself and certain other senior colleagues as seeking to restrain the prime minister—for example, when they thought that they had dissuaded her from adopting the ill-fated poll tax. Such restraint and even useful cabinet discussion diminished, in Howe's opinion, in the last years of Thatcher's long tenure. He attributes some of the difficulty to the death of a trusted intermediary, Ian Gow, who was Howe's close friend and Thatcher's trusted loyalist, and to the influence of economic and foreign policy advisers on the prime minister's own staff. The latter, political scientists will note, is a problem for cabinet government similar to one discerned in presidential systems: conflict between the top executive's personal staff and the political heads of government departments. Howe's revealing picture of the conflict contributes to the debate over the extent to which British cabinet government can become prime ministerial government.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
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The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change and Democratization *by Alison Brysk. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1994. 291 pp. $42.50.*

Over the last decade or so, a fairly extensive literature has developed about the human rights movement in Latin America. It consists chiefly of testimonials of victims (or

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victims' families) and essays that tend to have a markedly political or advocacy cast. More rigorous, analytical work has been dominated by lawyers and theologians. To the extent that political scientists have tackled the topic, they have done so for the most part in a superficial and sketchy way, with some references to, say, the "resurrection of civil society" or the "invisible transition" to democracy in Latin America.

In this regard, Alison Brysk's book on Argentina's human rights movement treads on uncharted terrain. It is an enormously refreshing contribution that blends careful, nuanced analysis with a deserved tribute. Although Brysk connects the disparate strands of the human rights literature, her study is squarely situated within the larger frame of social movements. She has picked the right case, since perhaps only in Argentina (and possibly Chile or Peru) can one find a coherent, reasonably well-defined human rights movement in Latin America.

The book argues persuasively that it was precisely the movement's success in engaging in "symbolic politics" and mobilizing public opinion against the unspeakable horrors of the military government in the late 1970s that ultimately limited its ability to exercise the sort of pragmatic politics that was called for in the period of democratic transition. Brysk concludes that, like other social movements, Argentina's human rights movement was "crippled and divided by the very characteristics that derive from its origins and the exhaustion of the very strategies that were uniquely effective under authoritarian rule" (p. 22). This is a valuable insight that is still being learned by a number of human rights movements in the region. Although some groups of the Argentine movement have been able to adapt to new circumstances and come up with a new agenda, the story has largely been one of frustration.

Brysk argues that under democratic governments the movement has been more successful in "rewriting history, providing an international model, and constructing democratic citizenship" (p. 21) than in institutionalizing greater mechanisms of accountability within state structures. Here she is on methodologically slippery ground. It is tough to assess with any precision the diffusion and endurance of new norms, anchored in principles of truth, justice, and accountability. Still, the media, pockets in the educational system, and general political discourse in Argentina reflect greater consciousness about human rights values than they once did. And it is certainly plausible that such changes can be attributed at least in part to the movement's relentless efforts.

Brysk devotes a great deal of attention to the international dimension of the Argentine experience—both the critical connections between the national human rights movement and the international regime, and the place of Argentina as a sort of model or pioneer in wrestling with complex human rights and political challenges. Other human rights figures have especially marveled at the 1985 trial of the country's former military rulers, which Brysk properly describes as "the high watermark of state reform in Argentina and the outstanding distinguishing feature of the Argentine case" (p. 74).

What Brysk might have explored further in the book, however, is precisely what enabled the civilian transition government to pursue such a policy against the former juntas. The reason—and Brysk mentions this but it deserves far more emphasis—is the military's humiliating defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands war of 1982 against Great Britain. In the Latin American—indeed, international—context, such a circumstance is exceptional. It was this "transition by collapse" that best explains why the trial could take place and why the human rights movement was able to play such a prominent and effective role in the first years of the civilian, constitutional government.

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Nearly twelve years after the transition, all of the organizations that made up Argentina's human rights movement continue to function. Recent revelations about military atrocities by a retired naval officer and an apology issued by the army's chief of staff have activated the movement. It shows that a country's trauma that contributed the term "disappearance" to the political lexicon is still being sorted out. It also underscores the continuing struggle of a human rights movement that Brysk has studied so judiciously in this welcome book and a movement determined to make sure the country will never again have to suffer such a terrible ordeal.

MICHAEL SHIFTER
Inter-American Dialogue

International Economic Policy in the 1990s *by William R. Cline. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1994. 260 pp. $35.00.*

William Cline's latest book contains eight lectures that explore several of the most salient international economic policy issues of recent years, fruitfully revisiting many topics on which he has already published extensively. The economic analysis is rigorous, but pitched at a level that readers familiar with basic economic concepts will find readily accessible. Indeed, if there is an overriding theme to the book, it is that basic tools of economic analysis can explain a wide variety of international economic processes and outcomes, and provide useful guidance to policy makers.

Among the topics this book covers are the prospects for sustained global economic growth; adjustment of external imbalances, especially in the United States; trade policy (including case studies of U.S.–Japan relations and NAFTA); the international debt problem; economic reform in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; the economic future of Western Europe; and the environment and global economic policy. One of the book's greatest strengths is that the author stakes out well defined policy positions on a variety of polemical issues, informed, he claims, by "judgmental evaluation of political feasibility" (p. ix).

One such issue concerns recent U.S. trade disputes with Japan. Surveying the literature on U.S.–Japanese trade, Cline concludes that the evidence does not conclusively support the popular view that Japan engages in widespread invisible protection and that this accounts for persistent Japanese trade surplus with the United States. Much of the U.S. deficit with Japan is due to lower U.S. savings rates and the impact of triangular trade. "It is thus a mistake for politicians to seek balanced bilateral trade as the proof of fair trade with Japan" (p. 94). The author shows that bilateral trade between the two countries responds to the normal macroeconomic influences of real exchange rates and relative growth; this means that if Japan has hidden protectionist barriers, they operate parametrically rather than absolutely. He offers sensible advice to U.S. policy makers. Instead of bargaining over outcomes, as U.S. negotiators have done recently in a dangerous descent toward managed trade, they should aim to identify and eliminate tangible, sector-specific barriers against U.S. products, as they did in the MOSS talks. In addition, the U.S. should strive to put its own macroeconomic policy in order by reducing the federal deficit and increasing domestic savings.

In the controversial area of the environment and global economic policy, Cline prescribes aggressive abatement of carbon emissions to stem global warming. This position

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contrasts with that of many economists working within the neoclassical paradigm, who recommend only mild abatement policies. The author believes that most economists' models use probability estimates of catastrophic damage that may be too low and a social rate of time preference that discounts future benefits too much. These errors, he claims, lead them to underestimate the benefits from energetic action. Whereas Cline's analysis identifies admirably the potential costs and benefits of different policy options given various risk propensities and long-term scenarios, his policy prescriptions would be very difficult to implement in the coordinated international fashion required, a fact he recognizes.

Despite obvious care to present opposing views fairly, Cline sometimes fails to do them justice. Scholars arguing for strategic trade policy, for example, can legitimately claim that their ideas have not been presented in the strongest light. For one, the author does not examine recent literature that contends that states can increase social welfare by targeting export sectors that generate large positive externalities.

This short review cannot do justice to the rich analysis and valuable insights found in this volume. This is an excellent book that should be read by scholars and policy makers interested in international economic issues. It is also a fine introduction to the issues currently facing the world economy for those without an extensive background in international economics.

ARVID LUKAUSKAS
Columbia University

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 13th Edition *by John Spanier and Steven W. Hook. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995. 356 pp. $29.95.*

Conventional Arms Control: Perspectives on Verification *by Sergey Koulik and Richard Kokoski. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 323 pp. $49.95.*

Dictionary of Alternative Defense *by Bjorn Moller. Boulder, CO, Lynne Reinner, 1995. 553 pp. $49.95.*

International Relations: Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Conflict and Cooperation *by William Nester. New York, Harper Collins, 1995. 473 pp. $37.50.*

Nuclear Wastelands: A Global Guide to Nuclear Weapons Production and Its Health and Environmental Effects *edited by Arjun Makhijani, Howard Hu, and Katherine Yih. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1995. 666 pp. $55.00.*

Political Leaders of Contemporary Western Europe: A Bibliographical Dictionary *edited by David Wilsford. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1995. 514 pp. $115.00.*

The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992–1995, with an introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Blue Book Series Volume V *by the United Nations. New York, United Nations Publications, 1995. 321 pp. $29.95.*

U.S. Presidents as Orators: A Bio-Critical Sourcebook *edited by Halford Ryan. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1995. 408 pp. $89.95.*

World Tables, 1995 *by The World Bank. Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 766 pp. $45.95.*

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



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

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

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

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

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